University of Cape Town

Department of Political Studies

ELECTED LEGISLATURES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA:

ATTITUDES OF CITIZENS FROM 18 COUNTRIES TOWARDS LEGISLATURES, WITH A PARTICULAR FOCUS ON MOZAMBIQUE, ITS ASSEMBLY AND PARLIAMENTARIANS

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By

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April 2009

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DEDICATION

To my countrywomen and -men who bequeathed democracy to my generation.

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To begin, I need to give credit to my two brothers, Rui and Fernando. They have been the best parents to me that I could have wished for. They did well in raising this difficult teenager with all her independent thoughts and lofty ambitions. They not only always encouraged me to pursue what I wanted in life, but they also made it possible by granting the necessary support. My brothers, nephews, nieces and sisters-in-law (and two grandnieces) – João, Didi, Bruno, Cláudia, Inês, Mariana, Beatriz, Cristina and Lena – have always been an anchor in my life. Thank you for keeping my place at the table even though I have been absent more often than present, missing many birthdays and holidays. I owe gratitude to my late mother for instilling in me the belief that education is a woman's priority. I am also grateful to consider as my family Jota Caramelo and Fernanda Santos – I am fortunate to have them as friends and mentors.

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ABSTRACT

Elected multiparty assemblies have existed in Africa on average for no more than two decades. Consolidating democracy and improving the lives of ordinary citizens demands guardian parliaments. Parliaments are comprised predominantly of politicians and, interconnected with citizens and executives, are perceived as core institutions of representative democracies. This dissertation seeks to contribute to a better understanding of African multiparty parliaments and their role in consolidating democracy.

The study seeks to comprehend the links between citizens and their elected parliaments in 18 African countries, in the process attempting to predict the prospects of these new democracies. It also focuses on the Assembly of Mozambique to attempt an understanding of the evolution, capacity and functioning of an emerging parliament. The study investigates the perceptions of Mozambican civil leaders toward their parliament, and it looks at the perceptions of Mozambican parliamentarians concerning their roles and their relations with the electorate, and concerning the Assembly's capacity and powers. This is critical to understanding how democracy has been and will be exercised, since parliamentarians are at the forefront of the process.

Each parliament has distinctive characteristics. However, there are common features based on their age and origin. The development of the Mozambican Assembly since the monoparty regime illustrates the challenges and achievements that African parliaments have undergone in the transition to democracy. The findings reveal that African citizens distinguish between presidents and parliaments, which is important given the legacy in Africa of strong executives led by dominant presidents. They also reveal that citizens value the gains made by the multiparty regimes and that parliaments as lawmakers are preferred to presidents.

In most countries surveyed, citizens, on average, gave positive evaluations of their parliaments, especially concerning their trustworthiness. Political characteristics outweigh socioeconomic status in influencing how citizens perceived parliaments. Party allegiance and perception of electoral fairness are the factors that most influenced how citizens perceived their parliaments.

Interviews with Mozambican MPs revealed their frustration over the influence of the Assembly over the national budget. In the MPs' opinions, direct foreign aid to the budget reduced parliament's role to that of a rubber stamp, weakening the role of MPs. Mozambican civic leaders saw parliament as an indispensable and critical institution, and they expressed frustration with the extreme party-centricity of MPs, which is perceived as normal by MPs. Distrust between these groups reinforces the sentiment among ruling party members that the party deserves protection**.** In democracies, MPs from different parties are political opponents and not enemies. In Mozambique, the transition from enemy to adversary is not yet complete. While fragile, parliament has been the only space in Mozambican society where political parties can interact.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABC	All Basotho Convention
AC	Action Congress
ACDP	African Christian Democratic Party
ACP	Alliance of Congress Parties
ADD	Alliance pour une dynamique démocratique (Alliance for dynamic democracy)
ADEMA	Alliance pour la démocratie au Mali-Parti panafricain pour la liberté, la solidarité et la justice
ADM	Aliança Democrática para Mudança (Alliance Democratic for Change)
ADP	Alliance for Democracy and Progress
ADSC	And Defar Senegal Coalition
AFFA	Asa, fahamarinana, fampandrosoana, arinda (Action, Truth, Development, Harmony)
AFORD	Alliance for Democracy
AFP	Alliance des forces de progrés (Alliance of the Strengthen of the Progress)
AJJ	Alliance Jef-Jel
AKFM/Fanavaozana	AKFM/Fanavaozana (AKFM/Renouveau)
Alliance RPR-UNSD	Alliance rassemblement pour la république-Union nationale pour la solidarité et le développement (Alliance rally for the Republic-National Union for Solidarity and developement)
AME	Antoko Miambona Enzaka
AME	Association de Maires (Mayor's Association)
ANAWI	Association Nationale Wisa
ANC	African National Congress
AR	Alliance du renouveau (Alliance for Renovation)
AREMA	Association pour la renaissance de Madagascar (Association for the Renovation of Madagascar)

AU	African Union
AVI	Ny asa vita no ifampitsara (People are judged by the work they do)
AWB	Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging
AZ	Agenda for Zambia
AZAPO	Azanian People's Organisation
BAC	Basutoland African Congress
BBDP	Basotho Batho Democratic Party
BCP	Botswana Congress Party
BCP	Basotho Congress Party
BDNP	Basotho Democratic National Party
BDP	Botswana Democratic Party
BNF	Botswana National Front
BNP	Basotho National Party
Brun-Ly	Brun-Ly
CAR-Dunya	Congres africain pour le renouveau-Dunya (African Congress for the Renovation – Dunya)
CBE	Coalition pour un Benin émergent (Coalition for an emergent Benin)
CCM	Chama Cha Mapinduzi
CCU	Chama Cha Uma
Chadema	Chama Cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (Chadema-Party for Democracy and Progress)
CoD	Congress of Democrats
CONU	Congress for National Unity
CP	Conservative Party
CPP	Congres du peuple pour le progrès (Congress of the People for Progress)
CPP	Convention People's Party
CUF	Civic United Front

DA	Democratic Alliance
DCN	Democratic Coalition of Namibia
DP	Democratic Party of Kenya
DP	Democratic Party
DTA	Democratic Turnhalle Alliance of Namibia
EISA	Electoral Institute of Southern Africa
EU	European Union
FA	Federal Alliance
FARD-Alafia	Front d'action pour le renouveau, la democratique et le developpement-Alafia (Action Front for Renewal, Democracy and Development)
FC	Force cle
FCBE	Force cauris pour un Benin émergent (Force Cauris for an emergent Benin)
FDC	Forum for Democratic Change
FE	Force espoir (Force Hope)
FF / FF+	Freedom Front / Freedom Front Plus
FM	Fampandrosoana Mirindra
FORD-Asili	Forum for the Restoration of Democracy – Asili
FORD-Kenya	Forum for the Restoration of Democracy – Kenya
FORD-People	Forum for the Restoration of Democracy for the People
FRELIMO	Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique
FV	Fanjava Velogno
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GRAD/Iloafo	Groupe de réflexion et d'action pour le développement de Madagascar (Group Discussion and Action for Development in Madagascar)

HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HP	Heritage Party
ID	Independent Democrats
IDEA	Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
IFP	Inkatha Freedom Party
IM	Isandra Mivoatsa
IPU	Inter-Parliamentary Union
IRIN	Integrated Regional Information Networks
ITU	International Telecommunication Union
JEEMA	Justice Forum of Uganda
KADDU	Kenya African Democratic Development Union
KADU-A	Kenya African Democratic Union – Asili
KANU	Kenya African National Union
KENDA	Kenya National Democratic Alliance
KSC	Kenya Social Congress
LCD	Lesotho Congress for Democracy
LEADER/Fanilo	Libéralisme économique et action démocratique pour la reconstruction nationale (Economic Liberalism and Democratic Action for National Reconstruction)
LNA	La nouvelle alliance (The new alliance)
LPC	Lesotho People's Congress
LWP	Lesotho Workers' Party
MAG	Monitor Action Group
MAZINGIRA	Mazingira Greens Party of Kenya
MDC (Benin)	Mouvement pour le développement par la culture
MDC (Zimbabwe)	Movement for Democratic Change
MF	Minority Front

MFM	Mouvement pour le progrès de Madagascar (Movement for the Progress of Madagascar)
MFP	Marematlou Freedom Party
MGODE	Movement for Genuine Democratic Change
MMD	Movement for Multi-party Democracy
MP	Member of Parliament
MpD	Movimento para a Democracia (Movement for Democracy)
MPs	Members of Parliament
NARC	National Rainbow Coalition
NARC-K	National Rainbow Coalition – Kenya
NCCR-Magenzi	National Convention for Construction and Reform-Magenzi
NDA	National Democratic Alliance
NDC	National Democratic Congress
NDF	National Democratic Front
NDP	National Development Party
NEPAD	The New Partnership for Africa's Development
NFK	New Forum for the Restoration of Democracy – Kenya
NIP	National Independent Party
NLP	National Labour Party
NOSI	Núcleo Operacional da Sociedade de Informação (Operational Center of the Information Society
NP / NNP (South Africa)	National Party/New National Party
NP (South Africa)	National Party
NPP	New Patriotic Party
NRM / NRM-O	National Resistance Movement/National Resistance Movement Organisation
NUDO	National Unity Democratic Organisation
ODM	Orange Democratic Movement Party of Kenya

ODM-K	Orange Democratic Movement – Kenya
PAC	Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania
PAICV	Partido Africano da Independência de Cabo Verde (African Party of Independence of Cape Verde
PARLINE	Parliaments online
PCD	Partido da Convergência Democrática (Party of Democratic Convergence)
PCP	People's Convention Party
PDP	People's Democratic Party
PETRA	People's Transformation Party
PF	Patriotic Front
PFD	Popular Front for Democracy
PICK	Party of Independent Candidates of Kenya
PNC	People's National Convention
PNU	Party of National Unity
PPM	People's Progressive Movement
PS	Parti du Salut
PTS	Partido de Trabalho e Solidariedade (Party of Labor and Solidarity)
RDD-Nassara	Rassemblement démocratique pour le développement – Nassara (Rally for Democratic Development – Nassara)
RENAMO	Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Mozambican National Resistance)
RENAMO-UE	Resistência Nacional Moçambicana - União eleitoral (Mozambican National Resistance – Electoral Union)
RP	Republican Party
RPSD	Rassemblement pour le socialisme et la démocratie (Rally for socialism and democracy)
SKS	Sisi Kwa Sisi Party of Kenya
SPK	Shirikisho Party of Kenya

SWAPO	South West Africa People's Organisation
TIM	Tiako i Madagasikara (I Love Madagascar)
TLP	Tanzania Labour Party
US	United States
UCDP	United Christian Democratic Party
UCID	União Cristã, Independente e Democrática (Christian Union, Independent and Democratic
UCID-PDC	União Cabo-verdiana Independente e Democrática - Partido Democrata (Christian Union, Independent and Democratic – Democratic Party)
UDA	United Democratic Alliance
UDF	United Democratic Front
UDM	United Democratic Movement
UDP	United Democratic Party
UFD	Union des forces démocratique (Union of Democratic Forces)
ULP	United Liberal Party
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNPF	United Nations Population Fund
UPC	Uganda People's Congress
URD	Union pour la République et la démocratie (Union for Republic and Democracy)
USD	United States Dollar
VT	Vohibato Tapa-kevitsa
ZADECO	Zambia Democratic Conference
ZANU-Ndonga	Zimbabwe African National Union - Ndonga
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front
ZRP	Zambia Republican Party

COUNTRY NAMES

Throughout out the thesis the names of countries are translated into English and in some cases abbreviated; the correct names of countries as they appear in the constitution appear in the second column.

Benin	République du Benin
Botswana	Botswana
Cape Verde	República Cabo Verde
Ghana	Ghana
Kenya	Republic of Kenya
Lesotho	Lesotho
Madagascar	République de Madagascar
Malawi	Republic of Malawi
Mali	République du Mali
Mozambique	República de Moçambique
Namibia	Republic of Namibia
Nigeria	Federal Republic of Nigeria
Senegal	République du Sénégal
South Africa	Republic of South Africa
Tanzania	The United Republic of Tanzania
Uganda	Uganda
Zambia	Zambia

Zimbabwe Zimbabwe

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CHAPTER 1
Introduction

1.1 A giant step toward democracy, and subsequently limbo

In just a few short decades, Africans have become voters, their monoparty parliaments have been replaced by multiparty assemblies, and African politicians have transformed themselves into political candidates.

Political liberalisation has been the modus operandi in many African countries since the 1990s, which has meant that multiparty assemblies have existed, on average, for no more than two decades in the region. Regarding the 18 countries in this study, the number of years in existence of multiparty assemblies is 16.2.

It is important to distinguish between a transition to democracy and the consolidation of democracy (Linz, Stepan & Gunther, 1995; Gunther, Diamandouros & Puhle, 1995). Despite the rapid spread of democratic transitions across the continent, very few countries have reached the stage of an entrenched democracy. Without doubt, the average African citizen is today freer than his peer of 20 years ago. Still, following positive steps towards greater liberties and the euphoria of the transitions to multiparty regimes in the 1990s, many countries seem to have stopped at some point in a middle ground (Carothers, 2002; Diamond, 2002). Citizens in these countries have more liberties and rights than before, but having reached this middle ground, progress toward the consolidation of democracy seems to have frozen. Even a country like South Africa, despite remaining – according to the Freedom House score – a full democracy up to the present (2008), experienced a decline in civil liberties in 2007.

Political competition is common practice; however, ruling political elites have often shown that they are democrats only if they remain winners. In addition, political accountability and good governance are seen as the main areas of fragility of the new multiparty regimes. The African executives themselves have identified both of these aspects as priorities. African governments have witnessed the popular uprisings that have taken place in other parts of the

world because of poor living conditions. Saying this is not saying that the executives are the evil in these societies. Elected African executives have inherited frail state administrations, and social and economic challenges. It does not help to point out politicians and elected executives as being at fault, particularly as it is not as simple as this. There are structural and historical constraints that African executives face. In addition, there is also the controversial matter of the aid dependency of African countries for whom, as Claude Ake (1996) points out, Bretton Woods institutions have – in the name of accelerated development – caused greater dependency.

Literature on African politics is normally full of negative considerations; however, as is often the case, there are impressive achievements that should not be disregarded. Indeed, it is reassuring to state that it is better to be a citizen in a nonracial South Africa than during the apartheid era, and it is better to be a citizen in today's modern Cape Verde than prior to independence when famines recurred, and most certainly, it is even better being a citizen of a multiparty Cape Verde. The same can be said about Mozambique, which has enjoyed less success, that it is certainly better to be a citizen of the relatively democratic Mozambique of today than prior to independence.

These achievements do not mean that there is no room for improvement; one clear setback in Africa's multiparty societies is the lack of political accountability. No rulers, politicians, civic organisations, parties, or parliaments are angels. That is why it is important to have citizens who check and monitor the political institutions, politicians who criticise other politicians, and an organised civil society that gives structure to the voices of interest groups. Political societies, especially democracies, need this leash. To enhance this mechanism, there is a need to fight back the mentality that 'checking' is only to be done to enemies and not, for example, to members within one's own party. The mentality that comrades protect each other is widespread in African politics.

Partly because of this mentality, African parliaments have been less efficient in keeping the executives accountable. Two other main contributors to this less-than-optimal performance of parliaments are their curtailment/inhibition by their national constitutions, and a predisposition to transfer this role of parliament to civil society. This trend is based on the paradoxical criticism that parliaments are too politicised and partidarised. The fault with this

last criticism is that parliaments are political institutions composed of politicians, as they are in all parts of the world. However, it is not inappropriate for civil society organisations and citizens to demand accountability from their rulers, yet this should complement and not replace parliaments. This trend can be found, for example, in the case of donors to Mozambique, as will be explored in further chapters.

1.2 The halfway inversion of the pyramid of power

Parliaments needed to grow into their new role of representing heterogeneous communities. The relative institutional simplicity of an authoritarian regime ceases with liberalisation. The political transitions of the 1990s happened abruptly. Voter registrations, party registrations, and new constitutions all came about very rapidly in most countries. Following democratic elections, parliaments needed to adapt and learn for the first time how to have political adversaries alongside them.

Multiparty parliaments are the homes of different voices, mainly antagonists. The people cannot be postulated simply as an ideologically homogeneous group. Discordance, debate and criticism are the order of the day. This implies a reorganisation of the pyramid of power used for the monoparty authoritarian regime.

As the figure below shows, the pyramid of power inverts from an authoritarian monoparty regime to a multiparty regime. In the first pyramid, the party represents all interests; therefore, it sits atop the pyramid, followed by the executive, which governs according to the party's orientations, followed in turn by parliament. At the bottom of the power hierarchy come the people.

In a multiparty regime, citizens are the foundation, since it is through their vote that governments and parliaments are elected. Parliaments and citizens are theoretically empowered in this model. However, the inverted pyramid cannot in practice be so linear. It is common that in emerging democracies the new pyramid of power retains traces from the past model. More so in countries where there is a ruling party that holds a comfortable majority and is a former liberation movement; under these circumstances, the party believes that it holds a superior legitimacy in the new system.

Examples of the confusion over the place of the party and the executive were declarations by the ANC's secretary-general, Gwede Mantashe, in favour of the party having power above all, and the declarations of the former president, Thabo Mbeki, stating the opposite. Within one week, both men stated opposing views on the powers of the party. On 7 January 2009, Mantashe announced that in the future, the party, and not the president, would monitor the performance of all its ministers and MPs, and those that the party considered incompetent would be fired, clearly stating that the party, and not parliament or the executive, would be in charge (Monare, 2009). Seven days later, former president Thabo Mbeki pleaded to his own party to "Put the people before party politics" (Mbanjwa, 2009).

Figure 1.1: The inversion of the pyramid of power



1.3 Parliaments, people, politicians and the consolidation of democracy

Parliaments, people and parliamentarians are naturally interconnected; voters go to the polls to elect their representatives, who take their seats as members of parliament. A political system is no more than a set of related objects (Mahler, 2000). The relationship between parliaments and people or, from a microcosmic perspective, between politicians and citizens

needs to grow and endure beyond the electoral moment. Parliaments are meant to represent the interests of the electorate between elections. This includes keeping the government accountable, contributing to the choices of social and economic policies, making laws, advancing citizens' interests, and safeguarding the constitution.

Over the last decades, Africans have become voters. Politically, the lives of African citizens have changed considerably during this period, from colonial-era subjects to citizens at independence; from there to comrades during the monoparty periods, and more recently, to voters. Citizens, more than voters, need to be aware of their duties and rights, and need to have representative instruments and institutions. Besides, the elections that allow them to keep governments accountable, parliaments and parliamentarians should be the public representatives between elections. For this to happen, parliaments and citizens need to develop forms of relations and collaboration.

Along with changes in parliaments, and the changes of the political settings of African citizens, African people have also changed, not only where significant demographic changes are concerned, but also in a socioeconomic context. The present access to and level of education is incomparable with three or four decades ago. A rural exodus has occurred across the entire continent, creating gigantic urban centres and bringing with it all the socioeconomic problems that such unplanned movement creates. Life expectancy statistics tell the story of a continent with its youth as the largest group –African citizens on average live 18.5 years less than the average citizen in the world (see Table 3.4). Africa is a continent of youth – 63.7 percent of sub-Saharan Africa's population is under 24 years old (U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base, 2009). At the same time, never before has it been so effortless for African citizens to communicate – over the last two decades mobile networks and the Internet have become more and more accessible and prolific.

If representative democracy is to have any meaning, citizens should be – at a bare minimum – aware of the most important political institutions, especially their representative legislature. They should be aware of how to contact parliamentarians, and be able to communicate with them. Citizens should have enough knowledge to be able to form attitudes toward these institutions, such as holding them accountable. It is for this reason that it is it particularly

important to gain more knowledge about the relations between citizens and legislatures, and subsequently to reflect on the consequences of this for democracy.

Under a democratic paradigm, the way citizens perceive, evaluate and support a political institution is determinative. Politicians, under normal circumstances, fear the way citizens might perceive their performance. And it is right that they should 'fear' their electorate. This apprehension arises from the concern of losing their place at the political podium through the ballot box.

In its recent history, Africa has displayed characteristics that make the politics on the continent distinctive. Political participation and political accountability have not been parts of the rights and habits of African citizens, firstly denied by the colonial powers, and subsequently denied by the repressive regimes that dominated the continent after these countries gained independence. Being represented by elected people is a phenomenon that has been around for less than two decades for the large majority of African citizens. Colonisation, followed by repression in subsequent decades, did not provide space for the development of representative institutions such as National Assemblies. In an era where democratisation seems to have reached a dangerous plateau, parliaments' strength is vital. Parliaments can be the safety valve, preventing further social conflict in the course of channelling the complaints and demands of citizens; this is especially true in new democracies, where parliaments can be the mediators between citizens and complex and abstract political and state institutions (Packenham, 1970; Norton, 2002). For this to happen, parliaments, people, politicians and executives need to march together, even though part of this common trajectory means keeping a check on each other's performances and behaviours.

This study examines eighteen sub-Saharan African countries. With the exception of Botswana, these countries were involved in the wave of multiparty elections that occurred on the African continent in the 1990s; few of the seventeen other countries had experienced multiparty elections before the 1990s. More precisely, the thesis covers 18 elected parliaments. The focus on *elected* is important, since parliaments exist under multiple regimes, whether democratic or not. This research undertaking seeks firstly to comprehend the links between citizens and their elected parliaments in the new group of democracies in Africa, hoping in this way to help predict the prospects of these new democracies. Secondly,

the study uses the case of the development of the Assembly of Mozambique to understand the development, capacity and functioning of an emerging parliament. Furthermore, using the Mozambican case, the study investigates the perceptions of civil leaders toward the role of the Mozambique parliament in its process of democratisation, and lastly, it investigates the perceptions of Mozambican parliamentarians concerning their understanding of their roles, their relations with the electorate, and their own assessments of the Assembly's capacity and powers.

1.4 Research problem

The general research question that the thesis addresses is, What is the role of Assemblies in the consolidation of democracy in Africa?

To answer the general research question, a set of specific research questions[1] was developed. These questions are divided into descriptive and explanatory questions (presented in Table 1.1).

The descriptive questions are aimed at collecting information, whereas the explanatory questions are aimed at determining the reasons behind the findings of the descriptive questions (Punch, 2000, 34).

The analysis starts with a comparative study on public opinion data from the eighteen countries in the Afrobarometer survey, and is followed by a case study of the Assembly of the Republic of Mozambique.

Throughout the study, the role of the Assembly in consolidating democracy is the dependent variable. In the comparative study, the independent variable is the relationship between citizens and parliament, and in the case study, three independent variables are explored: the capacity of parliament, civic leaders' relationships with parliament, and the opinions of parliamentarians with regard to parliament.

[1] The concepts 'general research questions' and 'specific research questions' are presented for example by Punch (2000, p.22): "General research questions are more general, more abstract, and (usually) are not themselves directly answered because they are too general. Specific research questions are more specific, detailed and concrete."

For the consolidation of democracy, the majority of citizens must have an unwavering commitment to the system (Alcántara Sáez, 2008). For citizens to be committed to the system, they need to be aware of the 'institutions' of the system (in this case parliament). They need to be able to distinguish among these institutions (for example between parliament and the executive). They also need to be able to evaluate the institutions. Therefore, the study raises the following specific questions: *What is the extent of Africans' awareness of legislatures?*; *What are the evaluations of those citizens who do have some basic level of awareness, of the performance of legislators and their legislatures?*; and, *Do African citizens* ***distinguish*** *between parliament and the president?* The descriptive questions are followed by an explanatory question: *What is the relationship between individuals' characteristics and their evaluations of legislatures?* This question tries to explain the relationship between citizens' profiles and their evaluations of their parliament. Chapter 3 describes changes in the sociopolitical characteristics of African citizens. Sub-Saharan Africa has the lowest per capita income, the lowest life expectancy, and the highest rates of HIV infection in the world. Africa still ranks as the region with the largest population living on less than 1 USD a day, as is shown in Table 3.2. This study tests whether socioeconomic conditions can impede a positive relationship between citizens and their parliaments. Taking into account socioeconomic conditions prevalent on the continent, this could hamper the consolidation of democracy in the region, assuming a consolidated democracy needs citizens who are knowledgeable about their parliament.

The case study explores the same question – is parliament contributing to the consolidation of democracy. The first specific research question is, *How has the Mozambican Assembly developed, what are its powers and capacity, and what is the extent of its institutionalisation?* This question aims to investigate the role of parliament with regard to political institutions and to make inferences concerning the potential role that parliaments can have in the consolidation of democracy.

The second specific question is, *How do civic leaders and journalists assess the role of the Assembly?* This question investigates the view that for a democracy to be consolidated, citizens need to know, evaluate and be aware of their parliament. This view is studied through in-depth interviews with Mozambican civic leaders to measure their awareness and evaluations of the Mozambican parliament as well their capacity to contextualise and distinguish the Mozambican parliament from other political institutions in the country.

The last descriptive question is aimed at analysing Mozambican parliamentarians, their political profiles and their democratic beliefs. The findings of Alcántara Saez on the politicians of Latin America are an example of how ´politicians matter'; as he stated:
'The great importance accorded to institutions in the study of politics over the past 15 years can be perceived in the widespread use of the phrase 'institutions matter'. This is certainly the case, but it is also true that we should pay attention to actors who move in the institutional arena on a day-to-day basis." (Alcantara Sáez, 2008, p.1).

The specific research questions addressed include the following: *How do Mozambican parliamentarians see the Assembly, their roles, their electorates and their relationships with the political parties, the executive, and donors?* and *Who are Mozambican MPs?* This knowledge will also assist in answering our general question on the role of parliament in the consolidation of democracy.

Based on the discussion above, it is important to raise the question: What is the role of parliaments in the consolidation of democracy? Given that parliaments are interconnected with citizens, executives and politicians, this thesis addresses the broader problem with the following set of descriptive and explanatory questions:

Table 1.1: Research questions

What are the roles of the Assemblies in the consolidation of democracy?		
Comparative study of 18 African countries		
Descriptive questions	How politically **aware** are African citizens of their parliaments?	**Awareness** – What is the extent of Africans' awareness of legislatures? Can citizens in Africa articulate a preference for what they want their legislators to do? Do they know who their representatives are? Are they able to offer opinions about various aspects of the performance of both legislators and the legislature? In the jargon of public-opinion research, how salient are legislators and legislatures in the minds of ordinary Africans?
	How do they **evaluate** their parliaments?	**Evaluation** – For those citizens who do have some basic level of awareness, what are their evaluations of the performance of legislators and their legislatures? Or, in social science parlance, what is the valence of Africans' opinions about legislatures and legislators?
	Does the African citizen **distinguish** between parliament and the president?	**Distinguish –** What are citizens' attitudes towards the coexistence of these two institutions?
Explanatory questions	How does the '**citizen's profile'** influence evaluations of the legislature?	**Citizen's profile** – What is the relationship between individuals' characteristics and their evaluations of legislatures?
Study on the Assembly of the Republic of Mozambique		
How has the Mozambican Assembly developed? What are the powers, capacity, and extent of institutionalisation of the Assembly?		
How do civic leaders and journalists assess the role of the Assembly?		
How do Mozambican parliamentarians see the Assembly, their role, their electorate and their relations with the parties, the executive and donors? Who are Mozambican MPs?		

1.5 Methodology and structure of the thesis

The study progresses from an analysis of the opinions of individuals from 18 countries to a comprehensive study of the Assembly of the Republic of Mozambique.

The research design of the thesis combines an intensive case study (one country) analysis with a comparative study on eighteen countries (Lieberman, 2005). The research method applied is a nested analysis. There has been theoretical debate among scholars on how to

integrate different methodological approaches, yet little guidance has been given on how to blend these analyses (Liberman, 2005, p.435). That this thesis attempts to apply a mixed-method strategy therefore posed a challenge. This combined approach has yielded important insights that would not have been apparent using other means; however, the method has its limitations.

The use of public opinion data on eighteen African countries was a pragmatic result of the availability of data, combined with an understanding that the countries included showed a pattern of similarity regarding the subject of study of this thesis – emerging multiparty parliaments. The comparison of the eighteen countries is therefore a comparison of similar countries, from the perspective that in all these countries multiparty parliaments are a novelty, as will be explained in further detail in Chapters 2 and 3. It is important to keep in mind that 'similarity' is always 'relative' as Dogan & Pélassy (1990, p.132) explained in their study on how to compare nations: "We must insist on the word 'relatively'. Indeed, neither similarities nor differences are absolute. They are clearly a matter of viewpoint and perspective."

In addition, the choice of methods and cases was conditioned by the fact that sub-Saharan Africa does not offer quantitative data to the extent that other parts of the world do. Public opinion data is still scarce on the continent (Bratton, Mattes, Gyma-Boadi, p.50). This fact directed the primary intention for the study towards a comparative analysis of the citizens interviewed, omitting the identities of the countries. However, agreeing with the general perception that the identities of the countries are relevant (Gronke, Levitt, 2004) and that, as was explained, there are 'relative similarities' among the eighteen countries, it was decided to undertake the analysis by country instead of having country only as a control variable.

The study of the eighteen countries is followed by a case study of Mozambique.

The choice of the case study was deliberate and not random, and came about for two main reasons. The first was the researcher's familiarity with the country that allowed her access to materials and to the Assembly. A non-random choice carries the potential problem of bias by the investigator; however, as Lieberman put it, "Despite certain appeal in the reduction of bias associated with a random selection, the promised benefits must be weighed against pragmatic investigator limitations" (Lieberman, 2005, p.447). This assumes particular importance since the research was conducted inside the political institution of a parliament,

where there is no tradition of researchers being present. Knowledge of the country's language (Portuguese) and familiarity with the country facilitated not only permission from the Parliamentary authorities and from the political parties to conduct research on the institution but it also allowed the researcher to consult and use available documentation, and to conduct interviews with deputies, staff, and civic leaders.

The second consideration for the choice of case study was the desirability of it in terms of potentially being able through it to assess the robustness of the preliminary larger analysis. Mozambique's assembly at the time of the study was in its third term as a multiparty parliament, and three terms is an average number of terms for parliaments in the study. Another factor dictating the choice of case study was to have a country that was not an outlier in terms of parliamentary age. Moreover, the country had been through a political liberalisation but was still not considered democratically consolidated. Rather, it is often classified among the countries that have reached a 'middle ground' and, consequently, an in-depth analysis targets an understanding of the role, or lack thereof, of the parliament in the process of democratic consolidation. Findings may then be inferred to other countries where the parliaments are equally young and the democratic processes are still in a developing phase.

The ideal situation would have been to have had eighteen case studies. However, taking into account resource and time constraints, this could be the only case study included. As Collier puts it "the case study method has the merit of providing a framework in which a scholar with modest time and resources can generate what may potentially be useful data on a particular case" (Collier, 1993, p. 106).

Furthermore, qualitative and quantitative methods were combined in the cross-country analysis as well as in the case study analysis. The combination of these methods has in the past come in for some criticism, but they have also been postulated as compatible (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998).

The layout of the thesis is as follows. The thesis is divided in 10 chapters.

Chapters 1 and 2 outline the research problem, the objectives of the study, and the methods and data used. Chapter 2 gives an overview of the literature reviews on parliaments,

democratisation, and the relations of both with citizens. Chapter 3 looks at the characteristics, in general, of the African citizen, politically, socially and economically. Also in this chapter, the main structural characteristics of the 18 parliaments are presented.

Chapters 4 and 5 use public opinion data to assess public perceptions of the 18 parliaments; Chapter 4 offers a descriptive analysis of the assessments of parliaments by their citizens, and Chapter 5 compares public perceptions of parliaments with those of the presidents of the countries, looking at whether citizens can distinguish between these institutions. Chapter 6 uses a regression equation to test which individual characteristics contribute to a higher score for parliament by citizens.

Chapters 7, 8 and 9 are dedicated to the study of the Assembly of the Republic of Mozambique. Chapter 7 gives a description of the development, functioning, and constitutional powers of the Mozambican Assembly, and analyses its place in the Mozambican political context. Chapter 8 examines the perceptions of Mozambican civic leaders and journalists of their parliament, and Chapter 9 analyses the opinions and perceptions of Mozambican MPs.

The study of the Mozambican Assembly seeks to understand the development of the institution, its relations with the parties, the executive, and civil society. The study necessitated substantial effort to obtain the opinions and perceptions of the MPs themselves on these matters. Besides in-depth interviews, an MP survey was conducted with 50 current MPs.

Finally, Chapter 10 sums up the main conclusions of the study and suggests areas for further research.

1.5.1 Comparative study of 18 African countries

Knowing that representative democracies, more than authoritarian regimes, depend on the support of their citizens for the regime and for the political institutions, it is appropriate to understand how citizens, the key determiners of regimes, perceive the core institution of a representative democracy – parliament. Therefore, comprehending citizens' perceptions of

their parliaments constitutes an important step toward discerning the future consolidation of democracy.

The data used is from a single point in time, between 2005 and 2006, depending on the country [2].The comparative analysis is divided into three chapters, as follows:

Citizens' perceptions of parliament (Chapter 4)

This chapter is a descriptive study of public opinion data on parliaments, using all the questions available in the Afrobarometer data (Round 3) regarding the relations between citizens and parliaments. The data analysis was carried out for the grouped sample of respondents across all countries, followed by a presentation of the same data by country. Therefore, this section describes citizens' trust in their parliaments; citizens' approval of the performance of their member of parliament; citizens' perceptions of the corruption of members of parliament; citizens' perceptions of the inclination of members of parliament to listen to them; how much contact citizens indicated as having had with members of parliament; how much time citizens believed members of parliament spent in their constituencies; and how much time citizens believed members of parliament should be spending in their constituencies.

This descriptive analysis is followed by a test of the hypotheses on the relations between public perceptions of parliaments and the electoral system, and the existence of a ruling party that dominates parliament. These hypotheses are restated as follows:

> H_1: That citizens' perceptions of parliaments will depend on the electoral system
>
> H_2: That citizens living in countries with dominant ruling parties will have a tendency to evaluate their parliaments more negatively

Citizens' perceptions of parliaments compared with their perceptions of their presidents (Chapter 5)

As stated, the previous section describes and explores the perceptions of citizens of their parliaments. In this section, using the same data, the ability of citizens to distinguish between parliaments and executives is explored.

[2] See appendix 1 and 2 for the date of each country and a map showing all 18 countries.

The political literature has characterised politics in Africa as the politics of the 'big man', where ruling leaders have manoeuvred formal rules and institutions to their benefit (Hyden, 2006; Bayart, 1993; Southall & Melber, 2006, Posner & Young, 2007). Elected African parliaments are young institutions, which are expected to perform an important role in the consolidation of democracies. However, the rapid democratisation processes have allowed very little time for these institutions to consolidate themselves in their new role.

African citizens for long have been exposed to executives and especially to the figures of presidents, the good and bad of who are icons of African politics. The personalisation of politics is a reality in most countries. Against this background, it is to be expected that parliaments are publicly perceived as secondary institutions, while presidents are still the predominant players.

By extension, it is reasonable to expect that parliaments, as quiescent institutions, receive very little support from the public. A comparative analysis was conducted comparing the responses on parliaments with the responses on presidents. As in the preceding section, the following are analysed: citizens' trust; citizens' approval of the performance of parliamentarians; and citizens' perception of corruption.

Again, the two hypotheses from the previous section are tested, as well as the hypothesis regarding the constitutional design of the country:

> H_3: That citizens' perceptions of their parliament in comparison with their president will depend on the electoral system
>
> H_4: That citizens living in countries with dominant ruling parties will show greater appreciation for their presidents than for their parliaments
>
> H_5: that the constitutional design will affect citizens' perceptions of their parliaments in comparison with their presidents

***Citizens' evaluations of legislatures – test and explanatory LegislativeScore[3] model, explanatory factors (Chapter* 6**)**

In this section, a multiple regression equation was selected and fitted to the LegislativeScore for each country.

The hypotheses are divided into two main groups of individuals' characteristics: socioeconomic characteristics and political characteristics, as is summarised in Figure 6.1, below. In the first group, the criteria were socioeconomic characteristics, including aspects of individuals' social and economic statuses such as their level of education; their level of poverty, determined by their cash income and the food deprivation to which they are exposed; their satisfaction with the national and their personal economy; their trust in other citizens; the age group (generation) to which they belong; their gender; and their habitat, whether rural or urban. The second group, individuals' political characteristics, includes their party allegiance, their exposure to the media (listening to radio, watching television, and reading newspapers), their satisfaction with democracy, their perception of the fairness of elections, their perception of democracy, embeddedness, and the frequency of engagement in political discussion.

Relating to the two main groups of characteristics (socioeconomic and political), it was expected that socioeconomic characteristics would be more relevant in the evaluations that citizens made of legislatures. Political characteristics are also important but less so than socioeconomic characteristics, e.g. if citizens are poor and live in rural areas, these trying characteristics will be so relevant in their daily lives that their party affiliation, their perception of the fairness of elections, etc. will be less important in their minds, so as to make these citizen less aware of their legislature and therefore less judgmental.

Hypotheses related to the socioeconomic characteristics of individuals

- That the level of education has a positive impact on the LegislativeScore
- That a higher level of poverty is associated with a lower LegislativeScore
- That a higher level of satisfaction with one's own living conditions has a positive impact on the LegislativeScore

[3] The concept LegislativeScore is explained on the introduction of chapter 6.

- That a higher level of satisfaction with one's own economic status has a positive impact on one's LegislativeScore

- That a higher level of interpersonal trust has a positive impact on the citizen's LegislativeScore (not questioned in Zimbabwe)

- That a multiparty generation is associated with a higher LegislativeScore

- That males are associated with a lower legislativeScore

- That residents of rural areas are more satisfied with their legislatures

Hypotheses related to the impact of political characteristics

- That citizens associated with the ruling party will have higher LegislativeScores

- That citizens associated with the opposition party will have lower LegislativeScores

- That citizens with religious affiliations will have higher LegislativeScores

- That citizens exposed to radio news will have higher LegislativeScores

- That citizens exposed to print news will have lower LegislativeScores

- That citizens that display a higher level of satisfaction with democracy will have higher LegislativeScores

- That citizens who believe that elections were not free and fair will have lower LegislativeScores

- That citizens who believe that they do not live in a democracy (embeddedness) will confer lower evaluations of their legislatures

- That citizens who engage in political discussions will have higher LegislativeScores.

1.5.2 Assembly of the Republic of Mozambique

This part of the study includes data on the functioning of parliament. The data originated from staff interviews, interviews with key civil leaders regarding how they perceived the Mozambican parliament, and an MP survey. The MP survey examined how MPs perceived their relations with citizens and how, in general, they perceived their roles as elected representatives in an emerging parliament.

Mozambique is one of the countries that embraced democratisation in the 1990s; however, the country seemed to stagnate in the wake of its important achievements in the areas of electoral competition and civil and political liberties.

After the recognised accomplishment of its transition to a multiparty system, the consolidation of democracy seems compromised. The Mozambican parliament has, to its merit, the achievement of having for 14 years hosted the two formerly belligerent parties to its civil war. This can be seen as a triumph of the Mozambican parliament; yet, this was a difficult process. Mozambique has a political system that is highly presidential, with a dominant ruling party. It is therefore interesting how in this context the Mozambican parliament has developed.

The combination of ordinary Mozambicans' perceptions and civil leaders' and journalists' perceptions permits a better understanding of how the Mozambican parliament is truly seen. The inclusion of MPs' opinions completes the triangle and gives insights into the gaps and common understandings between citizens and MPs. The study of observers' perceptions of the Mozambican parliament contributes to the general knowledge of how parliaments, as emerging institutions, operate in emerging democracies. The analysis of the case study is divided into the following three sections:

The Assembly of the Republic Of Mozambique (Chapter 7)

In this section, there are descriptions of the development, capacity and institutionalisation of the Assembly. The methodology for this section comprised collecting official data, legislation, and memorandums of the Assembly. In-depth interviews were also conducted with staff, former MPs and existing MPs. Plenary sessions and working committee meetings were observed during the sitting periods of two plenary sessions, the last session in 2006 and the first session of 2007.

Parliament in the minds of national civic leaders (Chapter 8)

This section investigates how Mozambican civic society leaders' perceived the Mozambican parliament. The methodology of this section comprised in-depth interviews and data collected on parliamentary performance indicators related to its interaction with the public. The interviews were conducted with a panel of leaders of several key organisations from

Mozambican society, journalists with experience in parliamentary affairs, and staff from the National Assembly. Due to time and financial constraints, most of the interviews were conducted in Maputo. However, a visit to Beira was carried out to interview the mayor and a representative of a religious organisation.

The selection of stakeholders was based on organisation type. Organisations who were politically involved, but who had no party affiliation were chosen. Additionally, the selection was restricted to organisations that were active in the national sphere and not just in Maputo. For this reason, based on contact with their members, but taking into consideration public activities within the regions, they were asked for both their perceptions and the perceptions that they believed existed across the country. An elected member of local government (the president of a municipality) was also included on the stakeholders' panel. Inclusion on the panel of journalists was determined on the basis of their experience and interest in parliamentary affairs, and on national coverage by them.

Mozambican MP survey (Chapter 9)

The survey sample comprises responses from 50 sitting members of the Assembly of the Republic of Mozambique, elected in the legislative election of 2004. The sample was stratified randomly, based on political party affiliation, gender and the electoral *circulos eleitorais* (corresponding to the Mozambique Provinces). The sample reflected the proportionality of the parties' distribution – 32 MPs from FRELIMO and 18 from RENAMO-UE. Members were contacted and asked to participate in the survey. The survey took place during the Assembly's sitting in Maputo from February 2008 to May 2008. The interviews were conducted in Portuguese, the official language of Mozambique. Most of the interviews were conducted in a private room allocated by the Assembly for the survey. When this was not possible, assurances were given that there were no other people present or within earshot of the interview. Interviews averaged between 1.5 and 2 hours. The questionnaire was anonymous, and MPs were previously informed that they were not obliged to respond.

Never before has an MP survey such as this one been conducted on the Assembly of Mozambique. For this reason, the research demanded caution in its preparation – it was essential to obtain the endorsement of both political parties (FRELIMO and RENAMO) and, more importantly, also to have their engagement in the study. As a legacy of the civil war,

there is severe distrust between both parties, which extends to strangers who want to research their activities. Besides conventional concerns about the research design of the survey, the procedures in obtaining authorisations and bringing the politicians on board are essential when conducting research in countries that are not yet democratically consolidated. As Chapter 9 shows, both political parties accepted collaborating in the study, with no conditions. They extended to the researcher full liberty to circulate in their spaces and to approach party servants and MPs. The only condition imposed by FRELIMO was that the sample needed to be proportionate to the number of seats in the Assembly. The proportionality rule is so present in the daily functioning of the Assembly that the RENAMO leadership promptly accepted this condition. An important lesson for future research in countries with proportional electoral systems with closed party lists is that MPs may be reluctant to participate if the party leadership does not give its authorisation for them to do so.

1.6 Sources of data

This dissertation is based on quantitative and qualitative data. At the same time, the analysis combines primary and secondary sources. As its primary sources, the study used public opinion data, an MP survey, in depth-interviews with journalists and civic leaders of Mozambique and the staff of the Assembly of the Republic of Mozambique. As its secondary sources, this study used reports, party programmes, policy proposals, law bills, national budgets and other written material produced by the government, as well as the Constitution, the database on parliament from the Inter-parliamentary Union, and newspapers.

The research fieldwork was conducted in Mozambique during several visits over the last four years; the longest uninterrupted stay in Maputo coincided with the first sitting period of the Assembly in the first semester of 2007 and the first sitting period in 2008. The researcher also attended a few plenary sessions of the South African parliament. Short research visits to the Ghanaian and Cape Verdean parliaments were also undertaken.

1.6.1 Cross-country data

Afrobarometer data.

The Afrobarometer surveys are public opinion surveys covering a wide range of areas related to democracy, governance, conflict and crime, economics and markets, social capital, and others. The data was analysed during the period when it was embargoed; however, the data used is presently available both in the form of a comparative tool as well as in the form of stand-alone country surveys. The analyses cover Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Note that the Afrobarometer surveys are concentrated in countries that have undergone at least some degree of political and economic liberalisation in the last decade. As such, the results represent the continent's most open societies and cannot be taken as being representative of sub-Saharan Africa as a whole.

***Socioeconomic and political indicators*[4].**

Several sources were used for the socioeconomic and political indicators. Worth noting is that the data on parliaments is available online, at PARLINE, from the Inter-parliamentary Union. Regarding data on elections, the main source was the website of the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA) and the data available on the website of the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). In general, the socioeconomic indicators for countries were from the different sections of the United Nations: the United Nations Statistics Department, the United Nations Population Fund, and the United Nations Development Programme. Information was also obtained from the website of the World Bank Group. As an overall background, the various editions of *Africa south of the Sahara* were crucial.

Legal documents

To code the parliaments' power, the constitutions of the 18 countries were used.

[4] Accurate references can be found in the Reference List.

1.6.2 Data on the Assembly of the Republic of Mozambique

MP survey

The survey included a sample of 50 members of the Assembly of the Republic of Mozambique elected in the legislative election of 2004.

In-depth interviews

The interviews were conducted with a panel of leaders of several key organisations from Mozambican society, journalists with experience in parliamentary affairs, and staff from the National Assembly.

Official data on the Assembly

Data was collected on parliamentary performance, indicators with regard to the actions of parliament that are open to public scrutiny. As an indicator, the number of visitors to the Documentation Centre of the Assembly was incorporated. The data was collected with the assistance of the Division of Working Committees and the Documentation Centre.

1.7 Contributions of the study

The main contribution of this study is its bringing of parliaments to the centre of the discussion on democratisation, good governance and accountability. To this end, the study is innovative in combining in a single study, a study on how people perceive parliaments – embracing public opinion and the opinions the elite – with a study on how multiparty parliaments have developed in the last two decades, with a study on parliamentarians themselves. The MP survey is an important, innovative contribution to the literature on politics in Africa, an area which had previously been seriously neglected. A study on parliamentary elites has been absent, not just in the African context, but also worldwide. Political analysis is inseparable from an analysis of the political actors; however, there has been a general lack of empirical studies on parliamentarians. Studies in this area are even more salient when there is a need to evaluate and measure quality of democratic life (Díez & Díaz, 2008, p. 7). Evidently, politicians are fundamental actors in politics; a study of their trajectories, values, beliefs, and attitudes are a *sine qua non* condition to a more accurate political analysis.

An important contribution of this study is that it reveals how the characteristics of parliaments and their interaction with other institutions impact on an electoral system and the development of democracy. Previous studies have dealt with electoral systems and their relations to accountability, but there are few empirical studies on the impact of electoral systems on parliamentary performance, and this study seeks to provide important insights into this topic. This work also points out the distinction between parliamentary efficiency and the constitutional or political autonomy of parliaments.

Another important contribution of this study is to emphasise the role that citizens' political characteristics, along with their economic and social characteristics, play in their relationships with parliaments.

The thesis presents interesting findings with regard to the relationship between perceived electoral fairness and the esteem in which parliaments are held. Here the study shows that when citizens believe elections are free and fair they are more likely to approve of presidential/parliamentary performance

The research also reveals that the level of trust in parliaments in these eighteen African countries is far higher than is the case in the most other countries, established democracies included. While it is noted that African citizens are quite capable of distinguishing between the performance and institutions of presidencies and parliaments, they do not seem unduly perturbed by constitutional arrangements that remarkably extend executive and legislative powers for the former, at the expense of the latter. The widespread distribution of dominant parties does not impinge upon citizens' trust in parliaments. Whilst dominant party theorists lament the tendency of strong ruling parties to merge party and state, the survey undertaken here seems to indicate that the majority of people who vote for dominant parties seem to be reasonably happy with this situation.

In the study of Mozambique, many of the themes mentioned above are pursued. The study deals with the political and historical background to the situation with regard to parliament in this country. It points out the weakness of parliament relative to the president and the ruling party, and the limited impact made by Mozambican parliamentary committees. The study provides data on the socioeconomic backgrounds of MPs, and the differences between the

economic situations of MPs from FRELIMO and RENAMO. This work also reveals that both ruling party and opposition party MPs concur in their view of the virtues of a strong presidency, and seem to have relatively little interest in promoting a stronger parliament. Interesting data is provided on journalists' relatively favourable views on the functioning of parliament, although 'stakeholders' were shown to be rather more negative. Finally, the investigation shows that all stakeholders agree on the importance of parliament and its crucial role in the consolidation of democracy.

1.8 Limitations of the study

The first limitation was the lack of data and literature on parliaments in Africa. Very few parliaments have websites with sufficient information. Of the 48 sub-Saharan African countries, 17 countries do not have a website dedicated to their parliament. Concerning the Assembly of the Republique of Mozambique, the website is limited to a part of the government's website, with little information on how parliament functions and its major highlights. On this matter, there are very few websites where there is information on the procedures of parliaments', even on access to the agendas or standing orders. Among the existing websites, the last update can go as far back as 1999. The exceptions to this are the parliaments of South Africa and Cape Verde. The latter went for a period of more than a year (2007) where it was not functional, but in 2008 it went online again. This issue with Africa's parliamentary websites ensures that the desk research on parliaments in Africa is inferior to the desk research on the parliaments of Europe, where the websites are regularly updated and provide large amounts of information. Because of the limited data on parliaments, a comparative study on the capacity and performance of parliaments could not be undertaken.
A second limitation of the study was the use of public opinion data from one point in time. To enable a superior and more feasible understanding of the public's perceptions, a comparison should also be done with data from different times, thereby ensuring that the noise of particular situations or events does not affect the findings.

1.9 Avenues for further research

There is such a scarcity of studies on parliaments and politicians that there are several options for future research. Unfortunately, the statement "we know a great deal about particular

legislatures but very little about legislatures as legislatures." (Norton, 2002, p. xi) does not apply to parliaments in Africa, where the scarcity of studies on particular legislatures is as rare as the comparative studies. There is a need for case studies on parliaments in Africa, and there is also a need for comparative studies on parliaments.

Through the constitutions and standing orders, it is possible to measure the powers that parliaments hold in a legal framework; however, the practice of these powers can be very distinctive. Therefore, to conduct a study on a parliament's powers in practice, it is pertinent to evaluate the role of that parliament in practice.

Research on the attitudes of the parties within parliaments and in relation to parliaments is also vital to measuring the dynamics of parliaments.

The relations between parliament, parliamentarians and citizens need further and consistent research. An exploration of the trends in public perceptions toward parliaments is definitely required, as is the use of other research methods, such as focus groups, in the study of the relations among parliament, parliamentarians and citizens, which could be important contributors to an understand of the representation function of parliaments.

Another fundamental area that urgently requires study is the oversight function of parliaments, not just descriptive assessments of this parliamentary function, but deep research on the roles of the political parties and the executive, and on the interference of external actors such as aid donors.

Another area requiring scholarly attention is a study on parliamentarians. Here again, research can assume different forms and embrace different methods, but to know who parliamentarians are, and what they believe, preach and fear are of special importance to political societies in a democratisation process.

One avenue of future research that is an important area to investigate is the relationship between citizens and parliaments, and the interrelationship of both with democracy. To identify the existence or nonexistence of these, it is important to compare multiparty parliaments from developing countries and developed countries, and from different regions.

CHAPTER 2

Literature review

2.1 Background

2.1.1 African parliaments prior to independence

This study examines eighteen sub-Saharan African countries. With the exception of Botswana, these countries were involved in the wave of multiparty elections that occurred on the African continent in the 1990s; few of the seventeen other countries had experienced multiparty elections before the 1990s. However, these multiparty periods were interspersed with authoritarian regimes. All held multiparty elections in the 1990s, following one-party regimes: some occurred after military regimes and some after civil war.[5] At some point, all had a parliament after independence, but as a result of the nature of the regimes, some of these parliaments did not accommodate opposition groups. Before independence, the type of parliamentary experience was classified according to that of the respective colonial power at that time.

Prior to independence, a pattern of colonial, legislative presence can be identified, with minimal parliamentary and representative procedures in place; in this regard, the countries colonised by Portugal faced even more constraints, given that Portugal was an authoritarian regime. In 1953, the Lusophone Legislative Council was established in the African colonial territories. In 1972, these legislative councils in Africa were elected by restricted suffrage. Between five and ten members represented each territory in Lisbon. In 1972, Portugal was not a democracy. As a result, in the African colonial territories, the elections were controlled by the Portuguese one-party state, and, as in Portugal, the vote was given to only a very small percentage of the population, which at that time, did not include natives of the colonial territories (Ramos, 2004).

[5] Benin – 1991, Botswana – 1966, Cape Verde – 1991, Ghana – 1992, Kenya – 1992, Lesotho – 1993, Madagascar – 1993, Malawi – 1994, Mali – 1992, Mozambique – 1994, Namibia – 1989, Nigeria – 1999, Senegal – 2000, South Africa – 1994, Tanzania – 1995, Uganda – 2006, Zambia – 1991, Zimbabwe – 1980. Source: *Africa South of the Sahara*.

In the French territories in 1946, small territorial assemblies were established (circa 25 members). Representatives were also elected to National Assembly in Paris and to the Grand Council of Dakar. In 1956, under the *loi de cadre*, Francophone territories held a referendum to decide their future association with France, and this was held under universal direct suffrage. In 1956, before independence, the first Guinean president, Sekou Touré, was elected as Guinea's deputy to the French National Assembly.

After the Second World War, legislative councils were created in the British territories. Elected assemblies were created in the 1960s. However, as with the Lusophone countries, the vote was only extended to male property owners.

With independence achieved, assemblies flourished in Africa, although most existed under nondemocratic regimes. Assemblies at this stage were used to unify the nation, and in countries with one-party systems, the assembly was a form of central committee of the party.

The literature on African legislatures goes back three decades, corresponding to the dawn of the newly independent states on the African continent. The first analyses of legislatures in Africa were country case studies produced in the decade after independence, including those on Kenya, Uganda, Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Zambia. In the same period, a few studies compared the legislatures of the newly independent states to those of the previous colonial regimes (Le Vine, 1979; Stultz, 1968). For understandable reasons, during the decades of the one-party systems, there were even fewer studies about how the legislative institutions operated and survived within these systems (although, for an exception, see Kjekshus, 1974). These studies mostly concluded that parliaments in the independent countries were weak institutions. Hopkins's (1970) study of MPs in the parliament of Tanzania explored the different roles of parliamentarians and their relationships with political parties, and revealed that the parties exerted great influence over MPs and thus rendered them ineffective. Hopkins concludes, "The actual role of the MP in the legislature is quite minor" (Hopkins, 1970).

2.1.2 The rise of multiparty parliaments

In the 1990s, single party regimes were forced by domestic and international forces to share the political arena with opposition parties, resulting in Africa witnessing an unprecedented

wave of formations of multiparty democracies. During this decade, Africa held 190 presidential and legislative elections, compared to only 29 elections held in the previous decade.[6] This wave of elections was global, with elections in the world doubling in one decade – from 294 elections in the 1980s to 603 elections in the 1990s. Africa has been the region with the largest increase in elections, with the number of elections multiplying six times. The end of the twentieth century was definitely marked by the expansion of democracy, as is unambiguously stated by Amartya Sen: "This century, they will find it difficult not to accord primacy to the emergence of democracy" (1999, p. 3).

As a direct result of this boom in elections, parliaments, which until then were mainly one-party institutions (or like the South African National Assembly, not representative of the majority of the population), needed to accommodate opposition parties. These assemblies faced the challenge of institutional and political demands. The procedures of one-party assemblies needed to be adapted and, in many instances, created from scratch. Many new members of parliament entered an assembly for the first time. Staff remaining from the previous one-party systems, a number of whom were also party members, needed to build the trust of all the new members. Parliaments also faced high expectations from the media and from their citizens. Like elections, these new parliaments were the visible faces of the new regimes.

Assemblies became the place where citizens could follow the announcements of political overtures. In South Africa, for example, the major political decisions regarding the transition made by President Frederik Willem (F.W.) de Klerk between 1989 and 1994 were announced in the National Assembly, which could be followed by South Africans though the media. African national assemblies took on different roles in transition periods such as these. Some, for that reason, could have been perceived by the public as being active agents of these transitions. Many countries used national conferences to draw up new constitutions, and these conferences worked like large national assemblies. Others preferred to draw up multiparty rules under the assemblies of one-party regimes, with no involvement of other political forces. The forming of national conferences appears to have been a practice particular to the francophone African countries.

[6] http://www.idea.int/vt/total_number_of_elections.cfm

The first national conference was organised in Benin and overthrew the authoritarian regime, hence being named the first civil coup d'état in Africa. This conference took place on February 19, 1990 and included representatives of the ruling People's Revolutionary Party, trade unionists, civil servants, students, religious leaders, and representatives of the military. The conference took ten days to replace the government, and democratic elections were held a year later. The media broadcast the event and its outcome throughout Francophone Africa, with special coverage by Benin radio and Radio France International (RFI). Between March 1990 and August 1991, the rulers of Gabon, Congo, Mali, Togo, Niger, and Zaire faced the demands of pro-democracy forces and convened national conferences. During this same period, opposition groups in the Central African Republic (CAR), Cameroon, Madagascar, Burkina Faso, Mauritania and, later, Chad mobilised campaigns to drive their demands for national conferences (Robinson, 1994).

In spite of common patterns, African transitions in the 1990s were not identical, and an important difference lay in the manner in which the incumbents of the authoritarian regimes reacted to pressure for political change from their citizens and the international community. The Nigerian political scientist Claude Ake (2000, p. 132) points out that authoritarian African leaders in the 1990s faced the international trend towards democratisation in one of two ways. Some leaders tried to postpone and even fight it, while others tried to accommodate the new era. Cape Verde is the example given by Claude Ake (2000) of an authoritarian regime that promoted rapid political change.

Political liberalisation has been the modus operandi in many African countries since the 1990s, which means that multiparty assemblies have existed for two decades in the region. The average number of years of existence of a multiparty assembly (with no reversion to authoritarian rule) in the 18 countries in this study is 16.22 years. The short lifespans of these assemblies demands a holistic approach in order not to judge them in a one-dimensional mode so that parliaments in Africa are not seen merely as 'rubber stamps'. As Paterson and Copeland state: "Today, parliaments are being recreated or newly established in many emerging democracies, and these new parliaments, now in their infancy, struggle to become institutionalised" (1994, p. 3).

2.2 Literature on democratisation and parliaments

2.2.1 The transition to democracy, democracy and democratic consolidation

It is particularly important to distinguish between the period during which a country undergoes a transition to democracy and that of democratic consolidation. It is equally illuminating to note that the passage between the stages is not always linear, and countries sometimes settle into a hybrid stage that is difficult to classify **(**Carothers, 2002; Schedler, 2001; Collier & Levitsky, 1997).

The debate around the definition of both concepts – transition and consolidation – has been promoted in recent years. While the debate is unsettled, it is difficult to define concepts that do not enjoy consensus (Schedler, 1997). A good definition, as a departure point in our understanding of both concepts, is the definition given by Gunther, Diamndouros & Punle (1995, p.xii):

> "Regime transition entails the creation of the basic political institutions of a new democratic system and the drafting of new rules for regulating the political behaviour of citizens, organisations and governing elites. Democratic consolidation ... involves the legitimisation of those institutions and the widespread internalisation of the new democratic regime's basic behavioural norms. It is important to note that transition and consolidation are conceptually distinct but that, in reality, they may temporarily overlap or even coincide."

The eagerness to understand when a country has reached a state of consolidated democracy results from the widespread belief that if a democracy is consolidated, it is less likely to break down (Schedler, 2001). According to this author, there has been a legitimate but narrowly defined classical anxiety surrounding this definition. Schedler (1997) attempts to offer a comprehensive framework for the conceptualisation of democratic consolidation. According to him the concept can be divided into five objectives: avoiding democracy's breakdown, avoiding democracy's erosion, institutionalising democracy, completing democracy and deepening democracy. The author regroups these variants into 'negative', 'positive' and 'neutral' forms of democratic consolidation. The first two objectives, namely, avoiding democracy's

breakdown and erosion, are 'negative' because they try to prevent democratic recessions. The last two objectives are described as 'positive' because they try to achieve democratic progress. The 'neutral' objective consists of democratic institutionalisation (Schedler, 1997, p.17).

Regardless of the precision, or lack thereof, of defining democratic consolidation in a simplistic way, 'consolidated' implies a process of going from one level to reach another level, in this case of levels of democracy. It is therefore equally important to discuss the concept of democracy. The concept of democracy also presents challenges and a lack of consensus, as Larry Diamond puts it:
"… just as political scientists and observers do not agree on how many democracies there are in the world, so they differ on how to classify specific regimes, and the conditions for making and consolidating democracy .... A key element in all these debates is the lack of consensus on the meaning of democracy ...." (Diamond, 2003, p.30).

Robert Dahl's definition of democracy offers a good guide to what a political system needs to have to be a democracy, which is competition, inclusiveness and civil liberties (Dahl, 1971). Dahl actually refers to existing political systems as polyarchies, and to 'democracy' as an ideal

Schmitter & Karl (1991) also contributed to the effort of defining democracy. They defined modern political democracy as "a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives." (1991, p.50).
This discussion continues in the section 2.2.4 on further distinguishing delegative from representative democracies.

2.2.2 Status of parliaments

The third wave of democratisation in Africa has also been paid attention by scholars. However, there have been few comparative studies on these new democratic parliaments when compared with studies on electoral systems. Scholars have been concerned with the

impact of electoral systems as political institutions of democracy (Cho, 2005; Norris, 1997; Lindberg, 2005). What is common to these overall analyses is the absence of a resultant study on parliaments. Notwithstanding the key function of electoral systems being to elect members of a parliament, the impact that an electoral system has on a democracy is affected by the internal characteristics of each parliament and its interaction with the existing political institutions and, in particular, with the executive.

There could be several reasons for the exclusion of parliament as a variable in these studies. The first reason could be the difficulty of obtaining data on how parliaments in Africa operate. Research on African parliaments demands more effort than a study of their counterparts in the Western world would. To start with, the researcher, in preparing for the fieldwork, will find that very little information is available on the websites of African parliaments. Of the 48 parliaments in sub-Saharan Africa, 15 do not have a website, and of the 23 that do have a website, eight are non-functional, which leaves 15 functional websites, which contain very little information. The short sitting periods of African parliaments can also constitute a problem when it comes to undertaking fieldwork.

Also, parliaments are the habitat of the political elite. As institutions, the parliaments in Africa must still build trust. In parliaments under new regimes, levels of trust among members and staff are still low, and the researcher needs to win the trust of all parties. Researching the inner workings of an institution comprising political elites also has its difficulties. During the rule of the authoritarian regimes in Africa, research was obviously compromised; therefore, there has been no tradition of dealing with researchers. Another reason for the exclusion of parliaments from the substantial research on democratisation was the time constraints involved. The unpredictable, massive political transitions of the 1990s forced political scientists to follow these phenomena as they were happening. This compromised the accuracy of the studies, as analyses were constantly being overtaken by circumstances. The need to understand the new political transitions on a broad scale prevented researchers from attempting to study deeply the political institutions involved.

Last, but of equal importance, is the perception among political scientists of parliaments in developing countries being ineffective institutions, which limits the desirability of investigating them. Samuel P. Huntington (1968), for example, argues that most legislative

institutions in the less developed countries are dominated by traditional elites, who are dishonest and block reforms that are needed for modernisation. From this point of view, legislatures are the foundation of social and economic stagnation.

2.2.3 The role of parliaments

The role these institutions have played in this universal trend towards political liberalisation in Africa therefore still has to be thoroughly explored. The bias regarding parliaments has produced, as Mulsof and Smith (1979, p. 28) state, "… a one-dimensional view of legislators only slightly caricatured as if they aren't the central policy-making organ, [and] they're not worthy of attention. But yet they are performing other functions".

At least legislatures can provide a window between the public and their rulers, as Mulsof states: "In many countries legislatures help keep the activities of the executive in the public view" (1979, p. 29). The inclusion of parliaments is from Claude Ake's (2000) perspective crucial for Africa; it is "… a democracy of incorporation. To be as inclusive as possible, the legislative bodies should in addition to national groups have special representation of youth, women's groups, and unions."

These positive views of what the role of parliaments are or what they should be are challenged by theories that claim democratic parliaments depend on the existence of an active middle class (Lipset, 1959), which in Africa are still scarce. Furthermore, Almond and Verba (1980) postulate that the survival of democratic institutions requires a strong civic culture. However, these presuppositions do little to elaborate on the actual impact of parliaments on democratisation.

Steven Fish's study of the relationship between parliaments and the new democracies in Eastern Europe is an exception. His findings reveal a strong correlation between the extent of the democracy and the strength of the legislature. Fish's findings reveal that a powerful legislature is an important contribution to the accomplishment of democratisation (Fish, 2006). This finding is also part of the conclusion of Alence's work, which shows that democratic institutions systematically boost African states' performance as agents of development (2004).

Nevertheless, little is known about how these functions have been performed, especially regarding the second function, representation. Very little research has been undertaken into how parliaments in Africa are deploying this function in practice. Furthermore, the law-making function has been labelled by scholars as a marginal function in developing-world legislatures. Mezey agrees with this, but comments further that "if legislatures were not central to law-making yet continued to exist, they had to have performed other functions" (Mezey, 1983, p. 511).

Emerging multiparliament are not exclusive to Africa, because the rise of multiparty parliaments is also a new phenomenon evident in Southern Europe. For example, Portugal's and Spain's democratic parliaments are just two decades older than most of African parliaments, Leston-Bandeira (2005) analysed the development of the parliaments of Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Turkey; their study focuses on the emergence of multiparty parliaments with the transitions to democracy.

The findings of Fish and Alence regarding the potential role of a parliament in relation to the strength of a democracy constitute a positive outlook, taking into consideration the negative attitudes towards democratisation found in Africa at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Several scholars have concluded that democratisation in Africa has been essentially a disappointment (Bratton & Van de Walle 1997; Chabal 1998; Van de Walle 2002; Carothers, 2002). As Nicolas van de Walle (2002, p. 66) points out, this "*fin-de-siècle* optimism has given way to early-twenty-first-century gloom"; multiparty elections and political change have not solved Africa's problems of corruption, lack of efficiency and lack of development. In spite of Van de Walle's sceptical perspective regarding the outcomes of political liberalisation in Africa, his findings that institutional learning is important, and yet does happen, are good news for parliaments in Africa.

Parliaments can provide a way of assuring the public's right to hold their rulers accountable. As Norton states, parliaments can be the 'safety valve' for the complaints and demands of citizens, thus preventing further social conflict. In a democratic regime, and especially in new democracies, parliaments can be the 'middle man' between citizens and the complex and abstract political and state institutions (Norton, 2002), even though rulers being held accountable to their citizens may still seem to be a remote possibility in Africa.

It is therefore generally accepted that parliaments should serve as a bridge between the state and society, facilitating the participation of citizens in their own governments in order to keep rulers accountable. Democracy needs to deliver the goods; people expect to it to improve their lives, and for that, democratisation needs to be accompanied by accountability and good governance.

2.2.4 Delegative versus representative democracies

The scepticism about political change in Africa harks back to Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan's (1996) research on the problems of democratic consolidation. Their argument is based on the need to distinguish between the transition period and the consolidation of a democracy. As the authors state, "The outcomes of these processes are also distinct: Transitions result in the creation of a new regime; consolidation results in the stability and persistence of that regime, even in the face of severe challenges" (1996, p. 3). Consolidation should not be confused with stability. Some of the main influences that the authors mention on the consolidation of democracy are the beliefs, values and attitudes of citizens towards the regime. The authors note that even if ordinary citizens are not politically involved, their trust in the regime is, in the long term, crucial. According to Diamond and Morlino (2005), citizens can be compared to the clients of a regime; their satisfaction is therefore essential in the appraisal of their regimes.

"The citizen's role is the distinguishing element between authoritarian and democratic regimes" – as is eloquently stated by Schmitter and Karl (1991); all regimes have rulers and public realms, but citizens occur only in democracies. The citizens' role, and particularly the notion of citizens' rights, is the key distinction between democratic regimes and other kinds of regimes. These include the right to choose their representatives and the right to exert power over their elected representatives. In a democratic political system in which policies should be based on consent, the level of support is of major importance. Political support is not just about whether people approve or disapprove of their government. It includes whether they feel a part of the governing process (Patterson, Boynton and Hedlund, 1969; Boynton, Patterson and Hedlund, 1968).

Scholars studying Latin American politics stress that democracy in this region does not fulfil the principles of representative democracy, but instead the practice is what they conceptualise as *delegative democracy* (O'Donnell, 1994). Delegative democracies occur in countries in which the political transition ended in a grey area, meaning that they are not at risk of reverting to authoritarian regimes, but they do not, at the same time, show progress toward institutionalised democratic practices.

According to Bratton and Logan (2006), African democracies are similar to Latin America's 'delegative democracies'. Elected presidents use the legitimacy acquired from elections to set themselves above other institutions. They behave as kings and not as presidents (Malamud, 2002). They act as superior to all other political institutions, such as parliaments and the judiciary. They are, therefore, immune to accountability. Accountability is thus an unnecessary impediment to the full authority that the president has been delegated to use.

To understand the difference between representative democracies and delegative democracies better, it is important to clarify the concept of representation. Representation is one of the key terms used in politics. According to O'Donnell (1994), representation entails accountability: "… in other words, it entails an obligation for representatives to answer to the represented". Representation has been a recurrent concern for scholars because of the relevance that it has for the model of organisation of our political systems. The debate about what it means is not uncontroversial today, and neither has it been over the course of history.

In the nineteenth century, John Stuart Mill's (2001) essay 'Considerations on Representative Government' defended the principle of representative democracy, advocated the adequate representation of minorities, urged renewed public participation in political action for necessary social reforms, and pointed out the dangers of class-oriented, or special-interest legislation (Philosophy, 2009).

One century earlier, the philosopher Burke defended in his writings the need for a parliamentarian to have full freedom to act, and not to be subjugated to the will of the represented. This debate between Mill and Burke about the conceptualisation of representation is accurately summarised by Pitkin (1969). According to Pitkin's analysis, Burke maintained that representation should be the mission of the elite, essentially

representing not individual people but the great and stable major interests, which together make up the national interest. The representatives should be like trustees: They have an obligation to look after their constituents but not to consult or obey them. According to Pitkin, Mill thinks of the representative as both an agent and as a trustee. He objects to the notion of aristocracy, based on the belief that people know how best they should be represented. For Mill, the representative should be an agent of the representative government, instead of the trustee that Burke defends. This debate, along with some variation, continues to the present. How should the representative be defined, and what constitutes the function of representation?

A recent study brings an innovative approach to the debate on representation. Carman (2006) endeavours to include the perspective of the public in his study. The literature in general does not deal extensively with the direct opinion of the public, but Carman tries to bring the public into the debate through a study of the public's preferences regarding parliamentary representation. In his study, he argues that individuals have attitudes about the type and degree of relationship that they believe should exist between elected parliamentarians, parties and constituents.

Few studies have been undertaken about how citizens perceive parliaments. Peverill Squire, in 1993, used public opinion data from seven American states to examine how closely people follow the activities of the state legislature. His findings challenge expectations regarding the relationship between the level of professionalism of MPs and the evaluation that citizens make about them. In Squire's findings, this level of professionalism is positively related to the degree of contact MPs have with constituents, but it is negatively related to the citizens' evaluations of a member of parliament's performance. They also found that the size of a district exerts little influence on public support for the legislature (Squire, 1993).

The fear among political scientists of there being a movement away from representative democracy does not exist only with respect to the current affairs of Latin America and other regions with emerging democracies. Only four decades ago, the philosopher Arendt expressed the same fear regarding Western countries, stating that "the people are not admitted to the public realm; once more the business of government has become the privilege of the few" (Arendt, 1965, p. 240).

Elections are the first instrument for political accountability, because through elections incumbents are forced to submit to the scrutiny of the public. However, elections in a representative democracy cannot be the only instrument that the electorate has for keeping rulers accountable.

O'Donnell (1994) stresses that the weakness of the system lies not so much on the side of the public but with institutions such as parliaments. In delegative democracies, these institutions struggle to develop their independence, and face a lack of cooperation from the executives, who see them as irrelevant. New democracies, where institutions are still embryonic, face a greater risk of deficiencies regarding accountability.

Others researching Latin American systems also have a negative opinion about the role of parliaments in this part of the world. These authors are more concerned with the detailed functioning of legislatures, and claim that the problem is that in Latin America, legislatures are reactive and the presidents are proactive (Cox, Morgenstern, 2001). These authors suggest that in Latin America the typical situation is that the legislatures cannot remove presidents from their positions, and they struggle with a lack of resources, which limits their ability to generate their own proposals. Therefore, they are merely reactive to the proposals of the executive. However, these scholars do not in suggesting this imply that the reactive nature of Latin American legislatures renders them dysfunctional (Cox, Morgenstern, 2001).

Deficiencies in accountability are often more discernible – and critical – in new democracies than in long-established democracies (Diamond, Platnner and Schedler, 1999). Regarding the assessment of parliaments, autonomy is commonly confused with efficiency. However, parliaments in new democracies that arise side by side with strong executives often suffer from a lack of autonomy rather than from a lack of efficiency (Carey, Formanek & Karpowicz, 1999).

With multypartism, African countries joined the 'age of parliaments' mentioned by Norton in his classification of the proliferation of parliaments around the world (Norton, 2002). Subsequently, this expansion of multiparty parliaments resulted in an edited book, a collective effort published on African parliaments in multiparty democracies (Salih, 2005). The editor of this book explains that parliaments in Africa are active and execute several

important functions, such as legislation (where proposals and programs, in the main, emanate from the political executive), representation (by providing the link between government and the people), scrutiny of the executive (to ensure that government is accountable, including the power to remove it), political recruitment of a pool of talent (some of which is expected to find its way to leading political and decision-making positions), legitimisation (through representative legislation, the open debating of public affairs, and government performance) and conflict management.

Developing simultaneously with the theory of the marginality of the law-making function for these legislatures was the view of Africa as an example of a continent ruled by neo-patrimonialism, and as a continent of the 'big man'. The Afrobarometer surveys have revealed higher levels of trust in presidents than in all other political institutions; this can be viewed as a sign that this 'big man' concept is still evident in the African political arena, even in countries where democratisation has taken place. However, the same surveys reveal an important finding that could question whether the theory of the 'big man' remains prevalent in these countries.

Many post-independence African countries opted for a one-party system, mainly with a socialist ideology. The parliaments in these countries began by defining themselves as the 'people's voice' but changed during the 1960s and 1970s, as the parties made significant adaptations that weakened their socialist structures (Salih, 2005). Although their real powers were short lived, the existence of these parliaments contributed to a degree of some institutionalisation. As mentioned above regarding the post-1990 wave of democratisation in Africa, there is little research available on African legislatures, particularly on the representative role of legislatures. One of the few comparative studies on legislatures is the four-country analysis of 'emerging legislatures' in Benin, Ghana, Kenya, and Senegal coordinated by Barkan, Ademolekun & Zhou (2004). They conclude that "the wave of political liberalisation and democratisation that swept across Africa during the 1990s gave rise to an expansion of legislative authority in some countries, but not in all" (Barkan, Ademolekun & Zhou, 2004).

Even though legislatures in Africa have often been labelled as 'weak', this attribute can vary significantly across countries: "The authority of the legislature ranged from being very weak

in Senegal to being moderately strong in Kenya, with Benin and Ghana falling somewhere in between" (Thomas & Sissokho, 2005). Barkan's (1979) work on the Kenyan parliament has provided valuable data on African legislatures. Barkan concluded that both rural and urban dwellers in Kenya were better informed about politics than Americans were, at least in terms of being able to identify their elected representatives. Barkan (1979) explored how legislatures can play an important role in the development of a largely agrarian society, especially with regard to the linkages that members of parliament can provide with their constituencies in rural areas.

A study conducted in 1978 (Loewenberg & Kim, 1978) tried to measure the representativeness of legislatures in six countries (Belgium, Italy, Switzerland, Turkey, Korea, and Kenya), solely by using data on the attitudes of MPs. The investigators collected data on how members of parliament conceptualised their constituencies, the extent of their communication with their constituencies, and their receptiveness to their constituencies' views.

2.2.5 Why the lack of studies on parliaments

In general, the great majority of legislative studies are country-specific, rather than comparative. Norton concluded from his review of the literature that "We know a great deal about particular legislatures but very little about legislatures as legislatures. There is a mass of literature on the US Congress … yet relatively little of that literature helps us advance our understanding of legislatures" (Norton 2002). Most of these studies have focused on the internal dynamics within specific legislatures, or on the relationship between the legislature and executive, with far less attention devoted to the relationship between citizens and legislatures.

There are several reasons why Africa's legislatures have received little systematic attention. With regard to the study of the links between citizens and parliaments, the problem is mainly a lack of data. With few exceptions, scholars have had no access to reliable data on public opinion in Africa. The scarcity of public opinion data is related to the lack of democracy in these countries. But it is also a result of an absence of the complex and costly structures and reliable census data needed to run public opinion polls.

As mentioned above, the literature on parliaments in Africa is mainly negative concerning the role of these representative organisations. In addition, African citizens are commonly referred to in the political science literature as 'minor' citizens, as a result of the legacy of colonialism and dictatorships in the region. Additionally, common images in the media of poverty, AIDS and malaria reinforce a picture of African citizens as victims or subjects who are illiterate and easily manipulated in all spheres – international, national, religious, ethnic, and party.

To add to this picture in recent times is the image of Africans as 'mere' voters without being 'citizens'. As Bratton and Logan state, "In fact, the problem for many new democracies in Africa is not so much that citizens knowingly delegate authority to strong presidents, but that democracy remains unclaimed by mere 'voters'" (Bratton & Logan, 2006, p.iv). This gloomy image is not far from that suggested in the literature of parliaments in Africa as being merely the rubber stamps of their executives.

While citizens' perceptions of legislatures have been the subject of scholarly investigation, this research has been largely focused on established democracies. The typical research design has compared public opinion on a number of policy issues to either the attitudes of legislators or their legislative voting records. An important, innovative and atypical contribution is Richard Fenno's (1978) study of US members of Congress in their home districts from the perspective of the legislator. Fenno made thirty-six trips with Congressmen and Congresswomen, over a period of eight years, to conduct his study. He understood that from the perspectives of the Congressman and Congresswomen, keeping the link with their district was a difficult but important task. He argues that analysing the behaviour of MPs demands an understanding of how they perceive their constituents, and also how they behave in 'their home' (Fenno 1978).

2.2.6 Public opinion

A more recent example is a study by Squire (1993), who used public opinion data from seven American states to examine how closely people follow the activities of state legislatures. His findings challenge expectations regarding the level of professionalism of MPs, and citizens' evaluation of them. The study's findings show that the level of professionalism is positively correlated with the level of contact with constituencies, but is negatively correlated with

citizens' evaluations of the performance of MPs. They also found that the size of a district exerts little influence on public evaluation of the legislature (Squire, 1993). The literature on the relationships between MPs in Africa and their constituencies often characterises these as negative and clientelistic (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997; Burnell, 2003).

In Africa, data on public opinion is scarce: "To test competing explanations of attitudes to reform in sub-Saharan Africa, one would need a comprehensive set of public opinion data, preferably for a range of countries. But since Africa remains an understudied continent, such data is scarce, spotty, or entirely nonexistent …. Systematic cross-national comparisons of public opinion were not introduced to Africa until the World Values Survey was extended to Nigeria and South Africa in 1993" (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005, p. 51). The same authors express concerns about the democratic process in cases where there is a communication gap between citizens and their political institutions: "It is, therefore, with some concern for the consolidation of democracy that we further examine the representation gap, that is, the dearth of formal contacts between the electorate and their chosen leaders".

Dalton also expresses this as a general concern among social scientists: "A very short time ago, political experts worried about the fragility of democracy … and political institutions were having a difficult time adjusting to calls for a more participatory democracy … the problem arose because political institutions were not growing to meet the citizenry's new needs and demands" (Dalton, 1996, p.261).

The literature on public opinion tends to be sceptical about how citizens can perform their role in democracies, and to what extent politics interests them: "That the mass public opinion is typically uninformed and uninterested in policy matters has been a settled question in public opinion research" (Kuklinski, 2001, p. 131). However, Kuklinski (2001) points out that although they can seem apathetic, citizens are able to exercise their role and hold their rulers and their elites accountable.

Concerning this relationship between democracy and public opinion, Hutchings (2003) explains that citizens exhibit a lack of clarity in their perception of political affairs. The principal lines of the modern critique of citizens' reasoning were laid down by Walter Lippman in his seminal work, *Public Opinion* (1922). Citizens, he contended, spend the

largest part of their time and energy engaged with concerns about their work, their families, and the world of public affairs is by contrast remote [and] complex. The 'pictures in their minds' tend to be crude, oversimplified, and stereotypical (Hutchings, 2003, p. 133)". Hutchings goes on to say, "This view of the mass public suggests that the electorate might best be described as a loose collection of sleeping giants … However, they can become surprisingly alert" (Hutchings, 2003, p. 3). Awake, then, they can be motivated by the lack of compatibility of the elite's interests with theirs. And while Hutchings's study is based on the American context, when taking into consideration the current lack of confidence in the capacity of Africans to be 'democratic citizens', it is pertinent to consider whether this is also appropriate in the African context.

How citizens assess and support political institutions, politicians and regimes has been one of the core topics of research in political studies in recent decades. Based on the belief that democratic regimes need political support, scholars have been trying to measure and understand the real impact of citizens' support. Politicians and practitioners have been more enthusiastic about understanding how much support they have, especially ahead of elections.

The media also broadcasts regular polls regarding both politicians themselves and their policies (Swanson, Mancini, 1996). The development of statistical software and other means of testing public opinion towards the end of the twentieth century and at the beginning of the twenty-first made polls a political tool accessible not only to Western countries but also to emerging democracies. Opinion polls ahead of African elections are starting to become common practice.

Tvangarai had opinion polls conducted by the University of Zimbabwe, which put him ahead of Mugabe in the elections of 2007.[7] In the local elections in Cape Verde in March 2008, several opinion polls were conducted; some were requested by the candidates themselves, some by local businesspeople, and others by the national broadcaster.[8] These are just a few examples of how electoral opinion polls are now also reaching African politics.

[7] See 'Morgan Tsvangirai leads opinion polls', http://en.afrik.com/article12842.html, retrieved 8 August, 2008

[8] See, for example, Sondagem (Do Paicv) Dá Vitória A Jorge Figueiredo No Sal, http://www.expressodasilhas.cv/noticias/detail/id/1404/, retrieved 5 July, 2008

However, these opinion polls are attempts to measure specific support (Easton, 1965) and are short-term evaluations of performance or policy decisions. Scholars have been trying to determine a measurement of the support that Easton (1965, 1975) has labelled as diffuse, because it is generally accepted that democratic regimes, to survive and even to function, depend on the public's will, acquiescence, and support.

These endeavours have varied in their methodology and conceptualisation. Fewer studies have been conducted relating to the support of parliaments. On the other hand, the literature indicates an attempt to measure support for regimes, because for different reasons, this has been a concern of established and emerging democracies.

2.2.7 Citizens' support of parliaments

With regard to established democracies, scholars have been interested in what seems to be citizens' alienation from politics. With regard to emerging democracies, the studies attempt to ascertain whether, based on citizens' support, these new regimes will survive. As Norris points out, "… the consequences for the system of growing political cynicism may be expected to prove even more serious for regime stability, particularly in newer democracies" (Norris, 1999, p. 264).

The literature that has been dedicated to measuring political support constitutes a large family of concepts and measures – as described in the *Compendium of Political Measures* (Robinson, Shaver, Wrightsman, 1999, p. 469). Concerning attempts to use the concept of political support in the African context, Achola's (1984) study regarding public support in Ghana deserves particular attention for the substance and pertinence of the analysis. Despite the relevance of this study, it should be noted that this was a public survey conducted in the Ghanaian city Komasi during the military regime. For this reason, it is peculiar that one of his findings is that higher education is statistically significant as a determinant of support for central government, local government and the army. However, regarding support for the army, high levels of education correlated with less support. The study also points out that in the African context the variables urban/rural and formal education should be treated with caution as causal variables for explaining political support (Achola, 1984, p. 400).

As stated before, few studies have analysed support for parliaments. However, there are some noteworthy exceptions. Boynton, Paterson and Hedlun (1968) call attention to the danger of confusing support for individuals within an institution with support for the institution itself. The authors claim that support for the institution can be diffuse or specific. Diffuse support is what they call a 'reservoir of goodwill' and is not dependent on the evaluation of a particular outcome (Boynton, Paterson and Hedlun, 1968, p. 163). In the same study, they mention the difficulty that political science faces in measuring political support for parliaments. They developed an indicator for legislative support, composed of seven possible responses (ranging from 'Disagree' to 'Agree') based on citizens' responses to a survey in the American state of Iowa. The questions were related to whether citizens felt that there were times when it was almost better for them or the governor to take the law into their own hands, as well as to the reduction of the legislature's powers. They found that people with more political knowledge and with a higher socioeconomic status gave more support to the legislature. Variable political knowledge was indicated by answers to questions regarding the knowledge that respondents had about the legislature itself, and not about political knowledge in general – specifically about whether they knew how many times the legislature met and the duration of the legislature's mandate.

The study conducted by Mishler and Rose (1993, 1994) in Eastern Europe exhibited a different view of legislative support. It suggests that in emerging democracies legislative support needs to be measured differently from the way it is measured in consolidated democracies. According to this study, the question in emerging democracies concerns whether the public supports the existence of parliaments in these new democracies; in their view, a measure of parliamentary performance is at this stage superlative. The existence of a parliament in these new democracies, which allows the presence and participation of minorities, can exacerbate and mobilise social cleavages, which as a result, can have a negative impact on support for the regime. In addition, these parliaments, due to their youthfulness, are still inefficient and unruly, which can have obvious consequences with regard to public evaluation.

The relationship between African citizens and their parliaments receives even less attention in the literature than does the study of parliaments. This study attempts to reduce the gap in the literature regarding Africans' attitudes towards these emerging institutions.

CHAPTER 3
Parliaments' features and individuals' socioeconomic and political milieus

The descriptive analysis carried out in this chapter contextualises the country-specific analyses by providing data on their demographic makeup and socioeconomic conditions. An examination of the characteristics of the examined countries' parliaments in terms of this framework allows for a meaningful interpretation of the related public opinion findings from the Afrobarometer survey.

3.1 Living conditions of African citizens

The realities of adult African citizens in 2008 are considerably different from those of citizens of 20 to 40 years ago. It is important to be aware while describing the demographic, socioeconomic, communications and political characteristic of a typical African citizen that Africa is a continent of great diversity. Citizens have diverse characteristics even within the same country, for example, as is the case in South Africa, where citizens living in third-world conditions coexist alongside fellow citizens living in the conditions of a lavish and developed first world. This coexistence of extreme social disparities is itself one of the characteristics of the sub-Saharan African continent, a region with the second most unequal distribution of wealth in the world, exceeded only by Latin America (Sparks, 2007).

3.1.1 Socioeconomic conditions of Africans

Africa has the second highest uneven distribution of income of the world; this to some extent is a result of the economic growth that the continent has been witnessing in recent decades. The average GDP (per capita in constant 2000 USD) went up from 531 USD per capita in 1990 to 572 USD per capita in 2005. However, this increase did not occur uniformly across all countries studied. Botswana has seen the greatest increase in GDP per capita, both in absolute and percentage terms, with an increase of 2183 USD between 1990 and 2005, nearly

doubling over the period to reach a figure of 4 559 USD – the highest of the 18 countries.

South Africa has shown a consistent rise in GDP per capita during the 1990s, reaching a figure of 3429 USD in 2005. This moderate growth of 8.8 percent for the period has allowed Botswana to overtake it on this measure as the leading country among the 18 studied. All other countries, with a few exceptions, have shown positive economic growth. Cape Verde has managed to increase its per capita GDP by 491 USD (58 percent) over the 15 years. The GDP per capita for all 18 countries in this study is shown in the table below. The three countries whose GDP per capita has decreased are Zambia, Kenya and Zimbabwe. Three of the four countries coming off the lowest base in 1990 – Mozambique, Uganda and Mali – all display growth rates in the top half of the table, as may be expected, the exception being Malawi.

Table 3.1: Real GDP per capita in constant 2000 USD for the 18 countries in the study

	GDP pc 1990	**GDP pc 2005**	**Variation**
Benin	273	323	50
Botswana	2 376	4 559	2183
Cape Verde	852	1 343	491
Ghana	211	288	77
Kenya	451	442	**-9**
Lesotho	378	547	169
Madagascar	271	273	2
Malawi	131	154	23
Mali	183	244	61
Mozambique	170	288	118
Namibia	1 619	2 096	477
Nigeria	386	456	70
Senegal	434	503	69
South Africa	3 152	3 429	277
Tanzania	259	325	66
Uganda	173	270	97
Zambia	361	351	**-10**
Zimbabwe	637	432	**-205**
Africa sub-Saharan average	531	572	41

Source: The World Bank Group. *2007a*.

In spite of its economic growth, the region is not doing well compared to the rest of the world. Sub-Saharan Africa has the lowest per capita income, the lowest life expectancy, and the highest rates of HIV infection. Africa still ranks as the region with the largest population living on less than 1 USD a day, as is shown in the table below.

Table 3.2: Population living on less than 1 USD per day (percentage)

	1981	1990	2004
East Asia and Pacific	57.7	29.6	9.1
Europe and Central Asia	0.7	0.5	0.9
Latin America and Caribbean	9.7	11.3	8.6
Middle East and North Africa	5.1	2.4	1.5
South Asia	51.5	41.3	30.1
Sub-Saharan Africa	41.6	44.6	41.1

Source: The World Bank Group, *2007a*

The table below shows the percentage of the population living on less than 1 USD and on less than 2 USD a day, by country. Using this measure as the generally accepted indicator of progress in poverty reduction, Madagascar, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, all of which have more than 80 percent of their populations living on less than 2 USD a day, can be considered the poorest countries. At a more severe level of poverty of under 1 USD a day, Nigeria stands out clearly for having a poverty level of nearly double the average of 39 percent among 16 of the 18 countries studied. Nigeria still has the highest level of poverty for populations living on under 2 USD a day, but Tanzania, Zambia, Madagascar and Zimbabwe follow closely behind it. Botswana and South Africa have the lowest levels of poverty for populations living on under 2 USD a day.

It is worth differentiating between the countries that have a greater concentration of their populations falling into the 1-2 USD-a-day band from those that fall into the 0-1 USD-a-day band. These are Benin, Kenya, Malawi, Senegal, Botswana and South Africa. This exercise may point to a distribution of wealth in these countries that is shifting away from the poorest levels to a more equitable one, with an emerging middle class.

Table 3.3: Percentage of populations living on less than 1 USD and 2 USD per day

Country	% pop < 1 USD/day	% pop < 2 USD/day
Benin	30.9 (2003)	73.7 (2003)
Botswana	23.5 (1993)	50.1 (1993)
Cape Verde	Not Available	Not Available
Ghana	44.8 (1998-99)	78.5 (1998-99)
Kenya	22.8 (1997)	58.3 (1997)
Lesotho	36.4 (1995)	56.1 (1995)
Madagascar	61.0 (2001)	85.1 (2001)
Malawi	20.8 (2004-05)	62.9 (2004-05)
Mali	36.1 (2001)	72.1 (2001)
Mozambique	36.2 (2002-03)	74.1 (2002-03)
Namibia	34.9 (1993)***	55.8 (1993)***
Nigeria	70.8 (2003)	92.4 (2003)
Senegal	17.0 (2001)	56.2 (2001)
South Africa	10.7 (2000)	34.1 (2000)
Tanzania	57.8 (2000-01)	89.9 (2000-01)
Uganda	Not Available	Not Available
Zambia	63.8 (2004)	87.2 (2004)
Zimbabwe	56.1 (1995-96)	83.0 (1995-96)

Source: The World Bank Group. 2007b
*** All are based on expenditure, except Namibia, which is based on income

As is shown in the table below, none of the countries in the study could be classified as 'High' on the UNDP's 'Human Development Index', which ranks human development in the world. In fact, no African country is classified as 'High' on this index.

Cape Verde is the African country with the best performance in this regard. Cape Verdeans have achieved a development score double that of Malians and Mozambicans. The country has shown remarkable development achievements, and their promotion to the rank of countries with medium human development was celebrated in 2007, the year in which this was achieved ("*ONU garante que país continuará a ser apoiado após graduação de Janeiro"*, 2007).

The life expectancy of Africans varies markedly among the 18 countries studied, ranging from a low of just over 40 years in Zambia and Zimbabwe to a standout high of 71 years in Cape Verde. Other countries that appear at the high end of the life expectancy spectrum are, as shown in the table below, Senegal, Ghana, Madagascar and Benin, all in excess of the Afrobarometer's continental average of 50 years – one that is 18 years lower than the world average. AIDS, Malaria and a lack of health resources leave the African population more vulnerable than the rest of the world.

The African citizen of 2008 will probably have had better access to education than one born a generation earlier, as at that time the probability of being illiterate in Africa was 50 percent. This rate has now dropped to 20 percent (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 2007). The inter-country differences regarding education are as equally marked as those of life expectancy – Mali ranks at the bottom of the list, with only 24 percent of its population being literate. Only three other countries in the study have literacy rates below 50 percent: Benin, Mozambique and Senegal. Zimbabwe's literacy rate of nearly 90 percent in 2005 was one of the highest in Africa and the world, and this is owed to an aggressive education drive after independence, but the lack of investment in education and the exodus of qualified teachers have since put those gains under pressure ('Zimbabwe humanitarian country', 2008).

It is also worth noting that among the countries rated as 'Low' on the human development scale, several have a literacy level verging on 70 percent, namely, Nigeria, Tanzania and Zambia. Ghana has the lowest literacy level of countries rated as 'Medium' on the scale, lower than the continental average.

Africa is a continent of youth, with 63.7 percent of the population of sub-Saharan Africa being less than 24 years old (U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base, 2009).

Table 3.4: Human development. Life expectancy, literacy and GDP for the 18 countries studied

HDI Rank*		Human Development Index value (2005)	Life expectancy at birth, annual estimates (years) 2005	Adult literacy rate (percent aged 15 and older) 1995-2005b
Sub-Saharan Africa		0.493	49.6	60.3
World		0.743	68.1	78.6
Medium Human Development				
102	Cape Verde	0.736	71.0	81.2
121	South Africa	0.674	50.8	82.4
124	Botswana	0.654	48.1	81.2
125	Namibia	0.650	51.6	85.0
135	Ghana	0.553	59.1	57.9
138	Lesotho	0.549	42.6	82.2
143	Madagascar	0.533	58.4	70.7
148	Kenya	0.521	52.1	73.6
151	Zimbabwe	0.513	40.9	89.4
154	Uganda	0.505	49.7	66.8
Low Human Development				
156	Senegal	0.499	62.3	39.3
158	Nigeria	0.470	46.5	69.1
159	Tanzania	0.467	51.0	69.4
163	Benin	0.437	55.4	34.7
164	Malawi	0.437	46.3	64.1
165	Zambia	0.434	40.5	68.0
172	Mozambique	0.384	42.8	38.7
173	Mali	0.380	53.1	24.0

Source: United Nations Development Programme, 2007. Human development report, 2007/2008.

3.1.2 Demographic conditions

Further to their progress on education, the African citizens of 2008 are more likely to be inhabitants of a large city than in the past (United Nations Population Fund [UNPF], 2007). According to the United Nations, there has been extraordinarily rapid urban growth in the developing world. This is particularly notable in Africa and Asia, where the urban population will double between 2000 and 2030. According to UNPF, in 2007, four in ten African citizens were city residents.

However, within the 18 countries covered in this study, there are major differences in urbanisation rates. In seven countries the urbanisation rate is inferior to the continental average of 35 percent: Kenya (21 percent), Lesotho (23 percent), Madagascar (30 percent), Mali (31 percent), Mozambique (34 percent), Tanzania (24 percent), and Uganda, with the lowest level of urban population, having around only one in ten citizens living in a city (12 percent) (United Nations World Urbanisation Prospects: the 2007 Revised Population Database, 2007). Namibia, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe share the same rate of urbanisation as the African average (35 percent).

At the other end of the scale, with over 50 percent of the population residing in urban areas is South Africa (59 percent), followed by Botswana (57 percent) and Cape Verde (57 percent). Ghana's, Nigeria's and Senegal's urban populations make up less than half of their total populations, but still exceed the African average, with rates of 48 percent, 46 percent and 42 percent respectively (UNPF, 2007).

Even though the African countries studied here exhibit differences in urbanisation rates, all countries show increases in their urban populations. The rate of urbanisation in Africa has been the highest in the world in last two decades (Njoh, 2003).

On average, an African citizen lives 18.5 years less than the average lifespan of citizens of the world.

Table 3.5: Population density per km^2, percentage that is urbanised, and numbers in major towns

Country	Population density (per km^2)	Percentage of population that is urban*	Major town
Benin	77.8	40.0%	Cotonou 762 000 (2007)
Botswana	3.2	57.3%	Gabarone 210 000 (2005)
Cape Verde	122.4 (2007)	57.4%	Praia 117 000 (2005)
Ghana	96.5	47.8%	Accra 2 121 000 (2007)
Kenya	58.3	20.7%	Nairobi 3 010 000 (2007)
Lesotho	61.7	23.3%	Maseru 172 000 (2005)
Madagascar	32.6	28.5%	Antananarivo 1 697 000 (2007)
Malawi	114.5	17.3%	Lilongwe 676 000 (2005)
Mali	9.7	30.5%	Bamako 1 494 000 (2007)
Mozambique	25.5 (2007)	34.5%	Maputo 1 446 000 (2007)
Namibia	2.5	35.1%	Windhoek 233 529 (2001 census)
Nigeria	157.2	46.2%	Lagos 9 466 000 (2007)
Senegal	55 (2005)	41.6%	Dakar 2 604 000 (2007)
South Africa	39.3	59.3%	Johannesburg 3 225 812 (2001 census)
Tanzania	41.8	24.2%	Dar Es Salaam 2 930 000 (2007)
Uganda	116.9 (2007)	12.5%	Kampala 1 420 000 (2007)
Zambia	15.5	35.0%	Lusaka 1 328 000 (2007)
Zimbabwe	33.9	35.9%	Harare 1 572 000 (2007)
Sub-Saharan Africa	32*	40.0%	
World	48*	57.3%	

Source: (Frame et al., 2007). All data from 2006 unless specified, *2005. **Source:** United Nations World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revised Population Database

3.1.3 Access to communication

Another important change in the characteristics of the African citizens of 2008 is their access to information and communication technology, especially their access to mobile phones and the Internet. The 2008 edition of the *African Telecommunication/ICT Indicators Report* examined the state of Africa's Information and Communication Technology (ICT) sector, including mobile and Internet/broadband development. This report indicates how Africa has changed with regard to ICT in recent years and how it is likely to change in the near future. Presently, all countries have mobile networks and are connected to the Internet. Rapid change has occurred, particularly with regard to the number of mobile subscribers in the last few years. In 2007 alone, 60 million Africans became new subscribers to mobile networks. The ITU (ITU Telecom Africa) predicts that mobile penetration in the region is approximately 30 percent.

The previous ITU report on Africa was published in 1990. In this report, there were only 8.6 million telephone subscribers in Africa, most of them in North Africa and South Africa. The report indicates that in 1990 Norway had more telephone subscribers than the entire sub-Saharan Africa combined. Moreover, mobile communication was almost non-existent in Africa, as the technology was still relatively new. The continent had only six mobile networks, and in 1990, no African country was connected to the Internet (International Telecommunication Union [ITU], 2008).

Cape Verde, once one of the most isolated countries in Africa, is now a good example of how the Internet has been used, not just by the general public, but also by state authorities to extend better services to the citizens, addressing in the process the problem that physical distance between the isles has posed to the dissemination of state information and services.

In 2007, the government launched a web service called *'Portal do Cidadão'* (or *'Porton di nos ilha'* in *Criuolo*). This web service aims to be a technological gateway between the government and citizens. Through this service, citizens can, for example, renew official documents online, or within a single day, officially register their company. The use of this Internet portal is thus a concrete measure to help government improve citizens' lives and to make state services more efficient (*Núcleo Operacional da Sociedade de Informação* [NOSI], 2008). This innovative structure reports directly to the prime minister.

In accordance with this effort involving using the Internet to benefit its citizens, the mayor of Praia City in Cape Verde announced in 2007 free wireless access in the public *'praça'* (plaza) in front of the municipality. From that day onwards daily life in the *'praça'* was transformed – in the late afternoon and early evening, small groups of youths (around five or six) could be found seated around one laptop after school hours.

3.1.4 The political environment of an African citizen

An African citizen in 2008, on average, will be freer than an African citizen of 20 years ago. After short periods of freedom following the independences of the 1960s and 1970s, most African countries became autocracies. Coups d'état were the norm, and presidents tried to perpetuate their stay in power. Many changes have occurred in this regard in the last two decades. In sub-Saharan Africa, only the Botswanans have had the opportunity of continually choosing their leaders through a multiparty ballot vote, with no interruption of democracy allowed following independence.

In the beginning of the 1990s, citizens in many African countries expressed in the streets their impatience with their autocratic regimes and demanded political change. Citizens caught scholars and political leaders by surprise with these popular protests for freedom (Decalo, 1992). Among the sceptical scholars was Samuel P. Huntington (1984), who predicted that democracy would not be embraced in Africa, due to the poverty in the region and the violence of African politics.

Contrary to these predictions, in the 1990s many African countries witnessed political changes in the direction of more freedom for their citizens. Even though there have been important achievements, the progression has not been continual and straightforward as is shown in the table below.

In 1994, South Africa elected a president through a system of true universal suffrage, where for the first time in the country's history, citizens of all races were allowed to vote. South Africa remains, according the Freedom House score, a full democracy up to the present (2008), however, with a decline in civil liberties in 2007.

Cape Verde is at the top ranking of the Freedom House score. In addition to being the most democratic country in Africa, it has also since 1991 witnessed two replacements of the party in power.

The table below shows that in all African countries, with the exception of Zimbabwe, the achievements regarding political and civil liberties have been very significant. In spite of the positive steps in the direction of more liberty, Kenyans, Madagascans, Malawians, Mozambicans, Nigerians, Tanzanians, Ugandans, and Zambians are still in the middle of the scale, their countries being classified by the Freedom House scorecard as 'partly free'. Being only 'partly free' is reason for concern for democracy theorists. After the euphoria of the transitions to multiparty regimes in the 1990s, many countries seemed to have stopped at some point in a middle ground (Carothers, 2002; Diamond, 2002). Citizens in these countries have more liberty and rights than before; however, having reached this middle ground, it seems that the progress of democracy has frozen.

Table 3.6: Evolution of political rights and civil liberties, by country

	1988	1994	1999	2005
Benin	14	5	5	4
Botswana	5	5	4	4
Cape Verde	11	3	3	2
Ghana	12	9	6	3
Kenya	12	12	11	6
Lesotho	12	8	8	5
Madagascar	10	6	6	6
Malawi	13	5	6	8
Mali	12	6	6	4
Mozambique	13	8	7	7
Namibia	11	4	5	5
Nigeria	10	13	7	8
Senegal	7	9	8	5
South Africa	11	5	3	3
Tanzania	12	12	8	7
Uganda	10	10	10	9
Zambia	11	7	9	8
Zimbabwe	11	10	11	13

Source: Freedom House, 1972-2006. This is the combined score for civil liberties and political rights, the best is 2; the worst is 14

Nancy G. Bermeo (2003), in her work called *Ordinary Citizens,* explains that ordinary citizens in some or other way are so busy living their daily lives that politics are not the centre of their concerns. The daily struggles of raising children, jobs, family, money, and transport use up all of the energy and time of most of whom she calls *ordinary citizens* (Bermeo, 2003). If this is true for the ordinary citizens of the world, it is even truer for ordinary African citizens as a result of their social and economic conditions, as described previously in this chapter. However, as Bermeo also says, from time to time ordinary citizens surprise us with their actions in embracing or disputing political regimes and leaders. This was partly what happened with what was known as the food crisis in 2008.

In the middle of 2008, African citizens unexpectedly organised popular riots against the increase of food prices. Several of the protests turned violent, with African governments struggling to calm the violence in the streets. In Burkina Faso, protesters burned government buildings and looted stores; in Cameroon, a taxi drivers' strike over fuel prices mutated into a massive protest about food prices, with at least 20 people dying in the protests. In Senegal, Mauritania, Cote D'Ivoire, and Mozambique, protests exploded in the capitals and in several other major cities (Walty, 2008; Bernard & Tuquoi, 2008)

In Mozambique, the main cities were blockaded by the popular uprising. No one could go anywhere for two days – roads, and main transport systems were blocked by enraged protesters (Serra, 2008). The main appraisal of these popular protests throughout Africa, besides all the extraneous causes that can be identified such as the global financial crisis or world population growth, is that African governments were placed at the centre of the problems. During the protests, better governance was demanded, this time not pompously concluded by conferences or by World Bank advisory reports. These were ordinary citizens in the streets demanding solutions from their governments.

Better governance in recent years has become part of the lexicon of donors to Africa. African governments themselves have announced their commitment to better governance, and have even acknowledged that "good governance has been elusive in much of Africa", as is argued by Akokpari (2004, p. 243). To confront this ongoing malfunction, the African union launched the African initiative New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), evidence of the recognised need for better governance (Akokpari, 2004).

Looking to the World Bank indicator for good governance, only 4 of the 18 countries in this study gets a positive score on the scale of good governance, as is seen in the following graph.

Graph 3.1: Quality of governance in the 18 countries (2007)



Source: The World Bank Group, *2007a.* The values vary from -2.5 to 2.5, and higher values correspond to better governance.

The Mo Ibrahim Foundation is an African initiative that also measures good governance across sub-Saharan Africa. Since 2007, this foundation has been classifying African countries regarding their good governance, and former presidents have been rewarded annually for their contribution to their countries. In 2007, Joaquim Chissano, the former president of Mozambique was chosen, and in 2008, the former President of Botswana, Festus Mogae, was chosen (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2008).

3.2. Parliament

In the following chapters, public opinion data on 18 African parliaments will be discussed, presented and analysed. This section provides a summary of parliaments' main characteristics, in order to contribute to a better understanding of the overall analysis. Besides their historical differences, these parliaments have structural and political differences which

are important to highlight, and therefore, in this section, the following questions are asked relative to each parliament:

1. How old is the multiparty parliament? Into how many mandates does this period of existence translate?
2. How is the parliament structured? Is it unicameral or bicameral?
3. How many seats does the parliament have?
4. How many MPs are there per mille?
5. What is the electoral turnout?
6. Has the parliament experienced turnover of the ruling party?
7. How are the MPs elected?
8. Is there a majority in the parliament?
9. How many parties have seats in the parliament?

3.2.1 The age of the parliaments

As was previously stated, multiparty parliaments are still in their infancy in most African counties. The average age of multiparty parliaments in the 18 countries that constitute this study is 16.2 years. As shown in the figure below, Botswana represents an outlier, with its multiparty regime and elected parliament being installed for 42 years as at 2007. At the other end of the scale is Uganda, which opened its parliament to parties only in 2005. Perceivably, the age of multiparty parliaments derives from the 'wave of democratisation' (Huntington, 1991) that swept across the continent. This can be seen in the small range within which the duration of continually elected multiparty parliaments is observed – 13 of the 18 countries have experienced continually elected multiparty parliaments for a period ranging between 13 and 19 years, the six years in which this took place barely accounting for the time span of one election cycle. On average, the parliaments of the 18 countries studied have each experienced four mandates. As shown in Table 3.11, the parliaments of six countries – Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa and Tanzania – have been given only three mandates.

It is known that the roles of legislatures can be influenced by the circumstances of their origin and their age (Muslof & Smith, 1979). The age and the life cycle of a parliament affect both

its role and the institutionalisation of its practices, and these in turn affect the learning experience of sitting with political opponents. In addition, the age of the parliament affects its composition and the experience of the parliamentary staff. Some assemblies inherited a staff structure from the previous authoritarian regime; this situation creates an issue of trust between the new parliamentarians and the old staff.

In this regard, the parliaments differ – in the case of the South African parliament, the staff was inherited from the previous apartheid legislature. As Dr Frene Noshir Ginwala, former speaker, put it when she took office, "All staff of the south African parliament were White" (Ginwala, 2007). In this case, there was the dilemma of the lack of political trust of the new members of parliament in the house staff, and on other hand, this staff was skilled and familiar with the legislature's business, which the new parliamentarians were not familiar with, taking into account their newness in the house. The exceptions were the former political parties – the NP (former apartheid-era ruling party) and the DP (former apartheid-era opposition party); these two parties knew the staff and the house.

A different situation existed in the countries where the ruling party was also the ruling party in the former monoparty regime, as was the case with the Mozambican assembly. Most parliaments in these countries had very rudimentary staff structures, or nearly none existed, since the sitting periods under a monoparty regime are relatively minor.

In these cases, the staff was politically closer to the former ruling party (it is important to note that in monoparty regimes, most of the civil servants were as a rule almost members of the ruling party, but this needs to be assessed carefully, since as there were no opposition parties allowed, there really were no alternatives). Furthermore, in these cases it was the opposition who were making their first appearance at parliament; therefore, it was the opposition that may have experienced apprehension towards the existing staff.

In Mozambique, for example, the staff in 1994 were mainly from the previous monoparty assembly, which meant that they were actually staff of the central committee of FRELIMO. The situation has changed over the years, and there has been an effort at departisation; however, reticence still exists from RENAMO parliamentarians towards the assembly staff. An example of this easing of reticence occurred at the beginning of the third elected term, in

2004, when Maria Moreno was elected leader of the opposition parliamentary group. The party accepted that her driver and her security personnel would be provided by the Assembly, instead of by the political party. Until then, RENAMO had never accepted this type of dispensation, fearing that these staff members would originate from FRELIMO, or in their opinion, which would almost equate to the same thing, from the 'State Security'.

Table 3.7: Age of parliaments and number of mandates

	Age of multiparty parliament (years)	**Number of mandates (electoral cycles)**
Benin	17	5
Botswana	42	9
Cape Verde	17	4
Ghana	16	4
Kenya	16	3
Lesotho	15	4
Madagascar	15	4
Malawi	14	3
Mali	16	4
Mozambique	14	3
Namibia	19	4
Nigeria	9	3
Senegal	8	7
South Africa	14	3
Tanzania	13	3
Uganda	2	1
Zambia	17	4
Zimbabwe	28	6

Source: IPU Parliaments Online database (Parline), 2008.

Besides the consequences of age with regard to the staff structure and resources of parliaments, there are the obvious consequences regarding the parliamentarians themselves – their experience within the parties, their leadership experience, their participation on committees, and their experience of existing internal rules, practices, etc. This does not mean

that age is necessarily correlated with efficiency, but nonetheless, the age of an organisation does affect its performance.

3.2.2 Parliamentary structure and seats

Equally important parliamentary characteristics are size and structure. Africa, like the rest of the world, did not adopt just one model; the continent shows an equal number of bicameral and unilateral parliamentary systems. Of the 191 chambers existent in the world, 114 are unicameral (60 percent) and 77 (40 percent) chambers are bicameral; in Africa, of the 53 chambers existent, 32 are unicameral (60 percent) and 21 are bicameral (39 percent) (*IPU* PARLINE database: Structure of parliaments, 2009).

The distribution of the number of seats in African parliaments is also similar to the rest of the world. The table below confirms that the majority of the structures are medium-sized, between 50 and 199 seats. The largest house in Africa is the 529-member Ethiopian House of Peoples' Representatives.

Table 3.8: Number of chambers for all parliaments in the world and in Africa

Range	World	Africa
<50	59	9
50-99	62	19
100-199	75	26
200-299	27	9
300-399	15	5
400-499	11	4
>500	14	1

Source: IPU PARLINE database: Structure of parliaments, 2009.

Within the 18 countries covered, there are also larger and smaller houses of parliament. The largest lower house is in South Africa, with 400 members, followed by Nigeria, with 260 members. Grouped with the smaller houses is Botswana with 63 members, followed by Cape Verde with 72, and Namibia with 78.

Table 3.9: Number of seats in the 18 African countries covered in the study

Country	Chamber	Structure of parliament	Statutory number	Current number
Benin	National Assembly	Unicameral	83	83
Botswana	National Assembly	Unicameral	63	63
Cape Verde	National Assembly	Unicameral	72	72
Ghana	Parliament	Unicameral	230	230
Kenya	National Assembly	Unicameral	224	224
Lesotho	National Assembly	Bicameral	120	120
Lesotho	Senate	Bicameral	33	31
Madagascar	National Assembly	Bicameral	127	127
Madagascar	Senate	Bicameral	33	33
Malawi	National Assembly	Unicameral	193	193
Mali	National Assembly	Unicameral	147	147
Mozambique	Assembly of the Republic	Unicameral	250	250
Namibia	National Assembly	Bicameral	78	78
Namibia	National Council	Bicameral	26	26
Nigeria	House of Representatives	Bicameral	360	358
Nigeria	Senate	Bicameral	109	109
Senegal	National Assembly	Bicameral	150	150
Senegal	Senate	Bicameral	100	100
South Africa	National Assembly	Bicameral	400	400
South Africa	National Council of Provinces	Bicameral	90	54
Uganda	Parliament	Unicameral	333	332
Tanzania	National Assembly	Unicameral	323	319
Zambia	National Assembly	Unicameral	158	158
Zimbabwe	House of Assembly	Bicameral	210	210
Zimbabwe	Sénat	Bicameral	93	93

Source: IPU PARLINE database: Number of seats, 2009); (IPU PARLINE database: Structure of parliaments, 2009.

3.2.3 MPs per mille

The table below refers to the 'density' of elected MP's for each of the 18 countries' populations. It is evident that parliaments vary significantly regarding the number of

members per mill residents. A headcount of 1 member of parliament per 100 000 of the populace appears to be the common measure among the 18 countries. The exceptions, with very low and very high numbers of MPs per capita are, respectively, countries with relatively small and large populations – that is, a result of the physical constraints/impracticality of having very small or very large assemblies.

In the following chapter, contact that MPs have with the citizens they represent does not seem to be correlated with MP density; still, to assess representation, it is necessary to look at how physically accessible the elected are to their electorate, and vice versa.

The total land area of the eighteen African countries is 9.7 million km^2 (Frame, 2008). The total land area of the United States is 9.1 million km^2 (The Central Intelligence Agency-USA [CIA], 2008), and in the European Union it is 4.3 million km^2 (CIA– European Union, 2008). However, the road coverage is drastically different on the three continents. Road coverage in the eighteen African countries examined is 25 meters of paved road and 91 meters of unpaved road per square kilometre. US road coverage per square kilometre is 400 meters of paved and 285 meters of unpaved road, and European Union road coverage is 1.2 kilometres of paved and only 58 meters of unpaved road per square kilometre. In the eighteen countries studied only 20 percent of the roads are paved[9].

Among the eighteen African countries, there is also a colossal disparity with regard to roads. For example, Mali and South Africa have the same land area of 1.2 million km^2, but Mali has only 3 368 km of paved roads in contrast to 73 506 km in South Africa (Frame, 2008).

Among the eighteen countries examined, there is a need to keep in mind geographical distinctions. For example, Cape Verde is an archipelago composed of ten small islands. The ratio of population per legislator in Cape Verde is the lowest in this sample – 6.056. However, geographical circumstances should be taken into consideration with regard to a country's place in this study's ranking: The Cape Verdean Assembly is located in the capital, Praia, on Santiago Island. For the Cape Verdean MPs to visit their provinces, they have to fly

[9] For the measures of paved and unpaved roads, see *Africa South of the Sahara*, 2008. The percentages and averages were calculated by the author.

or use the ferry. Even though in recent years transport links between the islands have improved substantially, travelling is still expensive and demands extra time.

The portrayal of road coverage relative to MPs per inhabitant shows how difficult, in general, it is for MPs in Africa to access their constituencies, at least in comparison with their Western counterparts. However, the contrary is also true – if it is difficult for MPs to travel to their constituencies, it is even more difficult for citizens from distant parts of the country to access parliament and their parliamentarians.

Table 3.10: Number of MPs per mille population

	Population (in thousands)	**Number of MPs per 100 000 citizens**
Benin	9 309	0.9
Botswana	1 905	3.3
Cape Verde	542	13.3
Ghana	23 946	1.0
Kenya	38 549	0.6
Lesotho	2 020	5.9
Madagascar	20 215	0.6
Malawi	14 288	1.4
Mali	12 716	1.2
Mozambique	21 812	1.1
Namibia	2 102	3.7
Nigeria	151 478	0.2
Senegal	12 687	1.2
South Africa	48 832	0.8
Uganda	31 902	1.0
United Republic of Tanzania	41 463	0.8
Zambia	12 154	1.3
Zimbabwe	13 481	1.6

Source: United Nations Statistics Department, 2008. Indicators on population.

Table 3.11: Parliaments' major features

	FH Score (2006)	Number of continually elected mandates	Turnover experienced	How are MPs elected	Majority party in parliament	How many parties have seats
Benin	4	5	Yes	Party list	No	12
Botswana	4	9	No	Constituency	Yes	3
Cape Verde	2	4	Yes	Party list	Yes	3
Ghana	3	4	Yes	Constituency	Yes	5
Kenya	6	3	Yes	Constituency	Yes	7 (one is a party coalition)
Lesotho	5	4	No	Mixed	Yes	10
Madagascar	6	4	Yes	Mixed	Yes (105 in 127)	4 (two are coalitions)
Malawi	8	3	Yes	Constituency	No	6
Mali	4	4	No*	Constituency	Yes***	4
Mozambique	7	3	No	Party list	Yes	2
Namibia	5	4	No	Party list	Yes	7
Nigeria	8	3	Yes	Constituency	Yes	5
Senegal	5	7	Yes	Mixed	Yes	13
South Africa	3	3	No	Party list	Yes	12
Tanzania	7	3	No	Constituency	Yes	5
Uganda	9	1	No	Constituency	Yes	8
Zambia	8	4	Yes	Constituency	No	7
Zimbabwe	13	6	No**	Constituency	Yes (78 in 120)	2 (plus one independent that was elected speaker)

*

There was a change in the coalition that comprises the government, but the previous ruling party is still dominant within the coalition (ADEMA)
** Does not refer to the election results of 2008, where for the first time, the opposition has the majority of seats. *** But is a coalition.

3.2.4 Electoral turnout

Voter turnout[10] (the number of people voting in legislative elections) is one of the measures of citizen participation. It is worth noting concerning the countries studied that, with the exception of Botswana, the last three elections were also the first two or three continual multiparty elections in the country. Taking into account the novelty of legislative elections, it is pertinent to test and compare voter turnout for the last three legislative elections. In the analysis of how parliaments are seen by the electorate, it is important to assess whether people even establish the first and obvious link between them as the electorate and the elected, meaning do people vote, and is this an increasing or diminishing trend?

The table below shows the electoral turnout for the 18 countries. Mali shows the lowest turnout with only 2 in 10 Malians voting in legislative elections. The low Malian turnout – barely 20 percent – is unique, being at present the lowest voter turnout in the world. Mali is therefore clearly a 'deviant' case with regard to voter-turnout analysis (Blais, Massicotte & Dobrzynska, 2003).

An interesting aspect of the findings of the global report on turnout is that, regarding the evolution of voter turnout, there is no significant difference between the two most widely used systems. Among the countries covered in their analysis, the ones with a *proportional list representation* system exhibited an average turnout of 73 percent, and those with a *first past the post* system exhibited an average turnout of 67 percent (Pintor, 2002).

[10] According to IDEA, voter turnout is expressed as the percentage of voters who cast a vote at an election. This total number of voters includes those who cast blank or invalid votes, as they still participate (IDEA, 2002).

Table 3.12: Turnout[11] for the last three parliamentary elections

	Previous	Penultimate	Latest
Benin	52%	76%	70%
Botswana	68%	77%	77%
Cape Verde	75%	77%	54%
Ghana	28%	65%	61%
Kenya	Not Available	41%	47%
Lesotho	82%	72%	72%
Madagascar	75%	60%	60%
Malawi	80%	92%	92%
Mali	21.6%[12]	21%	22%
Mozambique	88%	68%	36%
Namibia	76%	63%	85%
Nigeria	39%	85%	49%
Senegal	39%	67%	35%
South Africa	87%	89%	77%
Tanzania	77%	73%	73%
Uganda[13]	Not applicable	Not applicable	68%
Zambia	79%	69%	71%
Zimbabwe	31%	48%	48%

Source: Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), 2008**.**

[11] The number of votes divided by the voting population age.

[12] This election was boycotted by several parties: National Congress for Democratic Initiative (CNID), Sudanese Union-African Democratic Rally (US-RDA), Popular Movement for the Development of the Republic of West Africa (MPD), Rally for Democracy and Progress (RDP), Rally for Democracy and Labor (RDT), Union of Democratic Forces for Progress (UFDP), and the Malian Union for Democracy and Development (UMDD).

[13] Only in 2005 was the constitution amended to allow multiparty participation.

3.2.5 Parliamentary turnover

There is no data regarding the turnover of MPs that will allow a comparison of legislative turnover, but in the chapter on Mozambique, the turnover of Mozambican MPs will be presented.

In this section, parliamentary turnover is discussed. This refers to turnover within the ruling party, and consequently, also turnover of the party with the majority of seats (when not in minority rule). Western studies of legislative turnover have been concerned with a lack of turnover. Matland and Studlar argue that without new parliamentarians, there is no circulation of elites, and new ideas will be fewer (2003). As Jackson has stated, a limitation of rotation of parliamentarians "… would mean a danger of the three A's setting in – arrogance, apathy, and atrophy" (1994, p. 270).

As a result of the limited data on parliamentary turnover periods, it is impossible to verify whether the prophecy regarding the three A's is also applicable to Africa. Still, as stated previously, the majority of the countries in this study have not witnessed a turnover of the ruling party. As is observable in Table 3.11, nine of the 18 countries have still not experienced turnover of the parliamentary majority.

It is equally important to consider that turnover needs to be analysed carefully according to the existent electoral system. The constituency electoral system may show more individual MPs turned over than the proportional electoral system.

3.2.6 MP election process

The wave of democratisation in the 1990s brought to the centre of the political science debate the advantages and disadvantages of electoral systems, with theorists advocating which systems new democracies should adopt (Norris, 1997).

This study is not concerned with the evaluative aspect of which system is better or worse. However, it is important to be aware how each MP is elected. The countries analysed have different electoral systems, as presented in Table 3.11.

3.2.7 Party system and distribution of seats

Party systems are crucial features of parliaments. The concept of *party system* encompasses numerous factors and details; however, in this section, the aim is to embrace the existence of majorities. *Majority* is understood as the existence of a party or coalition that controls at least 50 percent of the seats in a parliament.

As can be seen in Table 3.11, only 3 countries do not have a majority party: Benin, Malawi and Zambia. Fifteen countries in this analysis have parties not just with a parliament majority but also with a dominant majority.

In these cases, ruling parties control more than 65 percent of the parliamentary seats. Often in these instances, recurring signs of authoritarian behaviour towards the opposition parties can be observed; also, in these cases, the absolute control of parliament originates with parliamentary groups tending to exhibit behaviour which Janis (1982) called *groupthinking*, defined as the tendency of members of a group to develop converging opinions in a given decision situation. According to research on groupthinking behaviour, extremely defective decision-making performance by the group is exhibited (Turner & Pratkanis, 1998, p. 105). Groups are most likely to exhibit groupthinking when they are highly cohesive. These groups tend to believe that the group is invulnerable, tend to see 'outgroups' as threats, and believe in the inherent moral superiority of their group (Turner & Pratkanis, 1998, p. 106).

What remains to be explored is whether this theory can be applied to the dominant parties in this study. Opposition parties often accuse these ruling parties of acting as though they were omnipotent and of playing dangerous authoritarian ticks. Tony Leon, former opposition leader in South Africa, accused the ruling party not only of exhibiting this behaviour but also of having weakened the National Assembly, undermining the National Assembly's dignity and its role (Leon, 2008).

3.3 Conclusion

In the last twenty years, African citizens and parliaments have changed considerably. Parliaments have started to become multiparty institutions, and it is postulated that they are the core institutions of their representative democracies. A consequence of this is that, African citizens are now the ones who decide who will sit in their parliaments. Multiparty parliaments are chosen at electoral intervals by their citizens. Among the majority of countries in this study, the elected and electorate have been though this process at least three times.

Still, the vote has not changed the economic status of the majority of Africans citizens. Africa remains a continent of poor people: four out of ten citizens live on less than 1 USD. In Nigeria, nine out of ten citizens live on less than 2 USD a day. Africa is also one of the regions of the world with the highest income inequality. Africans have seen their economies grow in recent years, accompanied by more freedom, although the benefits of these achievements are still far removed from the daily life of the ordinary citizen. The quality of governance is seen as the main cause of the continual problems of the continent.

Although the region does have common economic, social and political patterns, generalisations may misrepresent the complex realities. The same is true in relation to comparative levels of democratisation: There are countries doing consistently better, and definitely consolidating their institutions and democracy, although there have also been reversals in some countries covered in this study.

The youth of the parliaments in this study indicate that these institutions are still finding a place in the untamed politics of emerging African democracies. However, politics are not experiences in a static mode; as a result, parliaments cannot reschedule or suspend their development. The need for better governance, for the consolidation of democracy and, overall, to better the lives of ordinary citizens, demands guardian parliaments. Parliaments are mandated by citizens to represent and defend their interests. For this reason, it is critical that there is a minimum of understanding between citizens and parliaments, and between parliaments and citizens. To comprehend this relationship is the aim of the following chapters.

CHAPTER 4
Citizens' perceptions of parliament

This chapter describes and explores public opinion data pertaining to a single point in time that relates to the way citizens perceive their parliaments and parliamentarians. This information is then extended to their expectations of these institutions. Describing data implies addressing the question of 'what is there' at face value (Rindskopf, 2004 p. 137). Following this approach, this section aims to summarise as well as, to a lesser degree, to explore the data. Exploration here is used to mean formulating hypotheses and seeking to explore the meaning of the data; in other words, 'What might the data mean?' (Rindskopf, 2004, p. 138).

In this part of the analysis, a broad description of the data is preferred to an in-depth analysis. In subsequent chapters, an in-depth analysis of the Mozambican Parliament is conducted.

The data analysis is carried out for the grouped sample of the respondents across all countries, followed by a presentation of the same data by country. Under the exploratory analysis by country, the particularity of each parliament and the complexity of its context and environment limit a full comprehension of the phenomena associated with each of them. This type of in-depth country analysis is one that will provide fertile ground for future studies. In addition, a comparison of the country analyses permits the testing of two hypotheses:

H_1: That citizens' perceptions of parliaments will depend on the electoral system

The key function of electoral systems is to elect members of a parliament. The electoral system, in turn, will be affected by the internal characteristics of each parliament. It is therefore to be expected that the method used by citizens to choose their parliamentarians will have an impact on how the elected are perceived by their electors. This begs the question 'Does the electoral system impact on the way in which citizens perceive their parliaments and presidents?'[14]

[14] The analysis of the results needs to take in account the electoral system that elects the MP. The Afrobarometer uses the same question regardless the electoral system in existence.

H_2: That citizens living in countries with dominant ruling parties will have a tendency to evaluate their parliaments more negatively

As stated previously in the introductory chapter, it is reasonable to expect that parliaments will enjoy lower levels of approval by citizens in countries where dominance by a particular party is prevalent, since citizens will perceive their parliament as a mere extension of the ruling party. By the same token, it may be expected that citizens will rate more highly parliaments where dominance by a particular party is not prevalent.

In the countries covered in this study, we predict that where there are parties with parliamentary majorities in excess of 60 percent (see Appendix 3) – these countries are Tanzania, Botswana, Namibia, Senegal, South Africa, Uganda, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Madagascar, and Mozambique – these parliaments will receive lower ratings from citizens.

This chapter describes and explores the following:

- citizens' trust in their parliament
- citizens' approval of the performance of their member of parliament
- citizens' perception of the corruption of the members of parliament
- citizens' perception of the inclination of the members of parliament to listen to them
- how much contact citizens indicated as having had with members of parliament
- how much time citizens believe that members of parliament spend in their constituencies
- how much time citizens believe that members of parliament should be spending in their constituencies.

4.1 Citizens' trust in their parliament

The first graph illustrates how much trust citizens expressed for their parliament. The respondents were asked to rate their level of trust in their parliament. In order to begin to

interpret the answers, it is important to reflect on the meaning of *trust*, be it relative to an institution, a person, or a party. The meaning of the concept *trust* has been the source of an unresolved cross-disciplinary debate (Kramer, 1999). According to Kramer (1999), cited in Robinson (1996), by definition, trust is "a person's expectations, assumptions, or beliefs about the likelihood that another's future actions will be beneficial, favourable, or at least not detrimental to one's interests (1999, p. 576). In applying this definition to the findings, respondents who express trust in their parliament are declaring that their expectations of their parliament are that the parliament's future actions will be beneficial, or at least will not be detrimental, regarding their interests.

As the graph below demonstrates, the results give a clear indication of the high levels of trust that the electorate places in its representatives. Shown on an ascending scale of trust, the replies peak at 'a lot' of trust (29.6 percent), with a high proportion of respondents (25.1 percent) trusting their parliamentarians at least 'somewhat'. As shown in the next chapter, Africans have higher levels of trust in their parliaments compared with the rest of the world. An average of over 5 in 10 citizens place some trust in their parliament. Referring to the above definition of trust, we can infer that the majority of African citizens see their parliaments as actively promoting their interests, or at very least, as being benign, and in particular, they have little or no apprehension about the legitimacy of parliamentary decisions or acts.

In general, African multiparty parliaments existed in the early stages of their evolution as monoparty institutions under authoritarian regimes. African citizens lived under authoritarian regimes, many of them with strong material and ideological links to the former Soviet Union. It is therefore interesting to compare the way African citizens perceive their democratic parliaments to the views of their Eastern European counterparts of their parliaments, since both regions have experienced authoritarian regimes.

Mishler & Rose's (1997) findings regarding trust in political institutions in post-communist countries in Eastern Europe reveal that scepticism is more evident than trust as a legacy of communist regimes. In this chapter, it will be shown that African citizens, on average, contrary to their Eastern European counterparts, do trust in their parliaments. Parliaments in Eastern Europe, as institutions, ranked worst in the world on the measure of popular trust. Only political parties do worse than parliaments, according to their findings.

The positive trust demonstrated by Africans is given as an average for the respondents of the 18 countries. The aggregate results, however, hide the skewed outcome brought about by results at a country level, which are subsequently investigated

Graph 4.1: Trust in parliament



With trust 'Somewhat' and 'A lot' grouped together to represent significant levels of trust, 12 of the 18 countries demonstrate a majority of the electorate (≥50 percent of respondents) who trust in their parliaments. However, as shown in the graph below, again with 'Somewhat' and 'A lot' grouped together to represent significant levels of trust, in 6 of the countries, namely, Nigeria (21 percent), Zimbabwe (35 percent), Benin (38 percent), Zambia (40 percent), Kenya (44 percent) and Madagascar (46 percent), trust in their parliament drops significantly. With the exception of Benin, all of the other countries that express low trust (<50 percent) have a constituency-based electoral system.

This tendency does not mean that constituency-based electoral systems are the cause of the low levels of trust, but it does contradict the contention that with electoral systems where MPs are possibly better known by their constituents, as a result of not having been elected via an almost anonymous party list, this will contribute to a higher trust in the institution. The findings reveal that other variables influence trust and that the electoral system cannot be regarded as a contributor to trust in parliaments.

Considering the level of freedom among the six countries with lower levels of trust, there is no evidence that that this is the cause of the low level of trust in parliament (measured by the number of party seats). With regard to freedom, it can be said that, with the exception of Benin, all other low-trust-ranking countries also rank low on the Freedom House scores. As shown in Table 3.11 in the previous chapter, with regard to the 2006 Freedom House scores, Zimbabwe scores 13, Zambia and Nigeria 8, and Kenya and Madagascar 6, resulting in Zimbabwe being considered 'not free' on this measure, with the aforementioned other four countries being considered only 'partly free'.

The hypothesis relating to party dominance is also rejected by the analysis of trust in parliaments: the four countries on the opposite extremes of Graph 4.2 are all countries with party dominances in their parliaments.

The lack of trust exhibited by Zambians in their parliament is consistent with the perceptions of civic organisations. In 2005 (the year that the survey was conducted), civic organisations came together in a forum demanding a new constitution written by a constituent assembly, and not by the existent one, since it did not have their trust (see Appendix 9).

In Madagascar, two popular referendums were held, removing the powers of the Assembly and thereby entrenching the president's powers. In both instances, the presidents were committed supporters of these changes, while the prime ministers and their supporters opposed these decisions. This indicates that in some African countries the relationships between the legislatures and presidents have been tense in recent years. This tension reached a peak in 2007 when the Malagasy president Ravalomanana dissolved the assembly (see Appendix 9).

Graph 4.2: Trust in parliament, by country



4.2 Citizens' evaluation of their MPs' performance

Similar to their responses concerning trust, citizens also seem to have a propensity to evaluate positively the way that their members of parliament have performed. Overall, half of the respondents viewed the performance of their MP favourably, with the other half containing a fairly large proportion (11.2 percent) of 'No opinion' replies. Again, this grouped average is skewed, with eight countries having a majority (50 percent) of respondents who were unhappy with the way that MPs performed.

Graph 4.3: Approval of MPs' performance



Of the eight countries with negative performance evaluations, five have constituency-based electoral systems, two have party-list systems and one, Senegal, has a mixed system that combines both constituency-based and party-list systems.

Before analysing the results based on the electoral system involved, it is necessary to reflect on the questionnaire itself. One must take care when comparing electoral systems where MPs' names are on the ballot, and citizens elect a specific candidate, with a system where citizens choose their representatives through a ballot paper with a list of MPs under the party logo. Among the countries with a party-list system, different options were offered to the respondents: in the questionnaire for Cape Verde (in Portuguese), this question is formulated in the plural: "Os deputados da Assembleia Nacional" (Reis, Rodrigues & Semedo, 2008, p. 35), but in the questionnaire for Senegal (in French), this question is phrased in the singular and refers to a particular member of parliament: "Votre représentant à l'Assemblée Nationale" (Kirwin, 2008, p. 33).

Since a constituency system, by design, is built around a more direct link between electorates and their representatives than is the case under proportional or mixed systems, one might expect that this type of electoral system, due to the varying degrees of familiarity with and exposure to parliamentarians, would play a role in the way that the electorate assesses

parliamentarians' performances. The findings shown in the graph above suggest otherwise though. As with the findings regarding trust, the process through which parliamentarians are elected does not have an impact on citizens' evaluations.

As seen in the preceding analysis of trust, dominance of parliament by one party does not seem to affect the way citizens evaluate the performance of their member of parliament.

Graph 4.4: Approval of MP's performance (by country)



4.3 Citizens' perceptions of the degree of corruption of their MPs

Whether due to evidence, anecdotal-based speculation, or general mistrust, the vast majority (63.6 percent) of respondents believed that at least some of their parliamentarians were involved in corrupt practices. However, it is interesting to note that for this question the number of 'Don't know' responses was significantly higher than those of other questions, reaching 21 percent.

Graph 4.5: Estimations of number of corrupt MPs



The analysis by country of public perception regarding corruption reveals a wide range of scores. The highest levels of corruption perceived as 'Most' or 'All' members of parliament being corrupt were found in Nigeria where, shortly after the Afrobarometer survey, a scandal involving suspected fraud by the speaker of parliament led to her resignation. In Zimbabwe, Kenya and Benin, 4 in 10 citizens believed that most of their parliamentarians were involved in corruption, while in Nigeria, this number is 6 in 10.

In the analysis of the perception of corrupt behaviour by MPs, it is important to note that there are two distinct realities regarding the involvement of MPs in the management of public funds. In some countries, MPs are not involved in the management of public funds, whereas in others, they are directly involved through their participation in systems aimed at the distribution of development funds in their constituencies.

This is the case in Kenya, where all Kenyan parliamentarians have a constituency development fund that is their responsibility to manage for the development of their constituencies. The Kenyan government decided to create this Constituency Development Fund in 2003 (Kenya, 2008; "Where MPs visibly control public spending", 2008). The fund was proposed by President Kibaki in response to the difficulties involved in effectively allocating funds for the development of rural areas. This was during a time that saw the suspension of aid from international donors due to the increasing corruption in the country (see Appendix 9). The

Kenyan Constituency Fund is managed by a committee comprising members of the local community, under the chairmanship of their elected members of parliament.

The graph below shows that 4 in 10 Kenyans believed that MPs were involved in corruption. This is significantly high, in comparison with the other countries, but considering this figure in light of the history of corruption in the country, this value may actually not be high at all. The data was collected in 2005, two years after the fund was constituted. A more accurate analysis will be possible once more data has been collected from future surveys. It will then be possible to understand whether the creation of these funds has impacted on the public's perception of corruption among Kenyan MPs.

Mozambique is a good example of a system where MPs do not manage any public funds. The country ranks quite high on the corruption index of the Transparency International[15] organisation, as is revealed in the table below, where in 2008, Mozambique lay in 126th place out of 180 countries. However, Mozambican citizens do not see their MPs as corrupt, with only 1 in 10 citizens expressing concerns that their MPs were involved in corruption.

Graph 4.6: Perceptions of corruption, by country



[15] Transparency International developed an annual Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). The index ranks 180 countries by their perceived levels of corruption, as determined by expert assessments and opinion surveys. (Transparency International, 2005b)

Table 4.1: Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (ranking)

	2005	2008
Benin	88	96
Botswana	32	36
Cape Verde	NA	47
Ghana	65	67
Kenya	144	147
Lesotho	70	92
Madagascar	97	85
Malawi	97	115
Mali	88	96
Mozambique	97	126
Namibia	47	61
Nigeria	152	121
Senegal	78	85
South Africa	46	54
Tanzania	88	102
Uganda	117	126
Zambia	107	115
Zimbabwe	107	166

Source: Transparency International, 2005a

4.4 Citizens' perceptions of MPs' willingness to listen to their constituents

There was a clear and strong view expressed by the respondents that their voices were often overlooked by MPs. Just over 1 in 5 respondents felt that they found a willing ear among their MPs often or at all times.

Graph 4.7: Effort to listen



The Botswanan and Namibian parliamentarians are seen as the most attentive while Benin's, Nigeria's and Malawi's MPs appear to disregard their electorate at large.

Graph 4.8: Effort to listen, by country



4.5 Citizens' perceptions of how much contact they have with their MPs

The data analysis suggests that among the countries surveyed there is little contact between citizens and parliamentarians. Only 1 in 10 respondents said that they had had some form of contact with parliamentarians. The percentage of citizens that responded 'Don't know' to the question 'Have you had any contact with a member of parliament?' is the lowest out of all of the 'Don't know' options in the survey.

In the African context, however, cognisance must be taken of infrastructural peculiarities. Among other peculiarities, let us take transport as an example. The continental mean ratio of population per legislator in this study is 109.599. In Europe, the continental mean is 89.387.[16] These values could lead to an interpretation that the African ratio and the European ratio of population per legislator are similar and consequently comparable at face value. However, the infrastructural conditions that Western MPs face in order to visit their constituencies are very different to those African MPs face, as is evidenced by the difference in the number of paved roads in the two regions.

[16] See Table 1.1, Ratios of population per legislator: EU member states, 1996 in NORTON, P. (ed.) (2002) *Parliaments and Citizens in Western Europe,* London, Frank Cass., p.15 (15 European countries).

Given the above remark about African infrastructural particularities, it is paradoxical that the country with the best transport infrastructure in the region, South Africa, is among the countries in which citizens report having the least contact with their parliamentarians.

Graph 4.9: Contact with MPs



Only 10 percent of the Afrobarometer-surveyed public have had some form of contact with an MP. In absolute terms, this number swells in magnitude to over 10 000 contacts per year, spread over the 18 countries.

Graph 4.10: Contact with MP by country.



Comparing this multicountry chart to the number of MPs per mille presented in the previous chapter suggests that the density of MPs does seem to affect the amount of contact that takes

place. Madagascar, with the highest number of contacts, has 0.6 MPs per mille, while at the other end of the scale, Tanzania, with the lowest number of contacts, has 0.8 MPs per mille citizens. The differences in figures between the numbers of contacts by citizens with MPs, by country, are so small that greater credibility is thereby given to the conclusion that in Africa there is little contact between citizens and MPs.

4.6 Citizens' perceptions of how much time MPs spend in their constituency

The following graph suggests that a significant proportion of respondents (>80 percent) are aware, or claim to be aware, of the presence, or lack thereof, of MPs in their particular constituency. When viewed in light of the results for citizens' contact with their MPs, this suggests that the low levels of contact are due to reasons other than lack of awareness, such as public apathy or the inaccessibility of the MP.

Graph 4.11: Time that MPs spend in their constituencies



Here, among the different countries, we see large disparities between the periods spent by MPs in their constituencies – Madagascar's, Malawi's and Benin's MPs are thought by over 50 percent of respondents never to spend any time in their constituencies. However, parliaments differ substantially in their sitting periods.

The Mozambican assembly sits for approximately 180 days of the year, which means that usually MPs will spend at least half of the year in their constituencies. The Mozambican sitting periods are concentrated over 3-month periods at the beginning and end of the year. This is aimed at reducing the travelling costs of several trips during the year.

On the other hand, the annual sessions of the South African National Assembly are on average divided into four sessions, each lasting between one-and-a-half and three months. These shorter sessions are separated by recesses, which are referred to as constituency days or leave days. These constituency days are set aside for members to attend to their duties relating to the constituencies allocated (since the MPs are elected on a party-list, the Assembly in accordance with the political parties allocates constituencies to the MPs) to them (South Africa, National Assembly, 2004).

The Madagascan assembly holds two ordinary annual sessions that constitutionally are limited to being not more than 90 days each, so again, in theory, MPs have 180 days in their constituencies (Madagascar Constitution, 1998, Art. 71), but half of the respondents believed that their MPs were 'Never' in their constituency.

Not all constitutions stipulate sitting periods, thus leaving the way open for standing orders to be established with regard to sitting periods. The French-speaking countries in the study do specify the number of ordinary sessions and give some indication of the number of days that the sitting period should comprise (Benin Constitution, 1990; Madagascar Constitution, 1998; Senegal Constitution, 2001 and Mali Constitution, 1992).

However, the Botswanan Constitution stipulates that there shall be a session of parliament at "least once in every year so that a period of six months shall not intervene between the last sitting of parliament in one session and the first sitting thereof in the next session" (Botswana, 1997 Constitution, Art. 90). Botswanans indicated that they knew of the presence of their MP in their constituencies, as did Namibians and Lesothoans. Botswana and Lesotho are small countries, so this does not constitute a surprise.

On the contrary, Benin is another small country that is at the other end of the scale, with 7 in 10 respondents indicating that their MPs do not spend time in their constituencies. In addition, a

surprise is the answers from the Nigerians citizens. In this chapter, the Nigerian Assembly was evaluated negatively, and it is, therefore, intriguing that this is not a result of citizens' perceptions that their MPs were not present in their constituencies.

Graph 4.12: Time that MPs spend in their constituencies, by country



These results for the foregoing question indicate a clear disparity between the demands of citizens on the time of their MPs and what they see occurring in practice. The demands are encouraging, in that the low number of 'Never/Not necessary' replies indicates an active interest by the electorate in the activities of their MPs. The demands are also of a reasonable nature, with most participants wishing to have MPs visit their areas at least monthly.

If one compares the most common demand by respondents on the time of their MPs, that is, for monthly visits (accounting for 45.3 percent of all replies) to the impression these same respondents have of the practices of their MPs (with 26.6 percent assessing MP visits as taking place either monthly, weekly or all of the time), there is an imbalance in the 'supply and demand' equation.

Graph 4.13: Time that MPs should spend in constituencies



The country with the youngest multiparty parliament, Uganda, has the largest percentage of citizens expecting to see their member of parliament in their constituency at least monthly. Again, there is no clear pattern that emerges when the results are grouped by electoral system (no specific electoral system exhibits the same demand from citizens for visits from their MPs). In South Africa, with its party-list system, the lowest demand is exhibited by citizens for the regular presence of their MPs in their constituencies, with a figure that is very close to that of Nigeria, which has a constituency-based electoral system.

Graph 4.14: Time that MPs should spend in their constituencies, by country



4.7 Citizens' LegislativeScores

As stated in Chapter 1 (Introduction) and in Chapter 6 (Exploratory model), a dependent variable was constructed for the analysis, namely *LegislativeScore*. For this index, four questions were selected (Q55b, Q56b, Q62a and Q68b) from the seven in the Afrobarometer questionnaire relating to parliament. The criterion for selecting these questions for inclusion in the index was whether they related to citizens' *evaluation* of parliament.

The three questions that were excluded from the LegislativeScore dealt only with contact between MPs and citizens: Question 61 asks how much time the citizen perceives an MP to be spending in the constituency, Question 60 relates to the time that the citizen feels the member of parliament should spending in the constituency, and Question 32 refers to the number of times the citizen has contacted the MP. These questions are still relevant for an understanding of the relationship that citizens have with their legislatures, and their perceptions of these legislatures. However, they do not allow one to measure the levels of satisfaction that citizens have with these institutions and their members.

On the other hand, the four questions selected to construct the LegislativeScore give actual measures of evaluation: Question 55 reveals how much the citizen trusts parliament; Question 68 gives a measure of job approval, since it asks whether the citizen approves or disapproves of

parliamentarians' performance; Question 62 measures the citizen's evaluation of the MP's commitment to listen to the people; and Question 56 gives a measure of the citizen's perception of the levels of corruption among members of parliament. The foregoing four variables show internal consistency reliability for inclusion in the index, with a standardised Cronbach's alpha of 0.6.

All responses used to construct the score were reordered on an increasing scale, from a poor to a positive evaluation. The LegislativeScore is an index of scores that summarises citizens' evaluations of parliament, and is calculated by adding the ordinal-equivalent values of the responses to the four questions as follows:

$$LegislativeScore = Corruption + Perfomance + Trust + MP's\ willingness\ to\ listen$$

The response categories for each of the four evaluation questions were recoded as: 'Don't know'=0; 'Strongly disapprove'=1; 'Disapprove'=2; 'Approve'=3; 'Strongly approve'=4. The resulting LegislativeScore index consequently has a possible range of 0-16.

As Graph 4.15 illustrates, the lowest LegislativeScore is shared by countries that perform better and worse with respect to democracy and good governance. Cape Verde, which ranks top of the democracy rankings and the good governance[17] scores, ranks alongside Nigeria – one of the countries in the study where democracy is seen as not yet having been achieved, it being rated as only 'partly free', with its good governance scores indicating serious problems.

As stated previously, regarding the question relating to citizens' trust in their parliaments, the African parliaments in this study scored above the world average. This appears to be the case for new democracies as opposed to more established democracies, as Newton concluded based on his analysis of the World Values Survey. In his findings, countries such as Poland, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania Chile, and South Africa showed high levels of confidence in their parliaments. He goes on to state that the common denominator in these countries was that all were newly democratising nations (Newton, 2001). Newton argues that these results suggest that in new democracies confidence in parliaments "may be an expression of faith in the

[17] In the Good Governance Index, developed by the Ibrahim Foundation for sub-Saharan Africa, Cape Verde ranked in 3rd place, Benin in 13th place, and Nigeria ranked in 39th place (The Ibrahim Index of African Governance, 2008).

principles and potentials of democracy as a form of government, rather than as an evaluation of how parliament is currently working in practice" (Newton, 2001, p. 209). The author, in agreement with Newton's (2001) conclusion as to why parliaments in new democracies tend to be more 'trustworthy', believes that a caution must be sounded that there is a risk that an overabundance of trust can compromise citizens' vigilance over these institutions.

As Mishler and Rose argue, "trust, however, is double edged" (1997, p. 419), meaning that democracy requires trust, but at the same time, it requires an active and vigilant citizenry, one with a healthy scepticism relating to government and political institutions – as Gamson puts it, "Whereas insufficient trust presages the disintegration of civil society, excessive trust cultivates political apathy and encourages a loss of citizens' vigilance and control of government, both of which undermine democracy (cited in Mishler & Rose, 1997, Gamson 1968, p. 46-8).

The Afrobarometer survey that supports these findings was conducted in South Africa in 2006, which at that time, in recent years had witnessed serious scandals involving its parliamentarians. There were three prominent scandals: 'Travelgate', where MPs were convicted of fraudulently expensing travel costs; The 'arms deal' scandal that allegedly had the implicit and explicit involvement of a number of parliamentarians, and the High Court decision condemning and sentencing to prison one of the top parliamentarians of the ruling party for this complicity in it. In 2000, the arms deal was raised for questioning in parliament, bringing to the attention of the public accusations of fraud and, with this, the internal divisions between parliamentarians (IDASA, 2008). In 2003, the ANC Chief Whip, Tony Yengeni, was charged with fraud relating to a bribe, in the form of a luxury vehicle, by the European Aeronautical Defence & Space company (Gumede, 2007). Yengeni lost his seat in parliament and was sent to jail to serve a four-year prison sentence – which ended up being five months (Gumede, 2007). In 2006, fourteen ANC MPs were convicted on fraud charges relating to the abuse of parliamentary travel vouchers and were fined for theft. (South African Press Association, 2006).

Despite this sequence of scandals, the LegislativeScore for the South African parliament is still positive. This can mean that, for now, parliament is still viewed positively by South Africans as a result of its complex nature and development, i.e. if one is a member of an opposition party,

the scandals might be viewed with a certain detachment that would not affect one's confidence in parliament; the fact that these scandals were brought to light in parliament by an opposition party member may indicate an openness and accountability by this institution.

Those who affiliate themselves with the ruling ANC may view these scandals as one-sided witch-hunts that are driven by the media and do not accurately reflect on their MPs. This hypothesis will be explored in further chapters.

Graph 4.15: LegislativeScore, by country



4.8 Conclusion

People's perceptions and evaluations of their parliaments are not consistent with the standard of their countries' democracies. In terms of democracy, the worse- and better-performing countries rank side by side in terms of their citizens' evaluations of their parliaments.

However, there are three countries that scored consistently poorly on the measures of trust, job evaluation and perception of corruption) – Nigeria, Zimbabwe and Kenya. All three are also among the lowest on the 'liberty' ranking. But the lowest appreciation of parliaments by citizens is also shared (not repeatedly thought) by the countries faring better in democracy – Cape Verde, Benin and Botswana. This piece of evidence reveals the complexity that is implied in evaluating parliaments and interpreting these evaluations.

Democracy requires a fine balance between scepticism and trust by citizens in their political institutions. Governments are analysed repeatedly by scholars, sometimes including parliaments in the same 'basket' as all political institutions. However, it is crucial to keep in mind that parliaments are very particular institutions – they are constituted of political rivals,

competitive elements whose role is to question, to raise doubts. Governments and political parties, on the other hand, are generally constituted by groups or individuals that share the same objectives.

Described accurately as *representative institutions*, parliaments clearly cannot please all citizens in equal measure if they are to perform this role. Which political parties citizens support can be a factor that contributes to their satisfaction/dissatisfaction with their parliament. However, saying this implies that it is not possible to analyse citizens' appreciation of parliaments, and therefore, this should be undertaken with caution and moderation. The repeated low scores for the three countries mentioned previously (Nigeria, Zimbabwe and Kenya) need to be taken as a warning by citizens of their dissatisfaction.

The two hypotheses tested throughout the chapter were refuted in the analyses – the type of electoral system and the existence of party dominance do not show patterns that prove that there is a relationship between a particular electoral system and a parliament's support by its citizens; throughout the analyses of parliaments, there is no common behaviour among the countries with party dominance.

Tanzania, which has a parliament where 87 percent of the seats are occupied by the ruling party, exhibits consistently higher appreciation from its electorate; on the other hand, Nigeria, Zimbabwe and Kenya exhibit the lowest scores on average for citizens' appreciation. Although it is important to note that in the recent elections of 2008, Zimbabweans gave the majority of seats in parliament to the opposition, this had in practise already happened in the previous election. But constitutionally, the ruling party held onto their majority through the seats appointed by the president of the republic. These constitutional powers were removed in the constitutional reform that took place in 2007. As a result, for the first time, the majority in parliament actually corresponded to the will of the electorate, and the opposition won the presidency of the Assembly ("Zimbabwe opposition wins speaker vote", 2008). This country is currently experiencing a political crisis; however, with all the limitations on democracy and liberty, the Zimbabwean parliament may well be the only remnant of democratic institutions in the country.

In the majority of the countries surveyed, citizens, on average, gave a positive evaluation of their parliaments, especially on the measure of ‘trust’. This seems to indicate a vote of confidence by citizens in these institutions, which is good news and bad news. This confidence should give parliaments the motivation to perform, but at same time, it could also mean that citizens are not aware that they are the guardians of these guardian institutions.

CHAPTER 5
Parliaments in the land of the 'big man'

5.1 Introduction

This chapter analyses the perceptions among survey participants of African parliaments and presidents, and it examines citizens' attitudes towards the coexistence of these two institutions. It aims to test the way citizens rate their parliaments compared to what they might say about their presidents. It will further seek to answer the question of whether Africa remains the continent of the 'big man', where absolute power lies with an individual, feeding clientelistic relationships.

In the decades following the transitions to independence, the major part of the continent was marked by a proliferation of monoparty regimes; in many cases, these were almost one-man regimes. The majority of the leaders symbolised, at an early stage of independence, the birth of the nation itself. In many instances these presidents sought to extend their incumbency perpetually.

However, over the last two decades, this scenario has changed considerably. Monoparty parliaments were replaced by multiparty parliaments and executives, and presidents have found themselves needing to share their leadership of the nation with parliamentarians. Not much is known about how these emerging parliaments have been operating, but the little that is known tells us that the parliaments have faced a lack of institutionalisation and still struggle to assert their independence from strong executives. It is therefore reasonable to expect that parliaments will not be perceived as dormant institutions in the public eye.

Before attributing any conclusions of the analysis to constituent changes in the political actors and institutions, the fact that the makeup of African citizens has itself changed over recent decades must be taken into account. Africa is a continent of youths. The majority of the population is under 25 years of age, which means that few witnessed the post-independence movements; most did not live under colonial domination. Instead, the majority of African citizens belong to the generation that witnessed political liberalisation.

In recent decades, the development of elected African parliaments has been notable. Until the 1940s no African country had held a parliamentary election. By comparison, 13 Latin America countries had held elections by this date, and five countries had undergone the process in Asia.

During the 1950s two parliamentary elections were held in Africa (Ghana and Nigeria) compared with five in Asia and 41 in Latin America. African parliamentary elections slowly grew in numbers until the boom of the 1990s. In that decade Africa held 86 parliamentary elections. During the previous decade, they had numbered just 26 (Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance [IDEA], 2008).

Compared with other parts of the world – in particular with Western countries – the large majority of African legislatures are 'emerging' legislatures (Barkan, Ademolekun & Zhou, 2004). However, not all countries and parliaments have witnessed liberalisation, and even among those that have, there are substantial differences in institutionalisation levels and roles.

The eighteen countries covered in this study have multiparty parliaments that are, on average, 16.2 years of age. The outliers are Botswana (42 years) and Uganda (2 years). The majority of these institutions did exist before political liberalisation, although as one-party institutions or, as in the South African case, a multiparty assembly where a large part of the population was excluded from representation (Murray & Nijzink, 2002).

In spite of the fact that the emergence of democratic parliaments has been one of the visible consequences of the wave of democratisation that spread across Africa in the 1990s, this has not received substantial attention in the academic literature. The scarcity of studies on the relationship between African parliaments and their citizens may be attributed mainly to two factors: a historical lack of public opinion data and the fact that only as recently as the 1990s did a group of countries in Africa become politically liberalised. The two reasons are interrelated: The scarcity of public opinion data is in part a result of the lack of democracy, and public polls require the existence of liberty.

The combination of the recent availability of relevant data and the number of countries experiencing observable liberalisation processes allows us to seek new insights about politics in Africa from the perspective of ordinary citizens. The first question that needs to be

addressed in this study is whether these citizens are able to form basic opinions about their political institutions. This becomes important because citizens' awareness of their political institutions is seen as a prerequisite for accountability.

In addition, social and demographic changes have been so profound in sub-Saharan Africa that they have altered the nature and size of the electorate. The distribution of Africa's population is markedly different to the current ageing trends observed in the Western world. Life expectancy statistics show a continent with a dominant youth. Nearly 50 percent of the African population are under 25 years of age and are generally more highly educated and urbanised than in the past (The World Bank Group, 2007a).

On the political front, Africans have had increased opportunities to vote in recent years; indeed, elections have been blooming across the continent. However, Bratton and Logan (2006) argue in this regard that Africans are "voters but not yet citizens", implying that they are committed voters but not yet at the point of demanding political accountability from their rulers. In this case, accountability is still to mature to the point where citizens are able to assert their rights.

Comprehending citizens' perceptions of their parliaments constitutes an important step towards discerning the future of democracy. Citizens' perceptions of parliaments have been investigated, but the research has focused on established democracies, and even for those, the relationship between citizens and parliaments has barely been studied (Norton, 2002). The study of politics in Africa has tended to focus on democratisation and regime transitions (Hyden, 2006). Despite the fact that parliaments are crucial in these processes, they have been largely excluded. By contrast, presidents and executives have had the major share of academic attention, although often with a negative undertone.

5.2 Parliaments in the land of the 'big man'

The political literature has characterised politics in Africa as the politics of the 'big man', where ruling leaders have manoeuvred formal rules and institutions to their benefit (Hyden, 2006; Bayart, 1993; Southall & Melber, 2006, Posner & Young, 2007).

In the 1990s, with increased political openness, elected African presidents have been sharing the rule of the polis with new institutions, and opposition parties have been legally allowed to have a place in political affairs. In the 1990s, for the first time, the continent witnessed ruling presidents defeated at the polls and accepting the results (e.g. President Aristides Pereira of Cape Verde, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia). In fact, Posner and Young (2007) showed that, until recently, African leaders were typically forced to leave office by force or through death. Using data from the Archigos project, which codes the way that heads of state in every independent country in the world have entered and exited power (between 1875 and 2004), they showed that in the 1960s and 1970s nearly 75 percent of the African leaders left power as a result of a coup, violent overthrow, or assassination. Between 2000 and 2005, the share of leaders leaving power by unnatural means dropped to 19 percent, primarily due to an increase in voluntary resignations, in most cases triggered by constitutional term limits (in 9 of the 17 cases between 2000 and 2005) (Posner &Young, 2007).

The wrangle over amendments to constitutional term limits is one of the rare examples of visible disputes between presidents and assemblies. Some of the constitutions of Africa's new democracies established term limits on presidential tenures. Nonetheless, some presidents have been trying to amend constitutions to change this restriction: In Namibia in 1998/99, in Zambia in 2001, in Malawi in 2002 and, in 2006, in Nigeria. Only the Namibian president, Sam Nujoma, succeeded in his bid. President Obasanjo of Nigeria faced the embarrassment of a defeat by the National Assembly of his attempt to amend the constitution that would allow him a third successive term. This rejection was confirmed by the Senate. President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa tried to extend his mandate of the ANC presidency in 2007 to a third term, knowing that holding the party's presidency virtually guarantees control over the country's presidency. This attempt was thwarted by the ANC congress and led to the party forcing him to resign just a few months before the 2009 election.

The table below shows the duration that the presidents of the countries in this analysis have held office (at the time the data was collected). Of the 18 countries, three presidents had been in office for extremely long periods: President Kérekou, who by 2005 had been in office as president of Benin for 28 years (although not continuously: 18 years until 1991, and from 1996 to 2006); President Museveni of Uganda, who had been in office for 19 years; and President Mugabe who by 2005 was serving his eighteenth year in office as president (he had also served

as prime minister in the seven years preceding his presidency). Only President Kérekou has left power at the time of writing – 2008. In 2006, Kérekou stepped down after agreeing not to attempt to change the constitution, which prohibited him from running because of a two-term limit on the presidency, implemented in 1990, and a maximum age limit of 70 years (Benin, 1990, Article 44); Kérekou was 72 when he stepped down (Signouret, 2005).

All eighteen presidents served as both heads of state and of government, with the exception of Cape Verde and Senegal, where the head of government is the prime minister. Lesotho is a constitutional monarchy headed by King Letsie III. However, the prime minister is the head of the government while the king is constitutionally not allowed to be politically involved. In the case of Lesotho, the Afrobarometer questionnaire replaced 'President' with 'Prime minister'. Among the presidential newcomers, there is an emerging breed of leaders who hold past experience in the executives or assemblies, as either MPs or members of government with related parliamentary experience. One such example is President Armando Guebuza of Mozambique, who headed Frelimo's parliamentary group for the first ten years of the multiparty parliament.

Table 5.1: Duration of presidential incumbents to survey date

	President	Duration (in years)
Benin	Mathieu Kérékou	28
Botswana	Festus Gontebanye Mogae	7
Cape Verde	Pedro Pires	4
Ghana	John Kofi Agyekum Kufuor	3
Kenya	Mwai Kibaki	3
Lesotho	Bethuel Pakalitha Mosisili (Prime-Minister)	7
Madagascar	Marc Ravalomanana	3
Malawi	Bingu Wa Mutharika	1
Mali	Amadou Toumani Touré	1
Mozambique	Armando Guebuza	just started
Namibia	Hifikepunye Lucas Pohamba	just started
Nigeria	Olusegun Obsanjo	6
Senegal	Absoulaye Wade	6
South Africa	Thabo Mbeki	7
Uganda	Yowesi Museveni	19
Tanzania	Jakaka Kikwete	just started
Zambia	Levy Patrick Mwanawasa	3
Zimbabwe	Robert Mugabe	18

Source: (Frame et al, 1993, 2005, 2006, 2007)

The relatively short collective period these presidents have been at the helm of their respective countries may lessen the likelihood of their parliaments being overshadowed by the executives. However, African parliaments seem to be in the position of their Latin American counterparts, where parliaments are perceived as reactive institutions and executives as proactive ones.

African parliaments fit the description of Cox and Morgenstern (2001) with regard to Latin America. They argue that typically in Latin America the legislatures cannot remove presidents from their positions, and they struggle with a lack of resources, which limits their ability to generate their own proposals. The same could be said in general of the emerging African legislatures. The primary consequence of this weakness of the legislatures is difficulty in

keeping the executives accountable. Accountability can therefore be compromised. Deficiencies in accountability are often more discernible and critical in new democracies than in long-established democracies (Schedler, Diamond, and Plattner, 1999).

These parliaments, as a result of their short-lived existences, are still largely inefficient and unruly, which can have obvious consequences with regard to public evaluation. This power imbalance between executives and parliaments can also negatively affect citizens' views of parliaments.

5.3 The marginalisation of parliaments by international donors

To more fully understand the relationship between parliaments and executives in Africa it is important to recognise that Africa is a continent still struggling with the fight against poverty (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 2005). Poverty necessitates the implementation of effective policies to combat this scourge and promote development. As a result, donors and international agencies together with the executives in the host countries have tended to establish and drive policies and budget agendas. These agreements are often made without the involvement of parliaments. The urgent need to implement these agendas effectively marginalises parliaments, which are viewed as over-politicized and hence inefficient.

To further 'make the case' against their involvement, parliaments in most countries are not full-time institutions; they have short sitting periods, which reinforces the reason for their exclusion on this matter. They also suffer from a lack of resources and technical capacity. These factors conspire to constrict the role of parliaments as the watchdogs of executives. The political debates within parliaments are often reduced to discussions of political scandals or procedures, where the political party comprising the executive acts as the protective guardian of the executive. The impact of such debates on the public's image of parliament is to portray it as a sterile contributor to the development agenda. Parliaments are seen as mere puppets of the political parties' interests and not as institutions that represent the people's interests.

In the Mozambican case, where the parliament has only two parties, FRELIMO and RENAMO, there have been only a few occasions where both political parties have voted

unanimously. The party lines are towed strictly by the deputies of both political parties. The extreme party-centricity of the assembly is seen as the main problem of the Mozambican parliament by journalists and civil leaders alike, as will be seen in following chapters.

In this context it may be expected that parliaments are publicly perceived as secondary institutions, while presidents are still the predominant players. By extension, it is reasonable to expect that parliaments, as quiescent institutions, receive very little support from the public. The data analysis was performed both collectively and at a country level on the various factors of ruling party dominance, the electoral system and the constitutional design.

5.4 Dominant parties, electoral systems and constitutional design

5.4.1 Parliaments in the context of dominant parties

A further element that needs to be considered in the study of the balance of power between parliaments and executives in these countries is the existence of dominant ruling parties that have almost absolute control over the parliaments. Dominance of parliament by the ruling party is not an exclusive feature of African parliaments. Several European parliaments are known for having the same characteristic. However, in new democracies where there is still a lack of institutionalisation of the parliaments and systems, this dominance can hamper the development of parliaments as houses of debate and accountability.

Dominant ruling parties are a widespread phenomenon, with these parties holding large electoral majorities, as is the case with the BDP in Botswana (77.1 percent); FRELIMO in Mozambique (62 percent); SWAPO in Namibia (75 percent); the ANC in South Africa (69.7 percent); the RSP in Tanzania (81.4 percent); the NRM in Uganda (59.3 percent); and ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe (59.6 percent) (Nunley, 2008).

This phenomenon can obstruct competitive politics within parliaments, where party dominance can weaken the relations between parliament and the executive. In order to protect the executive from public scrutiny, members of the ruling parties in parliament advocate that their government be monitored behind closed party doors. Accountability of the executive to parliament is therefore similarly constrained. Moreover, many of Africa's dominant political

parties were previously liberation movements, where internal discipline was a fundamental credo.

To the advantage of political movements that fought for independence, the creation of the state is often perceived as an achievement credited to the party. In these movements, unity was a doctrine that facilitated the nation-building process and provided a front against any would-be challengers. As a result, there is at present a tendency to view the opposition as 'enemies' of the party and subsequently enemies of the state, with the distinction between the state and the ruling party often being indistinguishable.

In addition, members of liberation movements find it hard to understand the lack of support from or ingratitude of the people for their achievements in liberating them. It is in this minefield that multiparty parliaments have entered the political landscape, as counter-powers to executive powers that traditionally have been unquestionable.

This democratic predicament is further compounded by the near-certainty that these ruling parties will hold onto power in the next election. This certainty violates Przeworski's (1991, p. 10) criteria that are essential for democracy; as he states, "Democracy is a system in which parties lose elections". Furthermore, democracy is made of losers and winners. In some of the countries in this study, the institutionalisation of certainty by powerful dominant parties is evident.

This also serves to explain instances of political violence, as recently seen in Kenya and Zimbabwe, where opposition parties have managed to defeat the incumbents through elections. When studying parliaments and executives in Africa, the 'dominant party' context is therefore a key element to consider. In this analysis it is reasonable to expect that parliaments will enjoy lower levels of citizens' approval in countries where there is a prevalent party dominance, since citizens will perceive their parliament as a mere extension of the ruling party. By the same token, it may be expected that citizens will evaluate more highly parliaments with no clear party dominance.

5.4.2 The electoral system[18]

The impact of the electoral system on levels of satisfaction with democracy and political institutions has been studied extensively, albeit with asymmetric results. Some scholars argue that proportional systems facilitate a better representation of societal and minority groups, and therefore, citizens will be more supportive of their institutions (Lijphart, 1999; Anderson, 1998). Other scholars, by contrast, argue that constituency systems show higher levels of satisfaction with the state and the regime, since under such systems the voter has greater choice through their vote, which serves to strengthen the link between the voter and the elected (Farrel and McAllister, 2006; Norris, 1999). Cho (2005) refined this debate by adding the distinction between winning and losing citizens.

Using the Lesotho electoral reform as a case study, Cho (2005) has shown that citizens on the losing side (opposition supporters) were more satisfied with the country's state and regime following the reform. The Lesotho election of 2002 gave the opposition 40 parliamentary seats, which under the previous constituency system would not have been possible.

However, Cho (2005) also shows that in spite of their levels of satisfaction with the electoral system they still feel that the ruling party acts as though it were a 'winner takes all' race. A key point to note is that levels of satisfaction can be positively influenced by meaningful inclusion and representation of all political players.

In this study the analysis tests whether citizens' satisfaction varies by institution type rather than by citizen groups (i.e. external factors rather than internal ones). Does the electoral system impact on the way in which citizens perceive parliaments and presidents?

[18] Among the eighteen countries covered in this study, five have adopted proportional representation: Benin, Cape Verde, Mozambique, Namibia, and South Africa; eight countries have adopted a majoritarian electoral system (constituency) – Botswana, Ghana, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia; and two – Lesotho and Senegal – have adopted a mixed electoral system (International IDEA, Electoral Systems Worldwide, 2008).

5.4.3 The constitutional design

In an analysis of citizens' views on parliaments and presidents, it is reasonable to question whether the constitutional design impacts on these views. In analysing the eighteen constitutions, the countries were divided by constitutional design as follows: Hybrid – Benin, Cape Verde, Namibia, Senegal, Madagascar, Mali, Tanzania and Zimbabwe; Presidential – Mozambique, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Uganda, and Zambia; and Parliamentary – South Africa, Lesotho, and Botswana.

Following Lipjart's (1999) argument that under parliamentary systems the executives are more collegiate than under presidential systems, in which 'one-man' executives are more common , it is expected that this analysis will show higher levels of satisfaction with presidents under presidential systems, and that under parliamentary systems parliaments will be evaluated at least as highly as presidents.

5.5 Empirical analysis of public opinion data on parliaments and presidents

The quantitative analysis is divided into two main parts: firstly, an analysis is made of the level of awareness that citizens exhibit towards parliaments compared with those exhibited towards presidents. A lack of awareness, represented by 'Don't know' responses that citizens gave for both institutions, is compared and contrasted with responses for both trust and the evaluation of the performance of these institutions; the same analysis is then applied using different groupings of respondents, by electoral system and then by constitutional design.

Secondly, a comparison is carried out of citizens' trust in parliaments and executives in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the world, followed by an analysis of the opinions of the Afrobarometer respondents regarding their presidents and parliaments. At this point, the results relating to trust in, and performance of, the executives and parliaments are presented for each country. As for the analysis of the 'don't know' respondents, the results are also analysed by grouping them by electoral system and constitutional design, as well as by party dominance of the ruling party. To enhance the comparison of how citizens perceive parliaments and presidents, consideration

is also be given to the respondents' preferences for which institutions should be responsible for law-making.

The penultimate question contemplated in this analysis does not compare the two political institutions, but rather elucidates the desire, or lack thereof, of respondents to return to one-man rule and to a one-party regime. The results are presented by country and on aggregate. The last question presents the results relating to the impression that citizens have of the degree to which their presidents respect the country's constitution.

Within the text the words *assembly*, *legislature* and *parliament* are used interchangeably, but are applied to the second house in case of lower houses. The term *Africans* will be used in this paper to refer to the citizens of the countries covered in the study.

To facilitate a contextualisation of the findings, the table below shows the countries in the analysis, number of chambers, and number of seats. When attempting to make generalisations it is important to bear in mind the limitations of the study. As the table shows, the study covers a wide array of assemblies, ranging from a headcount of 63 deputies in Botswana to 400 deputies in Nigeria. This characteristic alone reminds us that not all parliaments are equal. They may even share a similar period of democratisation and therefore face similar difficulties and challenges. However, they are still unique institutions with their particular legacies and development trajectories. Even so, this study provides important insights into the public's perceptions of parliaments in Africa. For a deeper understanding of the findings, country analyses are essential. One such analysis is conducted, in the case of Mozambique, in Chapters 7, 8 and 9.

Table 5.2: Number of seats for the 18 African countries covered in the study

Country	Chamber	Structure of parliament	Statutory number	Current number
Benin	National Assembly	Unicameral	83	83
Botswana	National Assembly	Unicameral	63	63
Cape Verde	National Assembly	Unicameral	72	72
Ghana	Parliament	Unicameral	230	230
Kenya	National Assembly	Unicameral	224	224
Lesotho	National Assembly	Bicameral	120	120
Lesotho	Senate	Bicameral	33	31
Madagascar	National Assembly	Bicameral	127	127
Madagascar	Senate	Bicameral	33	33
Malawi	National Assembly	Unicameral	193	193
Mali	National Assembly	Unicameral	147	147
Mozambique	Assembly of the Republic	Unicameral	250	250
Namibia	National Assembly	Bicameral	78	78
Namibia	National Council	Bicameral	26	26
Nigeria	House of Representatives	Bicameral	360	358
Nigeria	Senate	Bicameral	109	109
Senegal	National Assembly	Bicameral	150	150
Senegal	Senate	Bicameral	100	100
South Africa	National Assembly	Bicameral	400	400
South Africa	National Council of Provinces	Bicameral	90	54
Uganda	Parliament	Unicameral	333	332
Tanzania	National Assembly	Unicameral	323	319
Zambia	National Assembly	Unicameral	158	158
Zimbabwe	House of Assembly	Bicameral	210	210
Zimbabwe	Sénat	Bicameral	93	93

Source: IPU PARLINE database: number of seats, 2009; IPU PARLINE database: structure of parliaments, 2009; & IPU PARLINE database: country, general information, 2009.

5.5.1 Analysis of 'Don't know' responses for parliaments and for presidents

A positive finding of the analysis of Afrobarometer responses is that African citizens have been shown to have opinions about their main political institutions. Over 9 in 10 respondents are aware of these institutions and are able to evaluate them. The data shows that they are not just aware of them but they are also able to distinguish between the positions and roles of the presidential figure and the legislature.

However, while being able to distinguish between the two institutions, Africans are shown by the data to have limited knowledge about their parliaments relative to their presidents. As is visible in the table below, the percentage of people unable to express an opinion about their parliament is almost double that of those who were not able to give an opinion about their president. This trend is visible across all questions analysed.

Table 5.3: 'Don't know' replies for questions relating to awareness of trust and approval of president and parliament (% of total responses)

	President	**Parliament**
How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say? (Trust the President/Trust Parliament/Trust the National Assembly)	3.6	7.5
Do you approve or disapprove of the way in which the following people have performed their jobs over the past twelve months, or haven't you heard enough about them to say? (President/MP/National Assembly Rep.)	5.8	11.2

The table below shows that when the 'don't know' responses are analysed under the subgroups of 'electoral system' and 'constitutional design', the discrepancies among the 'don't know' responses assume a detailed shape at the different levels of these two factors: citizens in countries under electoral systems that are 'mixed' or 'proportional' display significantly higher levels of ignorance about trust and performance than those analysed under the category *constituencies*.

In terms of constitutional design, citizens in countries that have a hybrid system display higher levels of ignorance than those that are distinctly parliamentary or presidential. It is interesting

to note that citizens of presidential systems have better-formed opinions of their parliaments than those under parliamentary systems. A likely cause of this is that even under parliamentary systems, the parliament is viewed as a secondary institution relative to the executive rather than a core one.

Table 5.4: 'Have no opinion' on trust and performance of the president and parliament, by electoral system and by constitutional design (% of total responses)

		Performance		Trust	
		President	**Parliament**	**President**	**Parliament**
Electoral System	Constituency (plurality)	4.3	7.0	2.9	5.4
	Mixed	4.7	19.4	4.0	9.9
	Proportional (closed party list)	9.2	17.6	5.0	11.2
Constitutional Design	Parliamentary	4.1	11.4	2.7	7.8
	Presidential	4.7	7.1	3.1	4.8
	Hybrid	7.7	15.6	4.6	10.2

Records have been grouped according to electoral system: Proportional – Benin, Cape Verde, Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa; constituency – Botswana, Ghana, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia; mixed – Lesotho and Senegal. **Source:** International IDEA, Electoral Systems Worldwide, 2008

Records have been grouped by the author according to current constitutional design: Hybrid – Benin, Cape Verde, Madagascar, Mali, Namibia, Senegal, Tanzania and Zimbabwe; Presidential – Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, Uganda, and Zambia; Parliamentary – Botswana, Lesotho, and South Africa. **Source:** Constitutions.

5.5.2 Analysis of 'opinions' about parliaments and presidents

In order to assess the responses from individuals able to offer opinions about presidents and parliaments, an analysis of the questions relating to trust and job approval was carried out. As a starting point of the analysis of how much trust parliaments and presidents received from Africans, the table below compares the levels of trust in African, Asian, and European countries as well as worldwide. Citizens' trust in political institutions has been a recurring question in public opinion surveys around the world.

Table 5.5: Citizens' trust in parliament and the executive in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the world

Africans' trust Afrobarometer			**World's trust World Values Survey**		**Asians' trust Asiabarometer**		**Europeans' trust Eurobarometer**	
	How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?		For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: Is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence, or none at all?		How much do you trust the institutions?		For each of the following institutions please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it? (Tend to trust/No trust)	
	Executive	**Parliament**	**Executive**	**Parliament**	**Executive**	**Parliament**	**Executive**	**Parliament**
No Trust	15.5	17.6	18.8	22.6	12.1	19.9	63.1	68.1
Little trust	18.7	23.3	31.5	37	24.8	26.2		
Some-what/ Quite a lot	21	27.1	32.9	29.8	40.9	38.0	36.9	31.9
Great deal of trust	44.8	32.0	16.8	10.6	22.2	15.9		

Table based on data analysis of Asiabarometer dataset 2003 (Cambodia, Indonesia, Japan, Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Laos, China, and Brunei); European and World Value Surveys Integrated Data File, 1999–2002 (The survey includes 80 independent countries; Afrobarometer's dataset, 2007; and Eurobarometer's dataset 2002.

Africans clearly rate their political institutions more highly than any other group surveyed in the above barometer studies. Collectively, Africans' level of trust in these institutions is more than double Asia's, the region with the second highest levels of trust. Compared to Europe, Africa is virtually an inverted mirror image. Moreover, parliaments are consistently trusted less than executives in every region surveyed, Africa not being an exception to this.

5.5.2.1 Trust and performance evaluation of parliaments relative to presidents

The following figure illustrates that, at an African country level, trust in presidents tends to be higher than that in parliaments, in all but three countries – marginally in Zambia, moderately in Cape Verde and quite clearly in Zimbabwe (with a level of trust in parliament 14 percent

higher than that in the president). The five countries with the highest levels of trust in the president relative to the parliament are South Africa, Madagascar, Malawi, Senegal and Benin. Of further interest are Nigeria, which displays the lowest levels of trust in both institutions (about 55 percent) and Zimbabwe, which clearly bucks the African trend in putting trust in parliament significantly above that of President Robert Mugabe.

Table 5.6: Percentage of trust in president and parliament and the relative difference (in ascending order) How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?

Country	Trust in President	Trust in Parliament	Relative
Zimbabwe	63.2	73.2	-14%
Cape Verde	63.3	66.3	-5%
Zambia	82.0	83.8	-2%
Botswana	81.4	80.8	1%
Uganda	90.9	90.2	1%
Nigeria	55.4	54.4	2%
Tanzania	96.7	93.9	3%
Ghana	86.9	83.3	4%
Namibia	90	85.8	5%
Mozambique	88.6	82.8	7%
Mali	89.2	81.8	9%
Kenya	84.4	76.7	10%
Lesotho	86.8	77.5	12%
Malawi	76.8	67.6	14%
South Africa	87.5	75.8	16%
Benin	75.6	64.6	17%
Madagascar	90.4	74.1	22%
Senegal	82.9	67.1	24%

Broadly consistent with the pattern observed for levels of trust, there is far greater approval of executives' performance relative to that of parliaments. The exception to this is, once again, Zimbabwe where approval of the president is lower than that of the parliament. Senegal stands out for significantly rating its president's performance above that of its parliament. Here too, Nigeria has the lowest overall level of approval of its political institutions – with 29.6 percent for President Obasanjo and 21.8 percent for its parliament – while at the other end of the scale,

Namibia (89.8 percent and 74.8 percent respectively) and Tanzania (93.1 percent and 67.2 percent) have the highest approval ratings.

Table 5.7: Percentage of positive evaluation of performance (difference in ascending order)
Do you approve or disapprove of the way the following people have performed their jobs over the past twelve months, or haven't you heard enough about them to say? (Answers regarding approval are the sum of the answers 'Approve' and 'Strongly Approve')

Country	Approval of president's performance	Approval of parliament's performance	Relative
Zimbabwe	26.8	28.3	-5%
Nigeria	29.6	21.8	36%
Zambia	40.6	26.4	54%
Cape Verde	44.9	41.8	7%
Malawi	55.5	42.1	32%
Kenya	61.9	37.6	65%
Benin	65.1	48.6	34%
Senegal	68.2	36.8	85%
Botswana	70.4	67.6	4%
Mali	73.3	55.0	33%
Ghana	76.0	64.8	17%
South Africa	76.8	56.3	36%
Lesotho*	77.7	57.5	35%
Uganda	79.6	63.2	26%
Madagascar	80.6	56.9	42%
Mozambique	80.7	72.7	11%
Namibia	89.8	74.8	20%
Tanzania	93.1	67.2	39%

* In Lesotho the question was approval of the prime minister's performance

5.5.2.2 Analysis of trust, by constitutional design, electoral system and party dominance

Whether a legislature is part of a parliamentary or presidential system undoubtedly affects relations between the legislature and the executive, but it also affects relations between the public and its representatives. Generalisations about the magnitude and character of structural effects are difficult to make because government structures vary considerably within and among countries.

Still, presidents are the most highly evaluated players regardless of the prevailing constitutional system. Even citizens within parliamentary systems have a more positive evaluation of their presidents than of parliament. As is evident in the table below, Africans express more trust towards presidents across all subgroups. The same trend is shown with regard to presidential job approval. Furthermore, evaluations of both institutions are consistently higher under parliamentary and hybrid systems than under presidential ones. A third category of 'party dominance' is added to the analysis in the two tables presented below.

Table 5.8: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say? (% of responses)

BY		President	Parliament
Constitutional Design	Parliamentary	85.8	77.4
	Presidential	79.1	76
	Hybrid	81.9	76
Electoral System	Proportional	81.9	75.1
	Plurality	80.7	77.4
	Mixed	84.8	72.2
Party Dominance	Absolute majority	88.6	82.6
	Simple majority	75.4	70.8
	No majority	82.8	77.8

Answers were aggregated from the categories 'Just a Little'+'Somewhat'+'A lot'. Country records for 'Party dominance' were grouped as absolute majority, greater than 66 percent (two thirds), Absolute –

BY	President	Parliament

Tanzania, Uganda, Namibia, Botswana, South Africa, and Senegal; Simple majority, between 50 percent +1, Simple – Ghana, Mozambique, Lesotho, Kenya, Madagascar, Zimbabwe, Cape Verde, and Benin; and no majority, less than 50 percent, No majority – Zambia, Mali, and Malawi.

5.5.2.3 Analysis of satisfaction with performance, by constitutional design, electoral system and party dominance

An analysis of the opinions in the table below, by system construction factors, reveals that under mixed electoral systems (Lesotho and Senegal) there are unusually low levels of satisfaction with the performance of political institutions. The other types of electoral systems or constitutional design do not appear to have a significant influence on satisfaction ratings (see Table 5.9).

It is worth noting that the most marked margin of opinions on the performance of the president relative to that of parliament is, paradoxically, found under a parliamentary constitutional design (South Africa, Lesotho and Botswana), in favour of the president.

The dominance of a ruling party across institutions raises the issue of how much capacity for resistance the legislature has with regard to the executive.

Somewhat at odds with the prevailing theory outlined above, it is shown below that citizens of countries with an absolute ruling majority have higher levels of trust in both their presidents and parliaments than those with simple or no majorities. Less straightforward is an interpretation of the results of performance approval. Still, attention can be drawn to the fact that under an absolute majority, approval of the president is highest, while the highest approval levels for parliaments can be found in countries with no ruling majority.

Survey respondents in countries with absolute party dominance rate the performance of their assemblies more highly than might be expected; there is a 50.7 percent approval, on average, in Botswana, Namibia, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda. This might serve as a panacea to the concern that these institutions are undermined in such countries by the strong

domination, at least in the short term, subsequent to the democratisation era by one party or by the executive, although this may reduce over time.

Another point to note is that the dominance of the ruling party does not seem to be a factor in how citizens perceive the performance of their political institutions – the differences among countries with absolute, simple and no majorities are insignificant.

Analysing responses by electoral system groups provides no profound insights into a preferred system evidenced by higher evaluations. It is apparent that citizens under a pluralistic system have lower levels of trust in their political institutions than under a mixed system, while approval ratings are highest under proportional systems and lowest under a system of plurality.

5.5.2.4 Performance analysis, by constitutional design, electoral system and party dominance

Table 5.9: Satisfaction with performance of parliament and president

Do you approve or disapprove of the way the following people have performed their jobs over the past twelve months, or haven't you heard enough about them to say? (Answers regarding approval are the sum of the answers 'Approve' and 'Strongly Approve')			
		President	**Your Member of Parliament**
Constitutional Design	Parliamentary	73.0	49.4
	Presidential	63.7	48.1
	Hybrid	66.1	54.5
Electoral System	Proportional	74.2	58.1
	Plurality	65.2	50.4
	Mixed	48.9	32.8
Party Dominance	Absolute majority	67.1	50.7
	Simple majority	66.0	51.3
	No majority	63.4	48.8

Records have been grouped according to electoral system: Proportional – Benin, Cape Verde, Namibia, Mozambique and South Africa; Constituency – Botswana, Zambia, Malawi Mali, Madagascar, Ghana, Tanzania and Uganda; Mixed – Lesotho and Sénégal.

Source: International IDEA, Electoral Systems Worldwide, 2008. Records have been grouped by the author according to current constitutional design: Hybrid – Benin, Cape Verde, Namibia, Senegal, Madagascar, Mali, Tanzania and Zimbabwe; Presidential – Mozambique, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Uganda, Zambia; Parliamentary – South Africa, Lesotho, and Botswana. **Source:** Constitutions

5.5.3 Preference for who should be the lawmaker

In spite of the lower regard with which parliaments are held in this survey, compared with the executive, respondents prefer their laws to be made by their parliaments rather than by their presidents – about 66 percent preferred parliamentary lawmaking compared with 20 percent who preferred president to make the laws.

The countries where this preference for lawmaking by parliaments was most pronounced are Cape Verde, Mali and Uganda. Those where the preference was more moderate are Botswana and Senegal.

Table 5.10: Percentage of responses about who should make laws

	Percentage of agreement with: The members of parliament represent the people; therefore, they should make laws of this country, even if the president does not agree.	**Percentage of agreement with: Since the President represents all of us, he or she should pass laws without worrying about what parliament thinks.**
Namibia	80.5	17.2
Mali	78.1	8.0
Uganda	76.9	12.6
Ghana	74.4	17.5
Kenya	74.0	19.5
Cape Verde	73.7	10.8
Madagascar	71.1	15.0
Malawi	70.2	14.4
Nigeria	69.9	15.9
Mozambique	68.3	18.6
Zimbabwe	59.9	30.0
Zambia	57.7	20.8
Tanzania	57.6	21.1
Lesotho	53.0	23.9
South Africa	52.4	22.7
Botswana	51.5	41.6
Senegal	51.3	40.2

	Percentage of agreement with: The members of parliament represent the people; therefore, they should make laws of this country, even if the president does not agree.	Percentage of agreement with: Since the President represents all of us, he or she should pass laws without worrying about what parliament thinks.
Benin	47.0	18.2

5.6 Rejection of return to one-man rule

Perhaps the most profound insight to be gained from considering the following table is that despite the strong support shown by respondents for their president vis-à-vis trust and approval, there was a very clear rejection of a return to one-party, one-leader rule. This was reinforced by their strong preference for retaining the electoral process and ensuring the existence of parliaments as a counterbalance to the executive.

Table 5.11: Percentage rejection of one-party and one-man rule

	Would you disapprove of the following proposition: Only one political party should be allowed to stand for election and hold office?	**There are many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove of the following proposition: Elections and parliament should be abolished so that the president can decide everything?**
Benin	82.8	81.1
Botswana	82.1	88.8
Cape Verde	79.4	65.1
Ghana	81.9	85.0
Kenya	75.0	88.4
Lesotho	70.4	86.2
Madagascar	71.1	73.8
Malawi	55.7	66.1
Mali	72.5	73.6
Mozambique	51.5	41.7
Namibia	58.7	44.9
Nigeria	82.1	74.4
Senegal	76.3	85.8
South Africa	66.0	65.2
Tanzania	42.7	81.3
Uganda	59.3	91.1
Zambia	85.8	89.3
Zimbabwe	88.5	90.1
Average	70.7	76.2

It is of further interest to consider the percentage of citizens who believed their president 'often/always' ignored the constitution. Nearly six in ten Nigerians believed that President Obasanjo violated their constitution, while five in ten Zimbabweans believed that President Mugabe ignored or failed to respect their constitution. Two years after the data was collected, President Obasanjo left office, while President Mugabe stood for re-election in polls in 2008 in a controversial and violent election.

The Zimbabwean parliament has been an important breathing space for the oposition in the country. This analsyis of the public opinion polls reveals that Zimbabwe is consistently the country where the president is rated lower than the parliament. The data was collected before the election of 2008, where the oppostion won over the assembly. President Mugabe and Zanu PF claimed victory of the presidency following a single-candidate follow-up election. Months after the second election, the country remains in a deadlocked position, with power sharing aggrements still unresolved at the time of writing.

Table 5.12: Constitution ignored by the president

In this country, how often does the President ignore the constitution? Percentage of responses: Often/Always	
Nigeria	56.9
Zimbabwe	47.8
Zambia	31.6
Uganda	29.8
Senegal	28.4
Kenya	26.4
Namibia	23.4
Total	23.0
Malawi	19.7
Benin	17.8
Mali	17.3
South Africa	14.9
Mozambique	14.8
Botswana	14.5
Ghana	11.2
Cape Verde	10.6
Lesotho	9.1
Madagascar	9.1

5.7 Conclusion

African citizens make a discernible distinction between presidents and parliaments. There are citizens who are unable to form opinions about either institution; however, this number is considerably higher when parliaments are considered. Citizens show an aptitude for having opinions about both institutions, which is particularly important as a prerequisite for accountability. Multiparty African parliaments are still in their infancy; it is therefore a positive indication that already in people's minds they are an institution that is distinct from the executive.

The limitations of a direct comparison between one institution that has several facets (parties, staff and agendas) and the institution of the executive leader, who is charged with delivering

development and efficiency, must be recognised. Still, presidents are perceived by their citizens as being more worthy of trust and of performing better than parliaments.

Parliaments should provide the link between the people and those who govern and, moreover, should assure citizens that government will remain accountable to them between elections. For this to occur, citizens need to have access to continuous channels of communication with parliaments or, at least, be aware that the institution is there, in case of need.

The parliaments examined here operate within countries still consolidating their democracies. In these cases, institutions are more vulnerable to abuse by other political players. Public support can be crucial in the event of a political crisis. In cases of a reversal in democracy, parliaments are usually the first victims and in the past have been suspended or completely abolished. If, hypothetically, President Mugabe decided to abolish the parliament, since his party does not have the majority, the data indicates that this attempt will face popular discontent, since Zimbabweans trust and believe more in their parliament than in their president.

Elected African democratic parliaments need to make an effort to be more visible to and reachable by their communities. However, as previous analyses in other parts of the world have shown, this will presumably end in more critical attitudes and higher demand from citizens towards parliamentarians. Democracy is not supposed to be a quiet 'game' between citizens and their elected representatives. Gaining citizens' support is not just crucial for parliaments to function in these countries, it can also be crucial for their very survival.

The positive evaluation of presidents does not imply unconditional support. The findings reveal that citizens do not want to lose gains made under the multiparty regimes, and parliaments are preferred to presidents as lawmakers. These findings reveal that despite the appreciation for the current presidents, citizens prefer to place limits on their functions and powers.

From a comparative perspective, African citizens show higher levels of trust and job approval for both institutions than citizens in the Western world. Literature on African democratisation is often underscored by negativism and scepticism. In contrast, for now, African citizens' evaluations look like a vote of confidence for their political institutions.

CHAPTER 6

Test of an explanatory LegislativeScore model, and explanatory factors

6.1 Dependent variable, independent variables and hypotheses

6.1.1 Dependent variable: LegislativeScore

This chapter analyses the relationship between the characteristics of individuals and their evaluations of legislatures – how do 'citizen's profiles' influence their evaluations of a legislature?

The Afrobarometer questionnaire provides seven questions for assessing citizens' perceptions of their parliaments and their members of parliament. In constructing the dependent variable, LegislativeScore, four of these questions were chosen. Each respondent was assigned a score for each of the questions in the LegislativeScore. The four questions have values from zero to four, the LegislativeScore for the respondent Y_1 will be the sum of this respondent's answers to the four questions. The total LegislativeScore is therefore the sum of the all respondents' scores, as is shown in the table below.

Table 6.1: The four questions constituting the dependent variable, Y

Question Scores	Y_1	Y_2	...Y_i
How much do you trust each of the following, or don't you know enough about them to say? 0;1;2;3;4	0	1	...
How much of the time do you think the following persons try their best to listen to what people like you have to say? 0;1;2;3;4	1	2	...
Do you approve or disapprove of the way that the following people have performed their jobs over the past 12 months, or haven't you heard enough about them to say? 0;1;2;3;4	2	3	...
How many of the following people do you think are or have been involved in corruption, or don't you know enough about them to say?	3	4	...


0;1;2;3;4

Consequently, the LegislativeScore for country A is the sum of the LegislativeScores of all respondents. LegislativeScore Y for Country (A) $=Y_1+Y_2+Y_3+Y_4+...Y_i$

The overriding criterion for choosing these questions was whether they related to citizens' evaluations of parliament. The three questions that were excluded from the LegislativeScore dealt only with contact between members of parliament and citizens. (Question 61 gives a score for how much time a citizen perceives an MP to be spending in a constituency. Question 60 gives a score for the amount of time a citizen feels a member of parliament should be spending in a constituency, and Question 32 gives a score for how many times a citizen has contacted an MP.)

Although these questions are relevant for our understanding of the relationships that citizens have with their legislatures, and their perceptions of these legislatures, they do not allow us to measure the level of satisfaction that a citizen experiences towards this institution and its members. On the other hand, the four questions chosen to build the LegislativeScore provide actual measures of evaluation. The four variables used to construct the index, LegislativeScore, showed reliability in being considered an index, the Standardised Cronbach's Alpha[19] in this instance being 0.598.

There have been other attempts at estimating a measure of citizens' relationships with their parliaments. Usually, these attempts aim at measuring the support that parliaments receive from their citizens. Measuring 'support' is a challenge that has still not been fully conquered. The existing studies proceed from a simple approach that investigates only one dimension, e.g. trust. These studies try to infer from the level of support a parliament enjoys how much trust it has from its citizens (Doorenspleet, 2005).

Other studies emerged in the search for a latent variable that would measure citizens' support for their legislatures. In some of these studies, more sophisticated statistical techniques, such as factor variables, were applied. Both approaches are not ideal. The first approach referred to is

[19] In psychometrics, a reliability coefficient indicating the degree of internal consistency of items within a test. If certain assumptions are met, it ranges from 0 (zero internal consistency) to 1 (perfect internal consistency); a negative alpha coefficient indicates that items of the scale are negatively correlated and that an inappropriate reliability model is being used. Also called the alpha reliability coefficient and coefficient alpha ("Cronbach's alpha n", 2008)

limited by the simplicity of its claim that what has been measured is 'trust'. The second approach referred to provides insights into what can contribute to a measurement of the relationship between citizens and their parliaments.

However, what is controversial is what is really being measured: specific support, diffuse support, or performance. Therefore, for this study, it was decided that a score would be used, not presuming or claiming that it will measure trust or support. The LegislativeScore is considered to be representative of how citizens rate their parliament.

The primary intention of the study was to perform a comparative analysis of the 25 197 interviewed citizens, omitting in its first phase the identities of the countries. However, agreeing with the general perception that the identities of the countries are relevant (Gronke, Levitt, 2004), as an alternative, it was decided to undertake the analysis by country instead of having country only as a control variable. As the results show, this procedure provided information on each country that analysed in any other way would have been lost. The underpinning idea was therefore to combine the richness of the comparative method with the accuracy of the country analysis.

6.1.2 Independent variables and null hypotheses

The model tests seventeen factors (independent variables) as predictors of the LegislativeScore. Accordingly, seventeen null hypotheses have been defined:

1. Level of education has no impact on the LegislativeScore
2. Cash income deprivation has no impact on the LegislativeScore
3. Food deprivation has no impact on the LegislativeScore
4. Being satisfied with the national economy has no impact on the LegislativeScore
5. Satisfaction with personal living conditions has no impact on the LegislativeScore
6. Trust in other citizens has no impact on the LegislativeScore
7. Allegiance to a party has no impact on the LegislativeScore
8. Listening to the radio has no impact on the LegislativeScore
9. Watching television has no impact on the LegislativeScore
10. Reading newspapers has no impact on the LegislativeScore

11. Age group has no impact on the LegislativeScore
12. Gender has no impact on the LegislativeScore
13. Habitat has no impact on the LegislativeScore
14. Satisfaction with democracy has no impact on the LegislativeScore
15. Perception of the fairness of elections has no impact on the LegislativeScore
16. Perception of embeddedness has no impact on the LegislativeScore
17. Frequency of political discussion has no impact on the LegislativeScore

6.2. Expectations of findings

In 2005, Reneske Doorenspleet (2005) published her study on Citizens' Support for the Legislature of Mali. Doorenspleet also used the Afrobarometer data, but the previous version (Round 2). In this chapter, similar hypotheses are tested using data from the 18 countries, but this time from the Round 3 version of Afrobarometer. Based on Doorenspleet's findings in the Malian study, it is expected that two main findings will emerge:

a. Legislative support will vary with levels of poverty and people's perceptions of economic performance;
b. Interpersonal trust, people's interest in and knowledge of politics, and the level of their support for democracy in general will be all important in understanding their support of their legislature (Doorenspleet, 2005, p. 95).

6.2.1 Hypotheses

The hypotheses are divided into two main groups of individual characteristics: socioeconomic characteristics and political characteristics, as summarised in Figure 6.1, below. The criteria in the first group socioeconomic characteristics includes the characteristics of the individuals' social and economic statuses, such as their level of education; their level of poverty, gauged by the cash income and food deprivation that they are exposed to; their satisfaction with the national and their personal economy; their trust in other citizens; the age group (generation) to which they belong; their gender; and their habitat, rural or urban.

The second group, namely, individuals' political characteristics, includes their allegiance to a party, their exposure to the media (listening to the radio, watching television, reading newspapers), their satisfaction with democracy, their perception of the fairness of elections, their perception of embeddedness, and their perception of the frequency of political discussion.

Lipset's (1959) argument that democratic parliaments depend on the existence of an active middle class exposes a potential threat to most parliaments in Africa, since the existing social disparities and poverty make middle classes in Africa a scarcity. As is shown in Chapter 3, Africa has the second highest uneven distribution of income of the world; Africa still ranks as the region with the largest population living on less than 1 USD a day, as is shown in Table 3.2. Simply put, if people are preoccupied with their ability to subsist, it would be illusionary to think that they would be concerned with political institutions.

Overall, the recent history of the African countries in this study includes fights for independence; the creation of nationalist movements, pan-African movements, one-party regimes; and recently, the introduction of multiparty democracies[20]. Accordingly, in each country, the citizens that constitute the electorate can be aggregated into generation groups, which will have witnessed different important moments in the histories of their own countries.

By way of example, when a 50-year-old Mozambican was born in 1958, the country was a colony of Portugal; when he was 17 years old, he would have witnessed the attainment of independence; then for 20 years he would have lived in a one-party state, which means that he would only have experienced a multiparty regime when he was already 57 years old. Of his 50 years of living, 27 would have been lived under an authoritarian regime. The opposite would have been the experience of a 25-year-old Mozambican who was born in 1985, when the country was at civil war. Most of her life would have been lived under a multiparty regime.

These different experiences ensure that the profiles of citizens can be divided according to each country's history. For each country of the study for which the LegislativeScore was constructed, 'generation' was included as an individual characteristic (see Appendix 6).

[20] See for example *Africa in History* by Basil Davidson (2003).

Parliaments are situated in cities, more specifically in one city of a country. As is shown in Table 3.5, the population of each country, its density and the population living in the largest city varies significantly. There are cities with fewer than 1 million people, compared with Lagos with almost 10 million people. Still, it is expected that in the cities where there is more access to education and information, citizens will potentially have more information on their political institutions.

While many liberation movements afford women a place in the political arena, politics is still dominated by male citizens, and for this reason, men will potentially pay more attention to politics.

Section 3.14 of this thesis summarises the political changes African citizens have undergone. Again, it is important to empathise with the political life of African citizens. As with the rest of the world, politics is the domain mainly of the political parties, with important distinctions between new parties, historical parties, opposition parties, powerful ruling parties, and personalised parties. Nevertheless, all are political parties.

It is through parties that citizens choose; they vote for parties, are members of parties, and have neighbours who are members of parties. Citizens follow some party leaders; they dislike others; they form opinions of parties; and they distinguish between parties. It is therefore to be expected that citizens' evaluations of the institution that is constituted by different parties will be influenced by the party allegiance of the citizen.

Regular elections are a novelty in most African countries; this has been perceived undoubtedly as an indication that democracy is strengthening in these societies (Bratton, 1998; Lindberg, 2006), albeit that many of these elections have been only relatively free or fair (Adejumobi, 2000).

In this regard, the Nigerian elections have been characterised by electoral fraud (Olarinmoye, 2008; Collier & Vicente, 2008); the Kenyan elections of 2007 were followed by widespread violence, due to President Mwai Kibaki declaring victory despite irregularities in vote counting (Kibaki, 2008); the Zimbabwean elections in 2008 were marked by violence and intimidation – as was reported by the Zimbabwe Election Support Network, a non-partisan, independent

group of 38 Zimbabwean nongovernmental organisations which declared its condemnation of the election violence – that specifically targeted their observers (Zimbabwe Election Support Network, 2008).

In Mozambique, domestic and international observers declared that the legislative and presidential elections of 2004 involved irregularities and fraud, although all observers agreed that overall election results were not in question because Frelimo's victory entailed a wide margin. This was confirmed by the parallel vote tabulation conducted by domestic observers. However, these problems could have had an impact on the distribution of parliamentary seats in some provinces (Mazula, 2006). The reservations about the irregularities surrounding the elections caused a deadlock after the elections, with the leader of the opposition, Afonso Dlhakama, giving several press conferences where he threatened that the party would not be part of a parliament elected through fraud (Mazula, 2006, p. 147).

In the area covered by this study, parliamentary seats are allocated in accordance with election results. Therefore, it is expected that the legitimacy of their allocation in the public's eyes results in the first instance from how free and fair the elections were.

Elected parliaments are core institutions of representative democracies; therefore, it would be logical to expect that democratic citizens would be more supportive of legitimately elected parliaments. Doorenspleet concludes "...perceptions of regimes have profound effects on how citizens perceive specific institutions" (2005, p. 91). Mishler and Rose (1993, 1994, 1997) postulate that legislatures in new democracies are important symbols of democracy, and that support for legislatures is more a consequence than a cause of the support of democracy by citizens.

Based in the discussion above, the following hypotheses will be tested.

6.2.1.1 The impact of socioeconomic characteristics

a) Level of education has a positive impact on the LegislativeScore.
b) A higher level of poverty is associated with a lower LegislativeScore.
c) A higher level of satisfaction with one's living conditions has a positive impact on the LegislativeScore.
d) A higher level of satisfaction with one's economic status has a positive impact on the LegislativeScore.
e) A higher level of trust for one's fellow citizens has a positive impact on the LegislativeScore (not studied in Zimbabwe).
f) The multiparty generation is associated with a higher LegislativeScore.
g) Males are associated with a lower LegislativeScore.
h) Residents of rural areas achieve a higher LegislativeScore.

6.2.1.2 The impact of political characteristics

a) An association with the ruling party has a positive impact on the LegislativeScore.
b) An association with the opposition party has a negative impact on the LegislativeScore.
c) One's religious affiliations have a positive impact on the LegislativeScore.
d) Exposure to radio news has a positive impact on the LegislativeScore.
e) Exposure to print news has a negative impact in the LegislativeScore.
f) The level of satisfaction with democracy has a positive impact on the LegislativeScore.
g) Citizens who believe that elections were not free and fair will confer a lower LegislativeScore.
h) Citizens who believe that they do not live in a democracy (embeddedness) will confer a lower evaluation of the legislature.
i) Political discussion has a positive impact on the LegislativeScore

Of the two main groups of characteristics (socioeconomic and political), it is expected that socioeconomic characteristics will exert more of an influence over the evaluations that citizens make of their legislature. The political characteristics will also be important, but less so than the socioeconomic characteristics; for example, if citizens are poor *and* living in a rural area, rural characteristics will be intrinsic to them and very relevant in their daily lives, to the extent that their party affiliation, their perception of the fairness of elections, and other political concerns will be less important. These citizens will therefore be less aware of their legislatures and consequently less judgmental of them.

Figure 6.1: Diagram of the hypotheses concerning the individual characteristics that will impact on the LegislativeScore



6.3. The model

In order to test these hypotheses, a multiple regression equation was selected and applied to the LegislativeScore for each country. It was assumed that the LegislativeScore was approximately normally distributed.

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{(1)} + \ldots + \beta_k X_{(k)} + e_i$$

Where

$X_{1, \ldots,} X_{(16)}$ are the selected factors for country *i,* chosen from the 17 available, and e_i is a random variable assumed to be normally distributed with a mean zero and constant variance.

A predictor was included in the model for Y, and both its marginal and conditional effects were significant. A marginal effect shows the influence of the factor when it is the only one included in the model. A conditional effect shows its influence when it is added to a model that contains all the factors. These are shown in Appendix 8 for each country. Genstat 10.1 was used for these tests.

The residuals, $Y_i - \hat{Y}_i$, from each chosen model were examined, and the departure from normality was detected.

The summary of the explanatory results for all countries is show in Table 6.2, and a more detailed description of the results by country is presented in Table 6.3. Appendix 8 shows the results of the marginal and conditional tests for all countries. For the significant factors, the value for each parameter was estimated (see Appendix 8). This allows one to measure the strength of the influence of each factor on the dependent variable, the LegislativeScore. The parameters also indicate whether the influence is positive or negative, as well as its strength.

The primary goal of the analysis was to run a comparative analysis of the 25 197 citizens, omitting the country setting in a first phase. However, agreeing with the general perception that the country context is relevant, as an alternative, it was decided to undertake the analysis by country instead of employing the country as merely a control variable. As the results show, this procedure gave information for each country analysed that any analyse other way

would have been lost. The underpinning idea was therefore to combine the richness of the comparative method with the accuracy of the country analysis.

For each country a screening of terms was conducted with the seventeen independent variables (predictors) having the LegislativeScore as response. The regression model (generalised linear model) was then applied to the variables with a statistical significance in the marginal and conditional tests, and these results are presented in Table 6.2. Subsequently, the variables that had shown high significance in just one of the variance tests were added to the model.

The model was run repeatedly until it comprised only the variables with statistical significance

As is shown in Table 6.3, the results do exhibit important differences among the countries; yet two variables show a pattern of influence in the majority of the countries: fairness of the elections and party allegiance.

Since all of the predictors were ordinal categorical variables, the analyses were conducted by category, having as a reference factor the variable with a lower number.

In the model used, *y* is the LegislativeScore, *x* is the 17 factors presented heretofore, and β (beta) are the parameters that indicate the strength and the direction of the effect of that factor on the dependent variable.

Table 6.3 reports the statistically significant variables for each country. As illustrated, the variables *party allegiance* and *fairness of elections* are the variables that have an overall effect in most countries. The R^2 statistic shows that overall the model only explains between 6% and 33% of the variation in the data. There is a small but statistically significant association between the factors presented; however, this is not adequate for making predictions.

Table 6.2: Screening test; conditional and marginal tests; response: LegislativeScore

	Gen-der	Radio	TV	News-papers	Discuss politics	Gene-ration	Fairness of elections	Embedded-ness of democracy	Satisfaction with democracy	Personal living conditions	Country's economy	Trust in others	Party allegiance	Food de-privation	Cash income de-privation	Edu-cation	Habitat
Benin	*	***	~					***	***	***	***	***	***	**	***	***	
		~				*	~	**	~	**	***	*		*	**	***	
Botswana		***	*		~		~	***	***	***	***	***		***	~	*	
		**	~		*			*	*	***				**			
Cape Verde	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***
	**	**		*	**		***	***	*	**		*	***			***	
Ghana	*	***	***	***	***	*	***	***	***	***	***	*	***	***	***	**	~
							***	*	**	**					~		~
Kenya		***	**	~	***		***	***	***	***	***		***	~	***	~	***
	~				~		**		***				**				**
Lesotho		~			***	***	***	***	***	***	~	***	***	**	~	*	*
					~	*	**		**	*		***	***				
Madagascar	~	***		**	***		***	***	***	***	***	**	***	**	*	***	*
				*			***			**		***	***			~	*
Malawi	*		~		***		**	*	***			*	***				~
							~		**			~	***				
Mali	***	***	*	*	***	*	***	***	***	***	***		**		*	***	~
		*			~	~	***		***	~			~			~	**
Mozambique	***	**	*	**	***		***	***	***	***	***	***	***	**	*	***	*
		~					~	***	**		*	***	***				**
Namibia		*	***	***	***		***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***		***
				***	*	~	***	***	*		*	***	*	*			
Nigeria	*	**	**	*	***		***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***		
		*						***	***	***		*	***	*	*	*	
Senegal	***	*	**		***	*	***	***	***	***	*		***	~	*	**	***
		*	*			**	***	**	**	***	~		***				***
South Africa	**	***	***	***	***		***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	
			~		**		***	***	***	**			***				
Tanzania			*	~			***	***	*	***	***		***		~	**	
				~			***	*		~	*		*				
Uganda	***	**	**	***	***		***	***	***	***	**	***	***	~		***	
	*			*			**			**		***	**	***		***	
Zambia		**	*		***		***	***	***	***	**		***	~	*	*	*
			**		*		***		**	~			***				
Zimbabwe		*	**	**		*	***	***	***	***	***		***	***	***	**	***
	*	***					***	~			~		***		***		

Coding: ~ .05<p<=.10; * .01<p<=.05; ** .001<p<=.01; *** p<=.001. The chance frequencies of symbols in 36 tests are ~=1.8; * =1.44; ** =0.324; *** = 0.036. The first row for each country corresponds to the marginal test, while in the second row, the conditional test *marginal = the variable* is the only one in the regression equation; it measures this effect by ignoring the effect of all other variables. *Conditional = the variable* is added to a regression model. It measures the effect of the variables in the presence of all the others.

Table 6.3: Summary of explanatory model

	Benin	Bots-wana	Cape Verde	Ghana	Kenya	Leso-tho	Mada-gascar	Mala-wi	Mali	Mozam-bique	Namibia	Nigeria	Sene-gal	SA	Tanza-nia	Ugan-da	Zam-bia	Zim-babwe
Education	✓		✓						✓	✓					✓	✓		
Cash income deprivation	✓		✓	✓							✓	✓						✓
Food deprivation	✓											✓						
Satisfaction with economy	✓	✓			✓		✓			✓			✓	✓				✓
Satisfaction with personal living conditions		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓		✓	✓			✓	✓	✓	
Trust in others			✓			✓												
Party allegiance	✓		✓		✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Radio usage	✓		✓						✓	✓								
Television usage		✓												✓				
Newspaper usage				✓							✓			✓		✓		
Generation													✓					
Gender			✓													✓		
Habitat					✓								✓					
Satisfaction with democracy	✓		✓	✓		✓	✓	✓		✓		✓	✓	✓			✓	✓
Perception of fairness of elections		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓
Perception of embeddedness			✓	✓				✓		✓		✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓
Frequency of political discussion			✓		✓	✓			✓		✓			✓		✓	✓	
R^2	.21	.09	.33	.15	.12	.20	.13	.13	.15	.21	.32	.20	.29	.29	.06	.06	.16	.24

6.4. Discussion of results by factor

Overall, there are two variables that show a pattern in most of the countries: party allegiance and the fairness of elections. There are only four countries in which the fairness of elections was not statically relevant: Nigeria, Namibia, Benin and Botswana. In only three countries was party allegiance, a related variable, not statistically significant.

6.4.1 Education

Level of education has an impact on the legislative score in five countries: Benin, Cape Verde, Mali, Tanzania and Uganda. However, it does show differences in the type of impact that it has on the dependent variable. In Benin, primary school education contributes negatively to the legislative score, and it is only in this country that the level of education impacts on the outcome.

In the other four countries where education impacts on the LegislativeScore, it was found to have a positive effect: In Mali and Tanzania an impact was only observed for a single level of education, namely, secondary and primary school education respectively. In Uganda and Cape Verde, an impact on the score was apparent at all levels of education. This happened at a decreasing rate (or with 'diminishing returns') in Uganda but at an increasing rate in Cape Verde, with higher education accounting for nearly double the impact that primary education has on the score.

In the remaining countries of the analysis, education did not contribute statistically to the LegislativeScore.

6.4.2 Cash income deprivation

Lack of access to a cash income does not appear to have a significant impact on the LegislativeScore. Somewhat surprisingly, it is the presence of a steady stream of cash income that appears to impact negatively on the LegislativeScore in four countries: Benin, Nigeria, Namibia and Zimbabwe.

In both Nigeria and Benin, only those who had never experienced a shortage of income contributed to the LegislativeScore (negatively). In Zimbabwe, it was those who had experienced a moderate level ('just once or twice') of shortage of income who contributed negatively to the LegislativeScore. In Namibia, all participants who did not experience a chronic shortage of income contributed negatively to the LegislativeScore.

In Benin, this variable contributed to a negative LegislativeScore. However, this trend was only statistically observed for those citizens who did not have cash. This means that the respondents who chose the answers that they had 'never' in the last year gone without cash or had gone 'just once or twice' without cash were the ones who expressed a more sceptical view of their parliament. The some pattern was demonstrated in Zimbabwe, where the citizens who were sceptical of parliament were the ones who chose the category 'never went without cash in the last year'.

6.4.4 Food deprivation

The scarcity of food only has a statistical significance in Benin and Nigeria. Its interpretation is not straightforward, however, since it appears to have had a negative impact (as would be expected) in Nigeria for those who went without food 'many times', but a positive impact at most levels on the LegislativeScore in Benin.

6.4.5 Satisfaction with the economy

In four countries, the level of satisfaction with the state of the country had an influence on how people evaluated their parliament. In Mozambique and Kenya all except those who had the most optimistic view of the economy contributed positively to the LegislativeScore. In Namibia and Benin, those who had a 'very good' view of the economy contributed significantly and positively to the score; in Namibia, those with a 'fairly good' view of the economy made a more moderate contribution (about one half); in Benin, those with a 'fairly bad' view of the economy (about one sixth of the most optimistic participants) made a marginally positive contribution to the LegislativeScore.

6.4.6 Satisfaction with personal living conditions

This variable shows statistical significance for the score in nine of the eighteen countries: Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Zambia, and Cape Verde.

In six of the aforementioned nine countries showing statistical significance, the effect on the score was significant at all levels of response, ranging from a relatively small positive contribution from those who viewed their personal living conditions as 'fairly bad' to a highly positive contribution from those who viewed their personal living conditions as 'very good'. In the other three countries where this variable was observed as contributing to the score, the contribution was not evident at all levels of response, and there was no contribution at the 'very good' level.

6.4.7 Trust in others

This variable was statistically significant in the two smallest countries of the sample – Cape Verde and Lesotho. In both countries, a level of trust, and in the case of Cape Verde, distrust, contributed positively to the score.

6.4.8 Party allegiance

Party allegiance is one of the few variables that was seen to impact on the LegislativeScore in most countries. In fourteen of the fifteen countries where this variable is a factor, citizens aligned with opposition parties contributed positively to the legislative score, Benin being the exception. In just seven of the fourteen countries, participants aligned with the ruling party contributed positively to the score: Uganda, South Africa, Zambia, Malawi, Madagascar and Kenya.

In these seven, the contribution to the score from participants aligned with the ruling party was consistently lower than for those affiliated with the opposition.

The seven countries where opposition-party affiliation was a contributing factor are Mozambique, Cape Verde, Nigeria, Namibia, Senegal, Zimbabwe, and Tanzania.

6.4.9 Radio use

Radio-listening habits had an influence in Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Mali and Mozambique. In four of these countries, listening to the radio contributed positively to the LegislativeScore, while in Benin, those who seldom listened to the radio (i.e. 'less than once a month') contributed negatively to the score. In Mali and Botswana, a positive contribution was made for all levels of radio listenership, from 'less than once a month' to 'every day', while in Cape Verde and Mozambique, only the most frequent listeners ('every day') contributed positive to the score.

6.4.10 Television viewing

Television viewership was found not to be a significant factor in all countries except South Africa, where those who watched television 'a few times a week' contributed negatively to the score.

6.4.11 Newspaper reading

Reading of newspapers had an influence in three countries: Namibia, South Africa and Uganda. In South Africa, people who read newspapers 'less than once a month' contributed positively to the score, while in Namibia, most newspaper readers (those who read upwards of 'a few times a month') contributed negatively to the score. In Uganda, the opposite effect was observed, with infrequent readership (up to 'a few times a week') contributing positively to the score

6.4.12 Generation

Only in Senegal was the post-independence generation seen to contribute negatively to the score. In no other country was the generation effect (designated the pre-independence, post-independence and multi-party generations) a relevant factor.

6.4.13 Gender

Gender was statistically significant only in Cape Verde and Uganda. In both countries, females contributed negatively to the score.

6.4.14 Habitat

The difference between an urban and a rural habitat was a factor only in Senegal and Kenya. In both countries, rural dwellers contributed positively to the score.

6.4.15 Satisfaction with democracy

In all countries where this variable influenced the legislative score, the trend was the same – the more there was satisfaction with democracy, the higher was the legislative score. There was an important finding in the Mozambican results: those who did not believe that Mozambique was a democracy lowered the score (-3.18).

6.4.16 Perception of the fairness of elections

Second only to 'party allegiance', this variable was influential in the majority of countries. In fourteen of the eighteen countries in the study, the way people perceived the fairness of elections impacted on the LegislativeScore.

In these fourteen countries, those who perceived the elections to be 'Completely free and fair' consistently increased the score significantly. Some of the 'weaker' replies, such as 'Free and fair with minor/major problems', were found to be significant factors in some, but not all of the fourteen countries, but they still contributed positively to the score. In a minority of countries, even those who viewed the elections as 'Not free and fair' contributed to an increase in the score. Moreover, the contribution to the score of the various levels of reply increases as the participants' conviction of free and fair elections increases.

6.4.17 Perception of embeddedness of democracy

This variable gives a notion of how much democracy citizens believe exists in their country. In ten countries, this variable shows statistical influence on the LegislativeScore. In all, the trend is that the higher citizens' belief is that their country is a democracy the higher will be

the LegislativeScore. In Tanzania and Ghana, where citizens that do not believe that their countries are democracies, they are more sceptical towards their parliaments with the parameters being -1.099 for Tanzania and -1.577 for Ghana.

6.4.18 Frequency of political discussion

In 6 countries, discussion of politics was statistically relevant to the LegislativeScore: Cape Verde, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Uganda, and South Africa. In all of these countries, the inclination was that discussing politics contributed to a higher LegislativeScore. Citizens who discussed politics more attributed a higher score for their perceptions of parliament.

Table 6.4: Observed and fitted LegislativeScore, by country

Country	Observed/Fitted	Mean	Median	Min	Max	Lower quartile	Upper quartile
Benin	O	7.4	7.0		-	16.0	5.0
	F	7.4	7.3	2.4	15.1	6.3	8.5
Botswana	O	9.9	10.0	-	16.0	8.0	12.0
	F	9.9	10.1	6.9	12.8	9.3	10.6
Cape Verde	O	6.6	7.0	-	16.0	4.0	9.0
	F	6.7	6.9	-0.5	12.4	5.5	8.0
Ghana	O	9.4	10.0	-	16.0	8.0	12.0
	F	9.5	9.7	3.3	12.4	8.7	10.5
Kenya	O	8.4	9.0	-	16.0	7.0	10.0
	F	8.4	8.5	4.8	10.8	7.7	9.3
Lesotho	O	9.1	9.0	-	16.0	7.0	11.0
	F	9.1	9.0	5.4	11.9	8.1	10.1
Madagascar	O	8.5	9.0	-	16.0	7.0	11.0
	F	8.6	8.6	4.1	12.2	7.7	9.4
Malawi	O	8.3	8.0	-	16.0	6.0	11.0
	F	8.4	8.5	5.2	10.2	7.7	9.1
Mali	O	9.2	10.0	-	16.0	7.0	12.0
	F	9.2	9.3	4.0	13.6	8.4	10.2
Mozambique	O	9.7	10.0	-	16.0	8.0	12.0
	F	10.0	10.2	3.8	13.6	8.9	11.2
Namibia	O	10.6	11.0	-	16.0	9.0	13.0
	F	10.6	10.7	6.5	14.6	9.7	11.6
Nigeria	O	7.1	7.0	-	16.0	6.0	9.0
	F	7.2	7.0	4.8	10.7	6.3	7.8
Senegal	O	7.5	8.0	-	16.0	5.0	10.0
	F	7.6	7.7	1.0	12.9	6.3	9.2
South Africa	O	8.7	9.0	-	16.0	7.0	11.0
	F	8.8	9.1	1.8	12.1	7.6	10.1
Tanzania	O	10.3	11.0	-	16.0	8.0	13.0
	F	10.5	10.6	6.9	13.3	10.2	11.1
Uganda	O	9.6	10.0	-	16.0	8.0	11.0
	F	9.6	9.7	7.0	11.8	9.2	10.1
Zambia	O	8.2	8.0	-	16.0	7.0	10.0
	F	8.2	8.1	5.8	10.9	7.4	8.9
Zimbabwe	O	8.4	8.0	-	16.0	7.0	10.0
	F	8.4	8.2	5.6	12.3	7.4	9.3

Table 6.5: LegislativeScore, observed and ranked

	Mean	Median	Min	Max	Lower quartile	Upper quartile
Cape Verde	7	7	-	16	4	9
Nigeria	7	7	-	16	6	9
Benin	7	7	-	16	5	10
Senegal	8	8	-	16	5	10
Zambia	8	8	-	16	7	10
Malawi	8	8	-	16	6	11
Zimbabwe	8	8	-	16	7	10
Kenya	8	9	-	16	7	10
Madagascar	8	9	-	16	7	11
South Africa	9	9	-	16	7	11
Lesotho	9	9	-	16	7	11
Mali	9	10	-	16	7	12
Ghana	9	10	-	16	8	12
Uganda	10	10	-	16	8	11
Mozambique	10	10	-	16	8	12
Botswana	10	10	-	16	8	12
Tanzania	10	11	-	16	8	13
Namibia	11	11	-	16	9	13

6.5. The fitted LegislativeScore compared with the actual data

The ratio R^2 is called the coefficient of determination, with its values lying between 0 and 1, which provides a measure of goodness of fit; values closer to 1 imply a better fit. A value of $R^2 = 0$ implies that there is no linear relationship between the dependent and independent variables (Statistics, 2008). The R^2 for the fitted model for each country is presented in Table 6.3. It varies between 0.086 in Botswana and 0.327 in Cape Verde. For data typically found in the social sciences, values for R^2 as low as 0.25 are considered useful (Statistics, 2008). As is shown in Table 6.3, the R^2 ratios are all significant (different from 0), but range between just 0.06 and 0.33.

6.6 Conclusion

The model tested revealed that, overall, individuals' political characteristics were more important concerning their assessment of the legislature than their intrinsic socioeconomic characteristics. As part of political characteristics, party allegiance and the perception of the fairness of elections were the most important independent variables determining the dependent variable – LegislativeScore.

Party allegiance was one of the few variables that was seen to impact on the LegislativeScore in most countries – in 15 of the 18 countries. In all of these countries, citizens aligned with opposition parties gave a higher LegislativeScore.

The perception of the fairness of elections influenced the LegislativeScore in fourteen of the eighteen countries. In these fourteen countries, those who perceived the elections to be 'completely free and fair' consistently increased the score significantly.

The findings reinforced the view that differences among countries matter when studying institutions such as parliaments.

CHAPTER 7

The Assembly of the Republic of Mozambique

The Mozambican Assembly is 31 years old. Seventeen of these were spent under a one-party regime and only 13 under a multiparty regime. Of the 17 years of one-party rule, 12 years were dominated by civil war. After only 13 years of the existence of a democratic dispensation, it is reasonable to state that the multiparty Assembly of Mozambique is still in its infancy. When assessing the performance or the role of the Mozambican Assembly, it is important to bear in mind (as with any other institution) its age and origin. These will influence the Assembly's institutionalisation process and the level of institutionalisation achieved.

Besides its postconflict nature, Mozambique's former status as a colony of Portugal – which was itself ruled by an authoritarian regime at the time – meant that Mozambicans, including colonial Portuguese citizens, had not prior to independence experienced government and a political environment that included representative and legislative organisations. This characteristic distinguishes the legislature in Mozambique from other former European colonies in Africa.

A political assembly came together for the first time in 1977 in Mozambique's history. The meeting took place in the old cinema in Maputo, since there was no infrastructure for this purpose in the country at the time. This old colonial-era cinema, in the centre of the city, was adopted as the Assembly building from that date onwards. During the one-party regime, the parliament was known as the Popular Assembly (*Assembleia Popular*). Since 1994, with the introduction of the multiparty system, it has been called the Assembly of the Republic (*Assembleia da República*).

At present, the Assembly comprises two political parties, which are the two parties that fought each other in the civil war. These two antagonistic parties have been seated side by side in the elected Assembly of the Republic since 1994. The country has already witnessed three legislative elections, in which (as shown in graph 7.1) FRELIMO has always achieved the majority of votes. In the first term, there was a third party involved, but from the second

term onwards, the Assembly has consisted of two parties only.

The RENAMO parliamentary group is at present a coalition between RENAMO and several small parties[21]. This coalition, however, has not prevented RENAMO from being the smallest parliamentary group in Mozambique's multiparty history.

Graph 7.1: Seat distribution in the Mozambican Assembly



Source: (EISA, 2008f)

FRELIMO and RENAMO's co-existence within the Mozambican Assembly has been marked by apprehension and animosity. In December 1994, during the first session after the first multiparty elections, which took place in a tense environment, the main opposition party, RENAMO abandoned the plenary session as a result of a disagreement over procedures for the election of the speaker. Without procedural rules for the Assembly and without any experience whatsoever of how to conduct multiparty assemblies, the very first session ended in a crisis, with the interruption of the Assembly.

Before 1994, FRELIMO deputies were chosen from among the 'comrades'[22], among whom there were high levels of trust. They were also used to ruling their own assembly. On the

[21] The small parties are the following: Independent Alliance of Mozambique; Mozambican Nationalist Movement; National Convention Party; National Unity Party; Front of Patriotic Action; People's Party of Mozambique; United Front of Mozambique. **Source:** (EISA, 2008g)

other hand, subsequent to 1994, RENAMO deputies participated in a political assembly for the first time. As stated by one of the MPs at the time: "To FRELIMO, we RENAMO deputies were just a bunch of bandits, the new arrivals in town[23]" (Raul Domingos, interview with the author, 2007, February 20, Maputo). Unlike RENAMO, FRELIMO had experience of an assembly albeit under a one-party regime. None of the deputies had experience of being seated next to members of another political party. Apart from becoming familiar with all of the practicalities of an assembly, such as how to vote, how to take the floor and how to organise the agenda, the Mozambican deputies had first to learn how to be with the enemy after a civil war. The first challenge for the deputies was to move from being enemies to being political adversaries. Whether this has been achieved is still debatable.

The history of Mozambique in the twentieth century is defined by long periods of war. The war against the ruling colonialists for independence was followed by a civil war after independence. Peace was only achieved in 1992, and since then the country has been the darling of the donor community. Its economic growth has been used as an example to the continent, with an annual growth rate of 8 percent and with low levels of inflation. Nevertheless, Mozambique is one of the poorest countries in the world, with 70 percent of the population living below the poverty line. Life expectancy is approximately 40 years; illiteracy is extremely high[24], most of the population is not able to read or write, and many have no understanding of the official language, Portuguese.

Mozambique has 20.4 million inhabitants[25], and 65 percent of the population lives in rural areas. Economic growth is mainly through foreign investment, for example, in aluminium production. However, it has been pointed out that the lack of tax revenues from these investments will be a medium- to long-term problem for the consolidation of the economy of the country. Mozambique is ranked one of the lowest countries on the UNDP Human Development Index for 2006 (UNDP, 2006), in 168th place among 177 countries classified

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[22] FRELIMO members used the socialist expression *comrades* to address or refer to one another; the expression is still used among the party members.

[23] Interview with Raul Domingos, former leader of RENAMO parliamentary group until 2000; currently president of the Party for Peace, Democracy, and Development.

[24] According to UNESCO, six out of ten Mozambicans are illiterate (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation [UNESCO], 2004).

[25] Instituto Nacional De Estatisticas Moçambique, http://www.ine.gov.mz/, online 29 September 2007.

by this index. It is important to bear in mind that the Mozambican population is extremely juvenile – four in ten Mozambicans are younger than 15 years old (UNDP, 2006). This means that most young Mozambican citizens were born after the peace agreement and during the period of democratisation. Elections have been part of their lives; however, this does not necessarily mean that democracy has been a part of their lives.

7.1 The assembly and democratisation

The transition to democracy in Mozambique occurred alongside the establishment of peace in the country. During both processes the Assembly was a key institution.

Not much is known regarding the role of African parliaments in their democratisation processes. What is acknowledged is that many one-party assemblies have given way to assemblies comprising several political parties. There is the common conjecture that assemblies are important for democracy, although how these institutions have developed and what their importance is for the development and democratisation of these countries needs further investigation. It is evident that the democratisation wave of the 1990s replaced one-party assemblies with elected multiparty assemblies in several countries. The Mozambican Assembly is one of these.

The study of the Assembly of Mozambique yields important insights into the relationship between democratisation and legislatures. The Mozambican case shows that a constitutional design in which the legislature's powers are extremely limited in relation to those of the executive will result in a stagnation of the democratisation process. The Mozambican Constitution grants almost no powers to the Assembly, and this correlates with the stagnation of the development of liberties in the country.

The stagnation of the democratisation process is indicated by the Freedom House scores for Mozambique, which have remained unchanged with regard to political values and civil liberties since 1994. With the value for political rights being 3 and for civil rights being 4, the country has been classified as 'partly free' for more than a decade (Freedom House, 2007). As demonstrated in Graph 7.2, in the transition period from 1993 to 1994, there was

significant development with regard to political and civil liberties, but since 1994 there has been no sign of evolution.

Graph 7.2: Mozambique's Freedom House Scores



Source: Freedom House, 2007

Further evidence of the stagnation of the democratisation process in Mozambique is the low participation in the elections in 2004, together with the problematic electoral process. In this election the turnout declined drastically from that of previous elections. In 2004, only 36.3 percent of the electorate voted, in contrast with a high turnout in 1994 of 87.9 percent, and in 1999 of 68.1 percent. In addition, according to several international observers, the elections in 2004 exhibited grave irregularities. However, these irregularities seem not to have influenced the final result, since FRELIMO won by a comfortable margin. Electoral irregularities lead to a lack of trust in the democratisation process and raise tensions between political parties. Moreover, this state of affairs led to the exclusion of RENAMO from state functions, as was evident from RENAMO's refusal in 2007 to participate in the anniversary of the peace agreement, and for the first time, the peace celebrations did not have the two political parties seated side-by-side ("Vitória retumbante manchada por má conduta", 2005).

In 1990, the one-party assembly in Mozambique approved a new constitution allowing the formation of political parties. This constitution was the foundation for the peace agreement signed between FRELIMO and RENAMO in 1992. Two years later, the country held its first

multiparty elections. Present in the Constitution of 1990 and retained in the revision of 2004 is a constitutional design that stipulates a strong presidential system. The president has full powers to appoint and dismiss the cabinet. The premier and the ministers can be dismissed individually and collectively by the president with no justification to any other institution. The only limit that the Mozambican president has regarding the investiture of the government is that the president can be forced to dismiss the premier and cabinet if the Assembly rejects the Government programme twice (Mozambique. Lei nº17/2007, 2007, Article 108).

The choice of a strong presidential system where the president is absolved of public accountability was made by the former pre-1994 Assembly. However, this constitutional design was not challenged in the subsequent constitutional revisions. The maintenance of this constitutional design is an expression of the will of the two main political parties and not just the legacy of the authoritarian former one-party regime. RENAMO, the largest opposition party, has not challenged this constitutional design in several revisions of the Constitution.

Since 1994, the country has been under the governance of the same political party, FRELIMO. After independence this former liberation movement with communism leanings became the governing regime. Since the first election in 1994, FRELIMO has won all the elections, with the exception of the municipal elections in 1998, where RENAMO won five municipalities. In the legislative and presidential elections in 2004, FRELIMO registered the highest vote. In the last presidential elections, FRELIMO presented the electorate with a new presidential candidate – Armando Guebuza. In doing this, the party respected the constitutional provision that establishes a limit of two terms for the presidency (Mozambique Constitution, Article 147, 2004). Besides the term limits, Joaquim Chissano, the president at that time, expressed no will to run for a third term, even though his party could have voted for a constitutional revision to allow him to do so. Even though the international community was pleased with Chissano's governance, he faced serious popularity problems in his own country during his last term, with one of his sons allegedly involved in a financial scandal.

Armando Guebuza was elected as FRELIMO's secretary general at its eighth congress in 2002 and became the party president in 2005. During the ninth party congress, he was re-elected president of the party with 100 percent of the votes. At the same congress, held in November 2006 ("Congresso confirma Guebuza para Presidente da Frelimo", 2006), Chissano was accorded the title of honorary president. Guebuza is the second elected

president of the country. His style is less conciliatory than that of Chissano. For instance, since being elected as president of the country, he has not met with the leader of the opposition. Guebuza's presidency has been characterised by a cold relationship between FRELIMO and RENAMO, with the latter accusing FRELIMO of showing a lack of tolerance and exhibiting an uncooperative attitude. RENAMO for the first time refused to participate in the 15th anniversary of the official commemoration of the peace agreement. Instead, Afonso Dlakhama met his RENAMO party members in their party office and read out his speech, which stated, "Our country is sick. The tyranny is back." ("Renamo exclui-se do programa oficial", 2007)[26].

Mozambique was included in the Ibrahim Index of African Governance, launched in 2007, using 2005 data. It was ranked 23rd out of the 48 countries in sub-Saharan Africa[27]. Placed in the middle of the table, the country is rated as doing well, at least in relation to the rest of the continent. The Mo Ibrahim Foundation awards an annual prize to a former African president for his contribution to governance and democracy. Joaquim Chissano won the first Mo Ibrahim prize for excellence in his leadership of Mozambique[28] (African Monitor: African Voices for African Development, 2007). The Foundation's press release indicated that one of the reasons for the choice of Chissano was his decision not to seek a third presidential term, and that, according to the Foundation, reinforced Mozambique's democracy. Even though there are term limits, Africa knows several examples of presidents that at the last moment have tried to change the constitution to allow them one more term.

Chissano signed the peace agreement in 1992, and during his two presidential terms had a cordial relationship with Afonso Dhlakama, the leader of RENAMO. The relationship between the President of the Republic and Dhlakama appears to have deteriorated with the arrival of Armando Guebuza. Across the political divide, Dhlakama has been accused of nepotism within his own party. In the last elections, Raúl Domingos, former parliamentary

[26] Jornal Noticias, Maputo, 5 de Outubro de 2007 article 'Renamo exclui-se do programa oficial'. Translation by the author. Original: *"O nosso país está doente. Os tiranos estão de volta, a democracia está em perigo e nós, homens e mulheres da Renamo temos que estar preparados para fazer o que for preciso em sua salvação*

[27] This ranking measures the quality of governance, assessing five areas: safety and security, rule of law, transparency and corruption, participation and human rights, sustainable economic development, human development. See http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/index/index2.asp online October 10, 2007.

[28] See http://www.africanmonitor.org/node/103

leader of RENAMO, was expelled from the party, despite the general perception that he was a potential candidate for the leadership of the party.

7.1.1 The foundation – the Popular Assembly

The creation of the Popular Assembly was decided at the third FRELIMO congress, in 1977. In the following year a new constitution was drawn up. The 1978 Constitution differs from the Constitution of 1975 in its attempt to separate executive and legislative powers in government.

The Constitution of 1975 vested six institutions with law-making powers. These included the Central Committee of FRELIMO, the Executive Committee of FRELIMO, the Permanent Committee of the Popular Assembly, the President of the Republic, the organs of the Popular Assembly, and the Council of Ministers. The Constitution of 1978 reduced these organs to four, slashing the power of the Executive Committee of FRELIMO and of the President.

The permanent committee of the Popular Assembly was composed of deputies elected by the Legislature but proposed by the Central Committee of FRELIMO. This structure created a situation where there was no distinction between the Central Committee of FRELIMO and the Permanent Committee of the Popular Assembly. According to research by Macuane, decisions by the Permanent Committee were then taken for ratification to the plenary, which approved them with almost no exception, and unanimously with no debate (Macuane, 2000). Only in 1987 did the plenary of the Assembly acquire importance relating to the approval of legislation. This change was a result of the alteration of the Constitution (Mozambique Constitution, 1986) and of the standing orders in 1986. Among other amendments was the creation of three separate functions, namely, the President of the Republic, the President of the Assembly and the Premier. Up to this point in time, the President of the Republic also served as the President of the Popular Assembly.

In 1990, with the Constitution that initiated the process of installing multiparty rule, the Permanent Committee's law-making role was even further reduced, this function subsequently being more centralised in the plenary Assembly.

Figure 7.1: Organisational chart of the One Party Assembly Mozambique



7.2. Development of the Assembly

The institutional capacity of a legislature is limited primarily by the level of powers provided by the constitution. But the assembly's capacity to perform its tasks will also is the consequence of a collection of different variables such as its party system, its resources, and its structure. Joel Barkan (2005) defined a set of seven variables to evaluate the way that legislatures are emerging in Africa. These include the pressures of patron-client politics, the formal rules, the level of legislative salaries, the collective resources and capacity of the legislature, the type of electoral system for converting votes into seats, and the presence of a coalition of reformers and/or opportunists.

An attempt to measure the institutionalisation of a legislature was first made by Nelson Polsby (1968) using the House of Commons. This concern with measuring institutionalisation is related to the belief that the level of institutionalisation will affect the political effectiveness of an institution. Polsby (1968) defined three criteria that a legislature needs to fulfil to be considered institutionalised. According to Polsby (1968), a legislature is in a positive process of institutionalisation when it progressively becomes more bounded, more complex, and more universal.

Table 7. 1: Level of institutionalisation

Criteria	Institutionalised Legislature	Mozambican Assembly	Comments
Bounded – autonomy in relation to other institutions.	Yes	No	The Mozambican legislature is not independent of the political parties.
Complexity – the organisation needs to be relatively complex with regard to its rules, its division of work, and its hierarchy.	Yes	No	There has been an effort to move towards this. However, there are still noticeable deficiencies.
Universalistic – that is, the organisation should use universalistic rather than particularistic criteria.	Yes	No	The first symptom that this criterion has not been fulfilled is that not all deputies have the opportunity to belong to working committees.

This analysis of the institutionalisation of the Mozambican Assembly reveals that there is still a long way to go along the route to institutionalisation. However, as stated previously, this judgment should be balanced by the fact that this weakness is in part caused by the constitution, which gives almost total power to the president of the republic. This does not equate to saying that the lack of institutionalisation is a result of the constitutional limitation of powers. Besides the constitutional limitation, the Mozambican Assembly struggles with other limitations.

There are several challenges that the Mozambican Assembly faces. The first is that the Assembly is hostage to an electoral and party system that restricts parliamentary autonomy. The ruling party holds the majority of parliamentary seats, and this reduces the deputies of the ruling party to one solid block protecting the Executive. This situation is reinforced by an electoral system that makes the deputies dependent on the party's hierarchy. In Barkan's (1979, 2005) research, it was found that patron-client relations provide an incentive for constituency work. Even though the Mozambican deputies are also under the influence of patron-client relations, the result is the opposite. The reason for this is that in Mozambique patron-client relations exist mainly within the party. The

electoral system, being a proportional party, closed-list system, forces the deputies to be obedient to their political party above anything else.

The autonomy of the institution in relation to other organisations and groups – that is, its demarcation from other organisations in the political system, including from the political parties – is seen as an essential feature of the development of a legislature. This is the main challenge that the Mozambican Parliament faces. In a state where the ruling party dominates all state structures, the Assembly is no exception, even though it is the institution where the opposition plays a role. There was a positive signal contradicting this characteristic when a few deputies were expelled from RENAMO, and the Assembly did not comply with RENAMO's request to expel them. On the contrary, there was institutional solidarity, and the deputies kept their places and all their benefits. It is questionable whether this would have occurred if the deputies had belonged to FRELIMO.

For a country that is a beneficiary of substantial international aid, international support for the institutionalisation of the Assembly has been negligible. On the contrary, that the country is a recipient of large quantities of international aid actually undermines the Assembly's oversight function with regard to the executive. This is because negotiations between the donors and the executive exclude the Assembly, meaning that it is the international community that effectively negotiates and judges the executive's actions.

This situation illustrates how the international community can support and promote the democratisation process by giving substantial financial support for elections but simultaneously create circumstances that represent serious obstacles for democratic consolidation. This includes supporting a constitutional design that contains dubious checks and balances of power, and preventing the Assembly from performing its oversight function. In addition, the international community has given little support to the Assembly's development. There have been sporadic projects by a few donors but no formal strategy plotted by these donors to manage and support aid to the country. This is evidenced by the fact that the Assembly's buildings are still those of the 1970s one-party Assembly. Only the more recent buildings, which were constructed after 1992, were funded by the Chinese government.

The institutionalisation of the Mozambican Assembly has not been a priority for the international community. Between 1995 and 1998, United States Agency for International Development (USAID) funded a project to improve the efficiency of the legislature, but it ran only from 1995 to 1997, while the United Nations for Development Programme (UNDP) rolled out one project and is starting their second project. However, these efforts are not part of a collective effort by the group of donors, constituted to manage aid to the country.

The rhetoric used in the plenary debates in Mozambique is often not polite. This feature could reflect the embryonic stage of development of the legislature. This characteristic was noted with regard to the debates within the fledgling US Congress, as Polsby reveals, citing Thomas Reed as saying "These were not pleasant days. Men were not nice in their treatment of each other (...)" (Polsby, 1968, p. 167). In the early days of the US Congress, it seems that the environment was characterised as an 'era of guns and dogs' (Polsby, 1968, p.168). The Mozambican Parliament appears still to be in the era of impolite language, but this has begun to improve.

The legislatures that have been established in the recent wave of democratisation in Africa have faced the challenge of rapid development. The democratisation processes in the 1990s were high-speed processes. With elections being supported by the international community, international advocacy for democratisation, and the exposure that citizens had to global events through the media, the political process did not lead the way. On the contrary, first-world influences led the changes. This context meant that these assemblies did not have, as their counterparts in Western societies had, decades or centuries to undertake their development. For this reason, these legislatures faced the challenge of actively promoting their institutionalisation as a strategy, rather than allowing it to develop as a natural process, as happened with these institutions in Western societies.

The focus on institutionalisation over a short time span carries the risk of generating an increase in the complexity of the structure that will not necessarily mean institutionalisation. As noted by Polsby (1968), an increase in hierarchical structure is not a necessary attribute of the institutionalisation process. Polsby (1968) states that organisations other than bureaucracies have uniformly centralised patterns of authority.

Polsby (1968) pioneered the use of *turnover of members* to measure the level of institutionalisation of an Assembly, a feature that years later Hibbings (1999, p. 33) questioned: "The indicators of institutionalisation actually could be seen as an indicator of the absence of institutionalisation – an inability of the institution to quash variance in individual members". To Hibbings (1999, p. 158), institutionalisation occurs when the turnover of members has minimal impact on the institution, and judgement of this criterion should also take into account the level of turnover. A high turnover can also reveal an increase in uncertainty. The Mozambican Assembly is in only its third cycle of turnover and it is thus too early to draw conclusions related to the turnover of its members.

Hibbings' (1999) findings, which correlated the development of the legislature with the surrounding environment, can be utilised to assist in an understanding of the Mozambican case. Hibbings noticed that members of parliament play according to the rules of the political game, which have mainly originated in the political parties and not in the legislature. This is observable in the Mozambican Assembly.

> It becomes virtually impossible to consider legislative institutionalisation without considering political parties. What we find is that individual members have been rendered relatively inconsequential by an institutionalising process, but parties and not the legislatures are primarily responsible for this effect. The parties are very good at obtaining the kind of behaviour they want, effectively reducing legislators, in many systems, to little more than drones (Hibbings, 1999, p. 159-160).

In cases such as the Mozambican one, where the political parties control the parliamentary rules, institutionalisation will depend on the will of the political parties. Based on the example of the House of Commons in the UK, Hibbings (1999) shows that political systems lead the process of legislative institutionalisation. This prompts the important deduction that that there is a variation in the potential of an assembly to operate the institutionalisation process. Hibbings states in this regard, "... legislative institutionalisation itself should not be expected to be identical across legislatures in different political systems" (Hibbings, 1999, p. 162). This idea is central to the study of institutionalisation in legislatures, since it reveals that it is an error to believe that legislatures can develop autonomously. For this reason, Hibbings is sceptical in applying

the rigorous operationalisation theory developed by Polsby (1968) to measure legislative institutionalisation.

> Legislatures are designed to be in tune with their environment, not to develop boundaries cordoning off that environment. If institutionalisation is the process of an organisation isolating itself from its environment by developing distinctive norms, idiosyncratic inside lingo, magnificent infrastructures, and unique career tracks, legislatures are simply unable to go very far down the road of institutionalisation .... the process of institutionalisation cannot continue without an organisation – any organisation - becoming too complex, too rigid, and too isolated from its environment. (Hibbings, 1999, p. 161-162).

Mozambique is a poor country. Development is at the top of the official agenda of the government and donor organisations. With regard to this, good governance and efficiency are goals for the national budget. This raises the question of how an assembly can be involved in the development of the country. The Assembly involves discussion, contradiction, and voting, and these processes are by definition time-consuming and therefore may not seem efficient. This problem raises the question of what role parliament should play in the development of the country. This question is even more pertinent to a country like Mozambique, where the two parties never collaborate, which means that opposing members of Parliament are constantly involved in political party struggles. This slows down and complicates the procedures of governance. On the opposite side of the coin, if the Assembly is not involved, how it could oversee and contribute to the political process is unclear. Efficiency may be compromised by the lengthy processes involved in the Assembly, but there is a gain in accountability.

The Mozambican Parliament has various limitations, but without doubt, it is the only state institution that keeps the executive's activities in the public eye. This seems to be a last resort practice of parliaments in developing countries (Smith & Muslof, 1979, p. 29). In many countries, legislatures help keep the activities of the executive in the public view.

It is evident that the Assembly did not start from scratch the day after independence, but it is also important to realise that initially there were no rules, procedures, and coexistence patterns among parliamentarians, and between parliamentarians and the staff of the

Assembly. Even the South African parliament, which had inherited a partial[29] multiparty structure, had to contend with inherited white staff with years of experience in a nondemocratic state.

It is therefore obvious that these legislatures are still institutionalising procedures, rules and work habits. The scarce literature on African legislatures is mainly confined to works on former British or French colonies. Mozambique was a Portuguese colony, which is important for the analysis of its legislature, since Portugal was not a democracy at the time that Mozambique's attained independence. As a consequence, Portugal's colonies had not observed any legislative practices upon which to build. However, their colonial legacy did not prevent the Mozambican Parliament from reproducing their model. Even though there are currently institutional similarities to the present Portuguese model, the political system is substantially different. The similarities are more a result of the cooperation that exists between the Portuguese-speaking countries, as the common language helps the sharing of procedures, documentation and expertise. For instance, in 1994 the Mozambican Assembly used the Cape Verdean standing orders as a foundation for its standing orders. This Lusophone cooperation appears to be nourishing a system distinct from the Francophone and Westminster models.

Mozambique has a diversity of mother tongues. According to the census of 1997, the language most spoken at home is *Emakhuwa* (26.3 percent), followed by *Xichangana* (11.4 percent), and last, Portuguese, the only official language, which is the home tongue of 6.5 percent of the population[30]. The variety of languages does not appear to be an obstacle for the workings of the Mozambican Parliament though. This is unlike the situation in the Senegalese Parliament, according to Thomas and Sissokho (2005), in which many of its members do not speak French, limiting their participation. In Mozambique there is no disagreement regarding the use of Portuguese within the

[29] The South African Parliament before 1994 comprised three houses: The House of Assembly (White representatives), the House of Representatives (Coloured representatives), and the House of Delegates (Indian representatives). This tricameral system was created in 1977. See for example http://www.sahistory.org.za/pages/library-resources/official%20docs/tricameral-parliament.htm, online 1 September.

[30] See official site Instituto Nacional de Estatísticas http://www.ine.gov.mz/censos_dir/recenseamento_geral/estudos_analise/lingua, online 10 September 2007.

Assembly. On the contrary, having Portuguese as the official language is seen as a unifying and equalising force.

There are many steps that the Mozambican Parliament still needs to take before it can be considered fully institutionalised. However, there are positive achievements that, in fairness, need to be mentioned. The Mozambican Parliament removed political conflict from the general population, and has been a political platform and resource for the opposition. It has aided political parties with recruitment and has made an effort to improve its internal structure.

Definitely on the ascendancy trend, this effort carries an inherent risk that institutionalisation will instead result in a centralised bureaucracy. The Assembly has provided a 'porthole' view of the executive and has facilitated international networking for members of both parties and for the institution itself. In addition, as mentioned above, it has been the only place where the previous enemies have been able to become political adversaries.

7.3 The Assembly in the multiparty context - the constitutional framework

The assembly is the weakest link with regard to constitutional powers, comprising the junction between the executive and the legislative components of government. The Mozambican Assembly does not have any power regarding the formation of government. The power to appoint and dismiss the government (individually or collectively) is centralised in the figure of the president. The single exception is that the president can be forced to dismiss his newly appointed premier and cabinet in the event of the government's programme being rejected for a second time (Mozambique, 2007, Artigo 108) when it is presented for the approval of the Assembly. Conversely, rejection of the programme, as a consequence, can result in the dissolution of the Assembly by the president (Mozambique, 2004a, Article 188). Logically, this clause discourages a vote against the programme by the deputies. In reality, this scenario is difficult to imagine, since the majority of FRELIMO party members give unconditional support to the government.

The Council of Ministers is presided over by the president of the Republic (Mozambique, 2004a, Article 160), and therefore, the president is the head of the government. The president appoints and dismisses the government at will. The president is only accountable to the Assembly with regard to giving his 'annual information', and this presentation is not subject to debate (Mozambique, 2007, Article 21). The president is excluded from any obligation to answer to the Assembly or to be present at sittings of the Assembly. The Assembly, however, can force other members of the government to be present and to answer questions. This power of the Assembly is limited though to verbal reprimand, since the Assembly does not have the power to dismiss the government collectively, or to dismiss individuals within the government. In fact, as was previously mentioned, the only power that the Assembly has is the power to reject the government's programme. Finally, the Mozambican constitution does not make provisions for censuring of the government by the Assembly.

Its constitutional powers relative to those of the president and the government definitely make the Assembly the weakest link among the political institutions in Mozambique. This condition is further highlighted by the constitutional division between the president and the government concerning their accountability to the Assembly. A paradoxical situation exists in which the president is the head of the government, but with reference to the accountability of the government to the Assembly, the government is represented in the Assembly by the prime minister. If the Assembly's power in relation to the government is weak, then with regard to the president, the power of the Assembly is non-existent. Actually, the President – in constitutional terms – is not accountable to any state institution. The only provision limiting presidential power is that the Assembly can require the attorney general to initiate a penal process against the president, which to be pursued, would require two-thirds of the votes in the Assembly.

7.3.1 The president, the Permanent Committee and the general secretary

In 2004, with the objective of improving the Assembly's administrative structure, the Organic Law was enacted, whereby the management of the Assembly was allocated to the president of the assembly, the permanent committee and the general secretary (Mozambique, 2004b, Article 8).

7.3.2 The president of the Assembly of the Republic of Mozambique

The president of the Assembly is the second-ranking figure in the state hierarchy of the Republic of Mozambique. It is the president of the Assembly who replaces the president of the republic in cases of incapacity or an absence from the national territory (Mozambique, 2004a, Article 151). Moreover, it is constitutionally forbidden for the president of the Assembly and the president of the country to be absent simultaneously from the country.

The president of the Assembly has full powers to convene the Assembly. It is his or her responsibility to ensure that the Assembly's instructions are respected, to sign all legislation approved by the Assembly, and to represent the Assembly both nationally and internationally. Also, and not least important, it is the president's function to promote the Assembly's relations with the remaining state institutions and with the emerging provincial assemblies.

In addition, the president of the Assembly supervises the administration and financial and asset management of the Assembly, and can delegate the day-to-day running of the Assembly to the general secretary in matters such as the recruitment of staff. Furthermore, this incumbent is responsible for the security of all the Assembly's buildings.

7.3.3 Deputies

Mozambique's Assembly consists of 250 deputies elected from a closed party-list system in 11 multi-member constituencies made up of the provinces (12 to 50 representatives for each, based on population). In addition, there are two single-member constituencies,

corresponding to the Mozambican communities on the continents of Europe and Africa, respectively. The seats are allocated according to the d'Hondt[31] method and the mandate is for the same period as applies to the legislature, which in normal circumstances is five years (Mozambique, 2004a, Article 170). Each deputy is entrusted to represent the entire country and not only the district in which he or she is elected (Mozambique, 2004a, Article 168)

In the event of suspension, resignation or justifiable absence, the deputy will be substituted, either temporarily or permanently. In the event of replacement, the deputy will be substituted by the next candidate on the party list. Suspension will be considered once justification is given as to why the deputy has asked to be absent from parliament. When or if the deputy returns to parliament, the substitute's functions terminate, and the incumbent deputy is concurrently reinstated (Mozambique, 1995). Normally, suspension occurs when deputies are appointed to take office in government, as was the case with the 14 FRELIMO deputies that were replaced in February 2005 as a result of their nomination to the government.

Several other functions are considered incompatible with the position of deputy. These are judge, career diplomat, a position in active law enforcement (the police or military), provincial governor, district administrator, or member of a municipal organisation (Mozambique, 2004a, Article 171).

To offer oneself as a potential member of parliament, one has to be over 18 and be included on one of the parties' candidate lists, since only political parties are allowed to contest the legislative elections (Mozambique, 2004a, Article 169). The party lists can include independent individuals as an alternative to party members. Until recently, the electoral law had a legal constraint that specified a minimum of 5 percent of the national quota in order for a party to hold a seat in parliament. In March 2007, the electoral law was altered and this clause was abolished. This modification is expected to permit small parties to hold seats in the Assembly. If the five percent quota had existed in the last

[31] "Method of voting for several electoral candidates, usually members of the same political party, with one mark on the ballot." (List system, 2009, p. 1)

election, the PDD party [32], led by the former RENAMO member Raúl Domingos, would have had a presence in parliament.

Constitutionally, Mozambican deputies are vested with the power to initiate legislation (Mozambique, 2004a, Article 183); however, this is far from common practice, as a consequence of the party's strict discipline and the centralised control that the deputies have over their parties.

The literature on African legislatures covers the role that African parliamentarians play in the local development of their regions (Barkan, 1979; Hopkins, 1979; Le Vine, 1979; Mezey, 1983; Thomas & Sissokho, 2005). Thomas & Sissokho (2005), in their analysis of the Senegalese legislature, conclude that the deputies, confronted with a lack of formal legislative power, make informal appeals to the executive 'behind-the-scenes' through party structures.

However, for a Mozambican deputy it is problematic to appeal to the executive, even behind the scenes. The reasons for this differ for the deputies of FRELIMO and RENAMO. The FRELIMO deputy is usually hierarchically inferior within the party structure and therefore to his or her comrade the executive member. This condition makes the parliamentarian powerless over the executive. For the RENAMO deputy, as a result of the deep divide between this party and FRELIMO, it is difficult to liaise with members of the government in a friendly and informal manner. This type of informal contact would also not be tolerated by the deputies of RENAMO's coalition partners.

The rhetorical language used in the plenary is antagonistic from both parliamentarian groups, with debates ending in severe quarrels. Plenary debates frequently degenerate into personal jibes or into accusations concerning the political pasts of both political parties.

As has been stated, the official language used in the Assembly is Portuguese. The standing orders offer the deputies the opportunity to use a local language, but if they do this, they need to provide a translation for the rest of the Assembly. It seems that there is no controversy concerning the issue of language in the Assembly.

[32] PDD – Partido para a a Paz e a Democracia. See the political party website http://www.pdd.org.mz/Pdd_Hstorial.htm (online May 24, 2007)

After three multiparty legislative sessions, parliament has started to employ some deputies with accumulated experience. Examining the parties' turnover rate of deputies, we note the following trends. Under FRELIMO, roughly 47 percent of deputies kept their seats for successive terms for Assemblies IV-VI, that is, a 53 percent turnover. For RENAMO, the turnover is higher than for FRELIMO; for their first inclusion in the multiparty Assembly it exceeded 60 percent, and increased to 70 percent for Assemblies V-VI, that is, 30 percent of deputies stayed on.

Table 7. 2: Turnover of deputies in the Mozambican Assembly

	FRELIMO	**RENAMO**
Before 1994: Popular Assembly	250	0
1994-1999: Assembly of the Republic	129	112
TURNOVER	**61 (47.2%)**	**43 (38.4%)**
1999-2004: Assembly of the Republic	133	117
TURNOVER	**63 (47.3%)**	**35 (29.9%)**
2004-: Assembly of the Republic	160	90

Within FRELIMO, the recent turnover of deputies was approximately 60 percent. As stated by one of the previous FRELIMO deputies, the party will usually introduce new members between sessions amounting to 40 percent of its seats and carry over the remaining 60 percent. In the last election, due to the new party leadership, this tendency was inverted to 60 percent new members and 40 percent returning deputies.

Regarding the infrastructural resources available to deputies, there is not much other than common areas in the National Assembly. The deputies do not have offices or any administrative facilities in the National Assembly or in the provinces.

7.3.4 Working committees

The Mozambican Assembly has eight working committees. Each committee covers more than one policy area. These include:

1. The Committee for Planning and the Budget
2. The Committee for Social Affairs, Gender and the Environment
3. The Committee for Agriculture, Regional Development, Public Administration and Local Government
4. The Committee for Economic Affairs and Services
5. The Committee for Defence and Public Order
6. The Committee for International Relations
7. The Committee for Judiciary Issues, Human Rights and Law
8. The Committee for Petitions

Because each committee embraces a range of diverse issues, it is questionable whether the deputies can be focused on such different spheres. Each committee has a meeting room and a support room. The staff and the leadership of the committee share the support room. There are three staff assistants for each committee, most of whom have a university education.

The working committee meetings take place within the session sittings. The committees meet once a week, normally on Mondays. Since each session lasts 45 days on average, the working committees comprise around six working days per session.

Each committee consists of 15 effective deputies and five substitutes[33]. A deputy is not allowed to belong to more than two committees. The number of seats and the presidencies of the committees are distributed according to the proportion of seats for each parliamentary group. The importance of the working committees has increased since 2001

[33] The Standing Orders, Article 40, stipulate that the working committees can have between 5 and 15 deputies. While the option exists to allocate the maximum value for each, there are 120 deputies who have not been allocated to working committees.

with the revised standing orders, which gave the committees the predominant role of debating and originating legislation.

The allocations of seats and the chairs of the committees are based on each political party's proportion of seats in the plenary. Only 120 deputies of the 250 have places on the working committees. The decision concerning the inclusion of deputies on the committees is made exclusively by the parliamentary groups and is then approved by a plenary resolution. Inclusion on a working committee is considered an important achievement within the party's parliamentary hierarchy and among the general staff of the Assembly. Belonging to a working committee also means a substantial increase in the deputy's remuneration.

Given that each session lasts a few months, legislative outputs are expected by the executive, with no delays that would result in the postponement of the following session. For this reason, there is a lot of pressure on the committees to take the legislation that was introduced by the executive to the plenary. For example, the new labour law was introduced by the executive at the beginning of the first session of 2007. In the last week of the session, it was still under review by the committee. Under pressure from the executive, it was decided to extend the working hours of the committee. This decision was announced by the chair of the committee without the requisite justification to the minister.

Mozambique's Assembly has a working committee known as the Petitions Committee. A petition is sent by citizens through a simple fax or letter addressed to the speaker. The matters raised include complaints of abuse of power or violation of the law by a political figure, enterprise, or public administrator. In the plenary (Mozambique, 2007, Article 85), each petition has to be read. As a result of the affairs covered by this committee, the plenary of the last session of 2006 was closed to the media and public for the first time in the history of the multiparty Mozambican Parliament. According to some MPs and journalists, the reasons were that important FRELIMO figures were referred to in the complaints. Others justified the closing of the plenary on grounds that the complaints concerned private companies, the owners of which were MPs from both parties.

The premise for closing the plenary to the public was based on a constitutional provision that establishes the principle of honour. However, invoking this provision was not

approved by the opposition, who did not accept the move and voted against it in protest. The petitions are numerous and the working committee struggles to deal with all of them. In many instances, the committee finds that the petition relates to a past court case which is out of its jurisdiction. A proposal has been tabled to change the petitions system in order to avoid the endless repetitive petitions that have been addressed to the National Assembly over the years.

7.3.5 The Permanent Committee

The Permanent Committee is the body that coordinates the entire Assembly. It sets the plenary's agenda and the Assembly's calendar, decides on the creation of task forces, coordinates relations with the other state institutions, and administers the Assembly's budget and services. The Permanent Committee is elected at the beginning of each term and consists of 15 deputies, the president, and one vice-president from each political party. The rest of the seats are distributed in accordance with the proportionality of the parties in the Assembly (Mozambique, 2007, Article 44).

In 2004, with the objective of improving the structure of the Assembly's administration, The Organic Law (Mozambique, 2004b) was enacted, whereby the management of the Assembly was allocated to the president of the Assembly, to the Permanent Committee and to the general secretary (Mozambique, 2004b, Article 8) The Organic Law establishes a consultative council administrative body. The general secretary is appointed by the president. Requirements state that the incumbent must be a civil servant with a minimum of ten years' experience (Mozambique, 2004b, article 25).

Figure 7.2: Layout of the plenary of the Mozambican Assembly



7.3.6 Parliamentary groups

The Mozambican Parliament suffers from what Braga da Cruz (1995) calls 'partycracy' (in an allusion to the Portuguese Parliament), since, "there is an undeniable supremacy from the political parties in the creation of the electoral and parliamentary will" (Braga da Cruz, 1995, p. 189).

The power of the parties starts with the electoral process, with parties monopolising the power to present candidates. As a consequence, the elected deputies view loyalty to the party as natural. Party discipline can be enforced strongly, as a violation can result in the removal of the perpetrator's name from the party list in the next election.

The structure of parliament is determined by the parliamentary groups, as are time allocated on the floor and the allocation of places in working committees; legislation is initiated only with the agreement of the political parties.

Few deputies can have the luxury of viewpoints outside their party's orientation. Only the RENAMO-Electoral Union deputy, Maximo Dias[34], is noted by his colleagues and the media for his relative 'freedom' from party constraints. His freedom results mainly from his position as leader of one of the small parties, which has links with RENAMO[35].

Leadership of a parliamentary group is obviously an important party position. Both parliamentary groups elect a leader from among their peers. However, this 'election' has always been proposed by the party's leader, with no controversy or dispute.

Oddly, RENAMO has been more unstable with regard to maintaining the leadership of its parliamentary group than FRELIMO. In the first two multiparty terms, Armando Guebuza, current president of the country, was the parliamentary leader of FRELIMO. This contrasts with RENAMO, which has changed the leadership of its parliamentary group in each legislative term

Table 7. 3: Parliamentary group leadership

	FRELIMO	**RENAMO**
1994	Armando Emilio Guebuza	Raúl Manuel Domingos
1999	Armando Emilio Guebuza	Ussufo Quitine
2004	Manuel Tomé	Maria Moreno

An odd aspect of RENAMO's behaviour towards the Assembly is the total absence of its leader from this institution. In fact Afonso Dlakhama was never a candidate for the Assembly. The RENAMO leader has never had exposure to any parliamentarian

[34] It is common news that the Mozambican Parliament notes the exceptional behaviour of Maximo Dias. See, for example, one of the news reports about the provincial elections from the international Mozambican news agency: "Only one deputy, Maximo Dias, of the RENAMO Electoral Union opposition coalition, pointed out that the amendments do not address the main problem, which is the sheer lack of time to organise decent elections, if they are to be held in January." http://allafrica.com/stories/200710110859.html, online 11 October, 2007.

[35] In an interview with the author, the deputy stated that he had already told the leader of RENAMO that he would not participate during the next term. Interview with the author, 2 August 2007.

experience. Furthermore, it is not known whether he ever participated in any formal event in the Assembly of the Republic. There have been different speculations regarding Dlakhama's decision. Some argue that this attitude is related to the traditional concept of the 'African chief' who cannot be exposed. Others argue that Dlakhama is awaiting his election as president, and therefore will not deign to be a deputy; he sees no point in being part of the Assembly. Whatever the reasons for Dlakhama's decision, the effect is harmful for RENAMO's long-term performance. Parliament is the only public space in the political arena of the country where opposition and ruling party function together. Dlakhama's absence wastes an opportunity to strengthen the political dialogue between the two. In addition, media coverage of the Assembly is particularly significant during the session periods, and the absence of the RENAMO leader from the Assembly removes him from the debate. This bizarre political strategy from the opposition leader also suggests a lack of confidence in parliament as the dominant mainstream political institution.

The absence of the leader of the opposition from the Assembly and the constitutional requirement that the president of the republic need attend the Assembly only once a year means the main political institution functions without the two main political figures of the country. The Assembly can hold major national debates, but the country knows that they were not debated at the highest level of the political parties.

In the Mozambican Parliament, party discipline is practised within the ruling party and by the opposition party. This practice seems to be contrary to the practices in other parliaments in the post-communist era, where there is a rejection of the principle of tight party discipline[36].

All over the world, party systems shape the structure of the legislature and relations between the executive and legislature. The latter relates to whether the head of the government has control of the party with the majority of seats. Morgensen applied the two classic indexes in four Latin American countries and in the US: the range of the index varies from 1.96 in Chile to 7.98 in Brazil (Morgensen & Nacif, 2002, p. 429)

[36] See for example Carey, Formanek, & Karpowicz (1999).

Table 7. 4: Laakso & Taagepera indexes

YEAR	INDEX
1994	2.135584
1999	1.991841
2004	1.854599

Mozambique is a one-party-dominant political system. As demonstrated in the table above, its rating on the Laakso & Taagepera indexes is consistently low and has been falling with each term.

The serious division between the two parties was evident in a speech given in the Assembly at the closing of the first plenary session of 2007 by the leader of the FRELIMO caucus, when he criticised the behaviour of the opposition. He accused the opposition of using insults, lies and speculation in their interactions with FRELIMO. "In truth, at several points during this session, the minority opposition made the insult, the lie, ... using political drama and even religious drama as the basis of behaviour in the plenary" (Tomé, 2007).

FRELIMO was constituted in 1962 in Tanzania with the aim of fighting for Mozambican independence. In 1974 the party signed an agreement of independence with Portugal, the ruling colonial power. In the decades after independence, FRELIMO developed a one-party regime based on a communist model. FRELIMO is simultaneously the party, the state and the country. There is no differentiation between these roles. The party was born before the state, and this creates a paternalistic legitimacy, since for FRELIMO, the country exists because of the party. This notion of legitimacy has translated into an attitude of ownership of the country. This can be seen as a version of absolute monarchism (*'L´État c' est moi'*) applied to a political party. In the first years of its independence, FRELIMO was seen as a menace by the neighbouring racist states. The white rulers of Rhodesia and South Africa feared that this liberation movement would inspire models in their countries. This situation, combined with some political discontent in a few Mozambican regions, created room for an opposition movement. It was for these

reasons that RENAMO came into existence. The civil war between FRELIMO and RENAMO only ended in 1992.

Because of this background, the plenary sessions can be quite tense and adversarial between the two parties. In many plenary debates, it is common for there to be name-calling, irreverent laughter, catcalling, and jeering. Inappropriate behaviour has included RENAMO MPs standing in protest in front of the President, which happened during the debate of the new Electoral Law, approved by the majority in April 2007. This behaviour shows the general antagonism that exists between the deputies of the two parties.

7.3.7 Parliamentary staff

At the end of 2004, the Organic Law regarding staff structure was approved. From this date the Assembly had unlimited power to manage and recruit its own staff. The staff have the benefits of public servants, but they are only accountable to the leader of the Assembly. Leadership of the staff departments is given to qualified individuals, and these key staff members are involved in international collaborative work on the continent or in bilateral agreements (mainly with Brazil, Portugal, Cape Verde and South Africa).
For example, the director of the library and archive of the Assembly has participated in meetings held by the Association of Parliamentary Libraries in Eastern and Southern Africa, (APLESA), an organisation that the Mozambican parliament joined in 2001.

In 1997, the average number of staff to members of the House of Commons in the UK was 2.7[37] ordinary members of staff for each member and 2.2 house staff members for each member. The ratio for the Mozambican parliament is 2.5 parliamentary staff members for each deputy.

[37] **Source:** Total number of MPs, peers and parliamentary staff members information list, Author: Reference Services Section

Table 7. 5: Staff structure

Post title	Number of posts available
Secretary General	1
Assessor of the Pres. of Assembly	1
Parliamentary Assessor	2
General Director Assembly	2
Director of Division	6
Director of Cabinet of the President of the Assembly	1
Director of the Technical Office	1
Assessor of the Secretary General	1
Chief of the Central Department	12
Chief of the Secretariat	1
Personal Secretary of the President of the Assembly	1
Administrator of the Palace	1
Chief of the Central Repartition	20
Secretariat for the Working Committees	12
Personal Secretariats	8
Executive Secretariat	8
Diverse Experts and Auditor	191
Other Experts and Technicians	107
Administrative staff, auxiliary staff, etc.	249
Total	**625**

Source: Mozambique , 2004b

7.3.8 The Assembly budget

Barkan's (2005) findings showed that approval of the Assembly budget by the Assembly and not by the government is one of the strengths of a parliament. In Mozambique, the parliamentary budget is approved by the Assembly. However, this approval is unofficially

negotiated with the Minister of Finance. According to the Assembly staff, the negotiation of the Assembly budget is done before the plenary's approval. Since 1994, according to the parliamentary staff and deputies, there has been no evidence of discontent with regard to the behaviour of the executive in this matter. The Assembly budget is presented later in this chapter.

There is a perception worldwide that the salaries of deputies are always high. In Mozambique there is secrecy surrounding the deputies' salaries. The reason given by the general secretariat for the confidentiality with regard to the deputies' salaries is to avoid an increase in the public's perception that the Assembly is a very expensive institution and that its productivity may not correspond to the benefits[38] derived. However, a comparison of the budget of the Assembly with that of other state institutions reveals that this perception is at odds with reality, and the Assembly is by its nature just more noticeable. As shown in the table below, the expenses for the Assembly in Mozambique amounted to 13 720 USD, less than the expenses of the presidency and even less than the budgets of some of the other state institutions. The *Casa Militar* (that part of the army in charge of the security of the President), the Ministry of Defence, and the Army have budgets that are five times the budget of the Assembly. To this list of security, budgets must still be added the budget of the Services of Information and Security – 4112916 USD, which alone is more than the budget of the Assembly. The budget of the South African parliament is 11 times bigger than the budget of the Mozambican parliament (The South African National Treasury, 2008).

[38] In 2006, the newspapers published the story that the Assembly was debating to increase the deputies' salaries by 27%. This raised serious discontent and criticism. This was exacerbated by the belief that the benefits that the deputies already receive are extensive. See, for instance, "Deputados Moçambicanos querem aumento", 2006.

Table 7. 6: Analysis of the Mozambican national budget 2007

	Meticais (MTN)	Dollars (USD)
President	463 011.91	18 520 000
Assembly	343 010.96	13 ,720 000
Constitutional Council	38 000.91	1 520 000
Supreme Court	98 661.01	3 946 000
Minister of Defence	274 697.24	10 988 000
Military House	201 251.23	8 050 000
Army	1 297 397.22	51 896 000
Services of Information and Security	411 291 60	16 452 000

7.4 The role of parliament and the international community

Mozambique receives budget inputs directly from 19 donors. These constitute a formal grouping of donors who manage their donations cooperatively. Fifty-five percent of the national budget is financed through donor grants and loans[39]. The group G19 monitors the achievements of the Mozambican government in relation to the spending of the donations in accordance with what was planned, and each year it negotiates the areas of intervention it perceives necessary in a dialogue with the Mozambican government.

During the period of the first session of 2007, G19 was seated with the government to ensure accountability for plans undertaken and to address future plans. During this time there was no commentary in the Assembly on this process by any of the parliamentary groups. The media covered the presence of the attorney general in the Assembly, as well as the presence of the donors overseeing the progress of the government. On 28 May 2007, the Norwegian ambassador, Thorbjorn Gaustadsaether, as the leader of G19, gave an interview to one of the main newspapers of the country[40]. It was clear from the content

[39] See, for example, Standard Bank Research Group January 2007 Blue Print**.**

[40] See the interview of the president of G19 by the newspaper *Noticias* on 28 May 2007.

of the interview that the donors judged the government's performance not just at the negotiating table but also publicly. Paradoxically, the institution of the people, the National Assembly, was not mentioned once in the interview. The discussions between G19 and the Mozambican government showed disregard for the Assembly.

The international community has indicated their satisfaction with the economic development of the country. This is evidenced by the choice of Mozambique as the first African country to receive aid upfront for five years. This allows the Mozambican Government to make medium-term plans instead of only annual plans. The problem of corruption has subsequently become a concern, and there have been corruption cases that have drawn the attention of the international community. An example was the Banco Austral scandal, which ended with the assassination of the journalist Carlos Cardoso.

7.5 The Assembly's functions

7.5.1 Law-making

All parliamentary bills need to be ratified by the president. However, legislation's journey within parliament starts with a first reading in the plenary. Then printed copies of the proposed act are given to the parliamentary groups. The first phase of discussions takes place in the working committees, and only when they are ready will they be sent back to parliament for approval.

In the working committee there is opportunity for debate, in which leading members of both political parties may take part. However, the small number of working committees, each with such large thematic areas and such short periods for each session, means that legislation gets superficially scrutinised by the deputies.

Parliamentary debate can slow down the legislative process. In the event of this happening, there is the constitutional power of '*iniciativa de lei*' (a law that does not need to be passed by parliament, but just needs pre-approval from parliament. This works similarly to a delegation from parliament to the government.). Another consequence of the work overload concerning the legislative process is that parliament, under pressure, will

give more and more tacit approvals. Both circumstances are a clear dilution of the role of parliament in lawmaking. If the law-making capacity of parliament is not reinforced, there is a serious risk that the Mozambican parliament will be sidelined, with the executive taking over the legislative function and an overlapping of the functions of the executive and the legislative.

In the Mozambican parliament there are rarely expired or withdrawn bills. There is no record, as with other parliaments, of bills that die naturally in the legislative process. Historically, the law-making function was a task of the Central Committee of FRELIMO. As is shown in the table below, the one-party Assembly met very seldom and approved little legislation. Between 1990 and 1994, the Assembly approved more legislation than between 1977 and 1990.

Table 7. 7: Analysis of the outcome of legislation – Popular Assembly (one-party) 1977-1990

Year	Session or Permanent Committee	Laws	Resolutions	
1977	1st & 2nd session	6	18	
1978	3rd	14	18	
1979	4th & 5th	13	24	From 1977 to 1986, 85 laws and 165 Resolutions were approved. During this period there were 15 sessions. In total the Assembly was seated for 25 days. (First Legislative Assembly)
1980	6th & 7th	7	17	
1981	8th & 9th	8	21	
1982	10th	11	18	
1983	11th	7	15	
1984	12th	5	11	
1985	13th & 14th	8	13	
1986	15th	6	10	
19 October 1986 – Death of Samora Machel				
1987	1st & 2nd	17	23	
1988	Permanent Committee (PC)	5	7	In this period, 40 laws and 64 resolutions were approved. (Second Legislative Assembly)
1988	4th & 5th	6	9	
1989	PC	3	8	
1989	6ª & 7ª	4	7	
1990	PC	1	7	
1990	7º & 8	5	10	

As was mentioned earlier in this chapter, the legislation essential to adopt a multiparty state was approved by the one-party Assembly.

Table 7. 8: Analysis of legislative achievements – Popular Assembly (one-party) 1990

Year	Session or Permanent Committee	Laws	Resolutions	Observation
1990	1ª extraordinary session (5 Oct – 3 Nov) Approval of the constitution. Members voted for a motion of congratulations to the Central Committee of FRELIMO, to the Central Commission of FRELIMO and to the Mozambican people. The Popular assembly is renamed the Assembly of the Republic.			
1990	Permanent Committee	5	5	For the first time an augmentation of presence was decided on for the deputies for participating in the plenary sessions and in the Permanent Committee (Resolução nº 3/90 B. Republica, Maputo I serie (21) 29 Maio, 1990).
1991	1ª session of the Ass Republic (14-22 Dec)	7	2	The resolution's retention of two deputies (Manuel Manjiche and Sebastião Marcos Mabote). Lei nº7/91 stipulates the rules regarding the creation and activities of the political parties.
1991	2º session (28 June to 22 July)	13	1	In this session, the Freedom of Speech and Freedom of Association laws were approved. The Law of the Media was also approved.
1991	3º session (9 -20 Dec)	11	6	
1992	4ª session (24 March to 4 April)	10	8	8 (including the resolution that updated the augmentation of the deputies)

In the era of the multiparty Assembly, i.e. during the multiparty period until 2004, the Assembly unequivocally increased its status as a law-making body.

Table 7. 9: Legislative achievements – 1999-2004 (three multiparty terms)

4 October 1992 – General Peace Agreement				
Year	Session	Laws	Resolution	
1993	6ª & 7ª	7	11	Motion of thanks to the Government for information regarding the peace agreement.
1994	8ª	9	5	
1994	1ª	1	3	
1994	CP	1		
1995	2ª	3	15	Approval of the standing orders and MP's Statute.
	CP		9	Mainly resolutions regarding the structure of the Assembly.
1995	1º extraordinary session (17/10 - 22/12)		2	This session was held to constitute the ad hoc commission responsible for the revision of the constitution and another ad hoc commission to change the national anthem.
1995	5 ª	4	4	
1996	4 ª	3	15	
1996	5 ª	4	9	
1997	6 ª	13	3	
1997	2º extraordinary	5	1	Resolution for the appointment of the members of the National Electoral Commission
1997	7		5	Approval of membership of the Commonwealth Parliamentarian Forum
1998	8 & 9	13		19
1999	10	4	10	Declaration of the Constitution of the Parliamentary Forum of Portuguese Speaking Countries
1999	3rd extraordinary	4	4	
2000	1 & 2	3	13	Election of the deputies that would represent the Assembly in the SADC Parliamentary Forum
2000	1 extraordinary		3	Election of the members of the Electoral Commission. The ad hoc Commission for Revision of the Electoral Law created.
2000	3	6	17	New standing orders approved (Lei n6/2001)
2001	4 & 5	15	11	
2002	6	5	4	
2002	2 extraordinary	5	0	
2002	7	5	6	Approval of the statutes of the Constitutional Court
2003	8 & 9	9	13	Approval of the Statute of Deputies (Lei n3/2004)
2004	10	6		
2004	3 ext	3	4	
2004	4 extraordinary	Approval of the new constitution		

7.5.2 Oversight

As has been stated previously, the Mozambican Assembly does not have any power over the formation of government. The power to appoint and dismiss the government (individually or collectively) is centralised in the figure of the president. The single exception is that the president can be forced to dismiss his newly appointed premier and cabinet in the event that the government's programme is rejected for a second time (Mozambique Constitution, 2004, Article 188) and (Regimento Interno da Assembleia, 2001, Article 159). The Government's programme is presented for the approval of the Assembly. Conversely, the rejection of the programme, as a consequence, can carry the dissolution of the Assembly by the President (Mozambique Constitution, 2004, Article 188).

As Burnell (2003) pointed out in his research on the Zambian Parliament, to solve the poor performance of parliament in overseeing the executive, and especially to guarantee the control of corruption, there is often an executive strategy of developing sideline institutions to guarantee the oversight of state institutions. Burnell (2003) points out that in Zambia these organisations ended up having functions that were mere formalities. This also happened in Mozambique, an example being the creation of the High Commission Against Corruption. According to Burnell (2003), the new institutions that started off as alternative institutions to take on the parliamentary oversight role were not only ineffective but were also not democratic. These institutions were established mainly to placate the international community.

7.5.2.1 Oversight powers

Oversight is considered one of the classic functions of any parliament, be it in the context of a parliamentarian or a presidential system. Overseeing the executive serves as a form of ongoing monitoring of the activities of the government. Parliamentary oversight generally implies an adversarial relationship between the executive and parliament. The paradox is that this perspective of the oversight function is unrealistic and counterproductive for the entire assembly. The aim should be to have the assembly constructively engaged in

overseeing the government. It is unreasonable to expect that the ruling party will be an adversary of the government comprised of them. The point to stress is that effective oversight will serve as an aid to the executive's performance.

The Mozambican parliament has the power to request information from the executive, compelling testimony from members of the government, requesting reports, and holding questioning time with members of the executive. In addition, the working committees can call public hearings (Mozambique, 2007, Article 50; Mozambique, 2004a, Article 172).

Table 7. 10: Oversight powers and capability

Censorship of the Executive: **Vote of no confidence** **Impeachments**	**No**
Obtaining information from the executive **Compelling testimony** **Requesting reports** **Question time**	**Yes**
Working Committee **Public hearings** **Summons to force an appearance by the executive**	**Yes**
Can the Assembly summons members of the government to answer questions?	**Yes**
Does the Assembly hold powers of agenda? (this means it can initiate and develop legislation pertaining to public policies)	**Yes**

The highest organ of FRELIMO is the Political Commission, with 17 members headed by the President of the country, who is also the president of the party. It is understood that in African parliaments the oversight function does not take place in public but in private within the political party; the same applies in Mozambique. However, as has been noted, the FRELIMO Political Commission comprises the majority of members of the executive. Of 17 members of the FRELIMO Political Commission, only six are members of the Assembly. Even the names of the Political Commission are important in the hierarchy, not just because of the functions that they have, for example, as the Speaker and the Vice-President of the Assembly, but also because they are historically important members of

the political party. However, the balance of power is definitely in favour of the executive, to the detriment of the Assembly.

The oversight function is a victim of the behaviour of the two parliamentary parties and the influence of the donor community in the country. The exclusive involvement of the international community with the executive, but not with the legislature, curtails parliament's influence.

Table 7. 11: Number of deputies in the FRELIMO Political Commission

FRELIMO Political Commission	MP	Government member
1. Armando Emílio Guebuza	No	President of the Republic
2. Filipe Chimoio Paunde	No	No
3. Alberto Joaquim Chipande	MP	
4. Manuel Jorge Tomé	MP – Leader of the Parliamentary Group	
5. Eduardo Joaquim Mulémbwè	MP	
6. Eneas da Conceição Comiche	No	Maputo Mayor
7. Verónica Nataniel Macamo	MP – Vice-president of the Assembly	
8. Margarida Adamugy Talapa	MP	
9. Alcinda António de Abreu	No	Minister of Foreign Affairs
10. José Candugua António Pacheco	No	Minister of Interior
11. Luísa Dias Diogo	No	Prime Minister
12. Aiuba Cuereneia	No	Minister of Planning and Development
13. Conceita Xavier Sortane	MP	
14. Raimundo Domingos Pachinuapa	No	No
15. Aires Bonifácio Aly	No	Minister of Education and Culture
16. Paulina Mateus Nkunda	No	No
17. Teodoro Andrade Waty	No	No

Source: "Membros do Conselho de Ministros", 2008; Bancada FRELIMO, 2007

As has been stated previously, the Political Commission is the key decision-making body of the party and meets weekly. It is composed of 17 party members. Of the 17, only six

are Members of Parliament (Alberto Joaquim Chipande, Manuel Jorge Tomé, Eduardo Joaquim Mulémbwè, Verónica Nataniel Macamo, Margarida Adamugy Talapa, and Conceita Xavier Sortane).

7.5.3 Representation

The constituencies are serviced, but this is done under the exclusive control of the political parties, as will be explored in Chapter 9.

7.5.4 International lobby

An important function of the Assembly is international lobbying, and the resolutions and decisions of the Assembly have an impact on Mozambique's relationship with the international community. An example of this function was the Mozambican Assembly's successful lobbying of the international community to cancel the country's debt.

In 1998, the Mozambican Assembly created a working group to study how the country should handle its international debt. The three political parties in parliament came together in a unanimous request for the international community to cancel the country's debt. The joint voice of all political parties in parliament is rare, but on this matter they spoke with one voice. The Mozambican parliament also petitioned the parliaments of the developed nations to support their request in their countries and to put pressure on their governments in favour of cancelling the Mozambican debt. This was partly achieved in 2007[41].

7.6 The media and the Assembly

The media has full access to the Assembly, including the plenary, committees and all the Assembly's physical space. During the plenary sessions, the TV cameramen are allowed to circulate in the hemicycle. The media have media cabinets with sound systems and full visibility of the plenary.

[41] In 2006 the Mozambican debt was reduced in 1.3 million USD. See, for example, "Dívida externa moçambicana orçada em 3,3 biliões de USD", 2007.

The media has a strong presence during the plenary sessions, with radio and television stations broadcasting live transmissions. Because the sitting periods of the Assembly are concentrated into only two sessions of 45 days each, the Assembly's activities receive intense media attention during this period.

7.7 Conclusion

The level of institutionalisation of parliament is still embryonic. Its autonomy from the political parties is far from a reality. Taking into account the political context, this situation is understandable, and it would be naive to advocate radical changes to a system entailing the role of parties not being central to parliament. With the existing electoral system and the pre-eminence of the parties in Mozambican society, parliament is an unequivocally privileged platform for political debate. As the Northern European countries have demonstrated, this is not necessarily a fatal threat to the role of parliament. But it could be if the Mozambican parliament does not move on from being only a podium for party disputes.

The Mozambican Parliament is a forum for debate, and in addition to its other functions, this is praiseworthy for a postconflict country. Parliament is an institution where it is assured that guns have been replaced by words. But in the case of Mozambique, after three terms, the verbal battles need to have more substance. The deputies especially need to be seen to be more committed to the delivery of economic and social advantages for the population instead of being committed only to their parties' agendas.

For the consolidation of democratisation in the country, parliament needs to be strengthened. International donors have implemented programmes in this direction. This external support is important, but it is not the solution to the weaknesses of the Mozambican parliament.

The imposition by international agencies of models for the development of the Mozambican political structure can be used as an excuse for any political failure. The political parties in the Mozambican political system are key actors, and therefore, they are definitely part of the problem, but without them, there would be no workable solution.

There are obvious areas in need of development. Firstly, there is the need to reinforce the role of the committees. This includes the need for the committees to be more specialised, and not to cover the large subject areas that they do at present. Then there is a need for the participation of all the deputies in functioning working committees. Also, there is a need for universality of the rules. There has been an outstanding and consistent development of the internal rules. However, it is pointless to have efficient internal rules if these are not accepted and understood in a universal way by all in the house. This was shown to be the case in the lack of consensus regarding whether the plenary should be closed to the public during the debate of the petitions. This lack of consensus regarding the management of the plenary debate demonstrates a lack of a common interpretation of the rules.

The Mozambican parliament has progressed with regard to the transition of the participants from enemies to political adversaries. However, this progression is still, after 13 years, not as advanced as it might have been.

CHAPTER 8

Elite perceptions of the Mozambican Parliament

8.1 Methodology of the chapter

This chapter investigates how civil society leaders evaluate the Mozambican parliament[42]. The methodology of the chapter comprises in-depth interviews and data collected on parliamentary performance indicators. The interviews were conducted with a panel of leaders of several key organisations from Mozambican society, journalists with experience in parliamentary affairs[43], and staff from the National Assembly. Due to time constraints, most of the interviews were conducted in Maputo. However, a visit to Beira was carried out to interview the mayor and a representative of a religious organisation.

To complement any insights into public perceptions of parliament, data was collected on parliament's performance indicators with regard to interactions between it and the executive. The aim of including such indicators was to assess public participation in general and, in particular, the public's involvement in parliamentary activities – parliament is currently open to public participation in the form of public hearings.

The parliamentary performance indicators collected consist of number of public hearings and visits to the regions by the working committees, covering the period of the two plenary sessions, the last session in 2006 and the first session of 2007.

During the same time, data was also collected on the number of visitors to the Assembly's Documentation Centre. This data was collected with the assistance of the Division of Working Committees and the Centre for Documentation. The choice of stakeholders was based on organisation type. The selection criteria limited organisations to those that were politically involved, but that did not have party affiliations. Additionally, these organisations were active in the national sphere, and not just in Maputo.

[42] In all fifteen members of the civil society were interviewed.

[43] In all 4 journalists were interviewed.

The respondents were asked to comment on their perceptions and the perceptions that they believed existed across the country (based on the contact they had had with their members concerning public activities within the regions). An elected member of local government (the president of a municipality) was also included on the stakeholders' panel.

The selection criteria for the panel of journalists were similar to those of the stakeholder panel. Their selection was based on their experience and interest in parliamentary affairs and their national coverage of these.

8.2 Parliament – engagement with civic entities

8.2.1 Public hearings

Parliament's standing orders stipulate that parliament, through the working committees, can hold public hearings (Mozambique, 2007, Article 50). In the last plenary session of 2006 and the first one of 2007, the working committees held 45 public hearings. It is not common practice for private/civic organisations to be called to public hearings. Of the 45 public hearings, only six involved nongovernmental entities, namely, trade unions and the Patronage Association, in a debate on the Labour Law.

Table 8.1: Number of public hearings held during two plenary sessions (last 2006 and first 2007)

	Type of organisation involved	
	Executive	**Private**
Committee on Petitions	Not applicable[44]	
Committee on Defence and Public Order	1	1
Committee on Planning and the Budget	10	10
Committee on Social affairs, Gender and the Environment	2	1
Committee on International Relations	4	4
Committee on Judicial Issues, Human Rights and the Law	11	11
Committee on Economic affairs and Services	12	8
Committee on Agriculture, Regional Development, Public Administration, and Local Government	5	5
Committee on Social affairs, Gender and the Environment	5	1

As shown in the above table, public hearings are held mainly with members of the executive. According to the information collected, there is no record of refusal or problems regarding having the members of the executive present. Even among the existing staff, there was a perception that the public hearings were mostly for members of the executive. Public hearings are used mainly to discuss laws sent by the executive to parliament. This structure is rarely used to monitor the activities of the government.

According to the standing orders, with the exception of the Petitions Committee, the working committees are open to the public. However, this structure is not commonly utilised in practice. During the last two sessions, out of 45 meetings of the working committees, only six had journalists present.

[44] This working committee is not open to the public.

Table 8.2: No. days worked by working committees, journalists' attendance, and visits to provinces

	How many days on average do the working committees sit	Number of meetings with journalists present	Visits to the provinces (last session 2006 plus first session 2007)
Committee on Petitions			
Committee on Defence and Public Order	18	0	2 to each province except to Maputo
Committee on Planning and the Budget	14	1	15
Committee on Social affairs, Gender and the Environment	20	4	10
Committee on International Relations	17	2	11
Committee on Judiciary Issues, Human Rights and the Law	18	0	3
Committee on Economic affairs and Services	46	0	4
Committee on Agriculture, Regional Development, Public Administration, and Local Government	14	4	7
Committee on Social affairs, Gender and the Environment	30		

8.2.2 The Assembly's Centre for Documentation

The Assembly building houses a documentation centre, which is open to the deputies as well as to the public. This service keeps an archive for the Assembly, but it also has a small library.

Currently, within the Assembly, it is the space most visited by the public. The number of monthly visitors to the library ranges from 20 to 500, depending mostly on the academic calendar, as most of the visitors are students.

As shown in the table below, approximately 4000 citizens have visited the Assembly to witness the service it provides. Public visits to the Assembly should be encouraged in an

effort to get the public more engaged with the Assembly. The Centre for Documentation is criticised by most of the respondents (civic leaders) for not delivering services promptly, such as providing legislation or other documentation.

Table 8.3: Number of visitors from July 2006 to July 2007

	Students	Others
July	537	3
August	815	11
September	726	10
October	777	3
November	92	5
December	39	3
January	33	9
February	42	5
March	95	0
April	185	3
May	192	6
June	81	0
July	81	1
TOTAL	3695	59

8.3 Findings from interviews

8.3.1 What journalists say

The media plays the role of disseminating all information pertaining to the National Assembly. There is no direct communication between the National Assembly and the public or even with nongovernmental entities other than through the media. All civic leaders interviewed referred to the media as the sole source through which they followed the Assembly's work. Occasionally, information on the Assembly's work was gathered through informal talks with deputies. The stakeholders interviewed reported that the deputies were generally friendly, helpful, and available when contacted. For each session, journalists receive a pass, which allows them to use the facilities of the Assembly and to

cover the proceedings of parliament. For journalists, gaining entrance to the Assembly is a simple process, requiring only that they obtain their badges. There is no record since 1994 of any journalist having been forbidden to enter parliament. During the plenary sessions, a strong media presence exists, with live transmissions by radio and television stations of the plenary sessions. Because the sitting periods of the Assembly are concentrated into only two sessions of 45 days each, the activities of the Assembly receive intense media attention during these periods.

The journalists interviewed were asked to rate on a scale of one (most important) to four (less important) the importance of the activities that parliament performs. The respondents' evaluations are shown in Table 8.4, below.

Table 8.4: Journalists' evaluations of the importance of the functions of parliament

Representation of the interests of the political parties	2	2	5	1
Representation of regional interests	5	3	4	3
Oversight of the executive	3	4	2	2
Law-making	1	5	1	4
Conflict prevention and resolution	4	1	3	5

In the opinion of the media, the oversight function is one that parliament needs to improve. From their understanding, based on observations of the parliamentarians at work, there are some failings evident: The parliamentary groups are not equipped to conduct oversight, mainly because there is a visible gap in information and technical expertise between the Assembly and the members of the government; moreover, there is a noticeable deficiency in the methodological and technical support that the parliamentary staff offers the parliamentary groups.

For these journalists, the oversight function in Mozambique still has far to go to reach a level of normality.

Table 8.5: Causes of the low performance of the Assembly

This is a area that needs to be improved	Yes
The parliamentary groups are not well prepared	Yes (–)
The staff body of the Assembly is not well composed	Yes
There is no political goodwill	Don't know
This function is normally exercised	No

Collectively, the journalists interviewed stated that the public image of the Assembly was negative.

The collective voice of the interviewees believed that the main reason for this was the tendency to limit the plenary debates to those exhibiting party hostilities. Their perception was that there was a crystallised image among citizens that the Assembly was a place of political conflict, which was distant from the common citizen.

Several media organisations cover the full plenary sessions live. The media cover mainly parliamentary press conferences, political parties' press conferences, and plenary sessions. On the contrary, the meetings of the working committees receive far less interest from the press.

Radio Mozambique, which gives national coverage, has two political programs that often cover the plenary sessions during the debates, as well as the Assembly's proceedings. The *Tribuna Parlamentar* is a one-hour weekly program consisting of live debates with the participation of deputies, politicians, and civil society. The program also takes calls from the public. *The Panorama Político* is a short weekly program consisting of snapshots of regional and national political issues. This program is produced by a team in Maputo, with the collaboration and input of its journalists in each region.

According to journalists, there is a satisfactory relationship between the media and the Assembly. Nevertheless, this relationship, according to journalists, has room for improvement. Journalists recognised that there was an increased turnover among their

colleagues covering parliament. This implies that there is a lack of specialisation among media professionals covering legislative issues, which are often complex.

8.3.2 What stakeholders say

All stakeholders interviewed gave a negative evaluation of the Assembly's performance of its oversight function. They maintained that the Assembly does very little regarding the oversight of the government. This poses a severe dilemma, since no other institution is vested with the power that the Assembly has.

The majority of the respondents, when asked to give an example of a positive aspect of the oversight function performed in the last year, chose the synergy that exists between parliament and the constitutional council, and parliament and the administrative court.

8.3.2.1 Party-centricity

The main critique made of parliament was its extreme party-centricity, to the detriment of the public interest. This was seen as the main impediment to parliament's performance.

The primary recurring problem pointed out previously is the extreme focus on party politics. In the stakeholders' collective opinion, this steers the discussions away from matters of real relevance to the country. This was seen as being potentially damaging to the public's overall perception of parliament.

Also considered problematic was the non-existence of legislation on bi-party agreement on policy. With the exception of a few laws in the first multiparty mandate, never have more than two political parties agreed on any policy or legislation. This was seen as unconstructive and counterproductive to the country's development.

Several respondents pointed out that the only exception to the lack of consensus in the National Assembly was the definition of MPs' remuneration benefits. This was severely criticised. The critique from stakeholders was not so much about the benefits themselves but about how consensus on this issue contrasted with the lack of consensus on others national matters. "If they can vote in unison on salaries and benefits, why not on what is

important for us". Ironically, this behaviour can be viewed with a degree of optimism, since it diminishes the taboo that the deputies of the two parties cannot vote in agreement – they have proven that they can.

This party-centricity was perceived as being harmful to the oversight function. Since the deputies are preoccupied with party battles, the opportunity to oversee the executive is forfeited. Often policy debates or question time with the executive ends up being wasted in futile discussions about past events.

Clearly, there is divided thinking on the evaluation of the behaviour of the two political parties regarding the oversight function. The ruling party was seen as being too protective toward the executive, and the opposition was seen as being too condescending toward the executive. The question was posed to the respondents whether the perception existed that oversight by the deputies of the ruling party of the members of government was performed in private. The answers varied – some believed that the deputies had indeed held members of the government to account in the party sphere, but that this was not done publicly in the Assembly. Others were sceptical of this hypothesis, while some mentioned that it was difficult to know and that any answer would be speculative.

The important thing to note regarding this matter is that the general perception was that oversight entails a conflict between two parties; that it entails someone being kept in check, with its associated negative connotations. Journalists' evaluations of the importance of the functions of parliament indicated that oversight could involve constructive engagement. If this perspective were to be adopted, then it would be plausible to anticipate that the ruling party's deputies would take over the oversight function.

One of the individuals interviewed explained that in Mozambique the state was still seen in a paternalistic light. If placed in the context of family values, it would be considered inappropriate to pass judgment on the 'father'. On the other hand, using the same metaphor, *constructive engagement* could be viewed as the oversight that parents exercise over their children. 'Be accountable to' does not inevitably need to have negative connotations.

RENAMO's conduct with regard to oversight was seen as suffering from the same syndrome as the ruling party – extreme focus on the party's agenda. There was, however, the perception that, particularly concerning oversight, RENAMO had improved in recent years. The respondents acknowledged that RENAMO deputies were the animators of the political debate. This was despite their insufficient technical preparation and notorious lack of information regarding the activities of the executive.

This constant clashing of the two parties does not help to improve the national esteem.

8.3.2.2 Reactivity in relation to the government

A general perception was that parliament was still reactive in relation to the government, not only regarding its oversight function but also in its legislative capacity. Because of the unmatched periods of activity between the government and parliament, this reactivity would be difficult to turn round. Nonetheless, the stakeholders felt that parliament could make an effort to alter this state of affairs.

8.3.2.3 The absence of national leaders

The absence of the president of the country and the leader of the opposition from the parliamentary arena was seen as a barrier to the development of an affable relationship between the two main parties.

Because of the structure of the constitution, the president of the executive, who is also the head of the government, does not participate in the plenary sessions. On other hand, the leader of the opposition has always opted for not integrating the legislative party list, and as an obvious consequence, an opposition leader has never become a deputy of the house.

The non-attendance of plenary sessions by the leaders of the two main political parties was seen as detrimental.

8.3.2.4 Participation and contact with parliament

The stakeholders were aware that the National Assembly is open to the public; at least, it was known that the plenary sessions are open. Regarding the working committee meetings, there was some misinformation propagated that these are not open to the public. Moreover, there was no absolute certainty among all stakeholders about whether there was a need for an invitation to attend a plenary session. There were also doubts regarding the dress code; for example, there was a rumour that there is a dress code for women, in particular, that is not prevalent in other Mozambican institutions.

Even though it was known that the plenary sessions are open, none of those interviewed had attended a plenary session.

Regarding public hearings, the majority of those interviewed had never been called to a public hearing by a working committee. However, a few had had contact with the working committees regarding specific legislation.

It is important to note that the stakeholders declared that, in their experience, the chairs and deputies of the working committees were willing to cooperate, revealing an open and friendly attitude. However, there was no direct contact between the Assembly and any of the civil organisations. The contact with deputies was informal, and typically, it was the civil organisations that took the initiative to contact the Assembly.

In general, it was reported that contact with the deputies was uncomplicated, and that it was more bureaucratic and time-consuming to make contact with the Assembly as an institution. When asked about their impression or knowledge of the public visiting or attending the National Assembly, the majority of respondents declared that they believed the image of the Assembly was intimidating. The police, the army, and the relevant protocols (for instance, the barricading of streets) intimidated the ordinary citizen.

8.3.2.5 Cooperation with civic entities for policy and law development

In the public's view, parliament should embrace a deeper partnership with a diverse range of higher education institutions. The purpose of this collaboration could be to constitute advisory working groups on specific matters. However, it could also be to use these educational institutions to promote educational programs on parliament. Planned visits by student groups and sessions with the deputies could form part of an educational and public relations program designed and implemented by the Assembly.

8.3.2.6 A tribute to the media

Often, stakeholders have praised the role of the national media for their coverage of the plenary sessions of the National Assembly, not just because of the live television coverage by TVM (the Mozambican public broadcaster*)* and Radio Mozambique but also because of the newspapers' provision of dedicated spaces for debate and analysis of the proceedings of the Assembly.

Praise was also given to the translation efforts undertaken by the radio stations of the Assembly for their works translated into the diverse local languages, especially, allowing the average citizen in the rural areas to hear and understand news emanating from the Assembly. This was seen as an important manifest contributor to the awareness all over the country of the proceedings of the Assembly.

Nevertheless, it has also been pointed out that further technical, legal and political training should be provided to journalists, in particular to those covering the field of politics. Parliamentary coverage requires specific technical knowledge that not all journalists reporting on legislatives issues possess.

8.3.2.7 Visits to the provinces

It is well known that parliament conducts several visits to the provinces. However, there were some concerns as to how these visits should take place. The main concern was that

there was no feedback about these visits. Also, the visits were not well publicised. In addition, local and civic entities did not receive a post-visit report. Therefore, there were no means of following up on the issues raised during the visits.

8.3.2.8 Impact of the donor community

Parliaments have been excluded from the process of negotiating international aid. External aid is arranged between the executive and the donor, and this denies parliament the right to see or scrutinise the conditions attached to the aid agreements. This exclusion results in parliament being unable to oversee the execution of the aid plan. Accountability is severely hampered under this practice, not only accountability related to aid but national accountability as well.

The close relationship between donors and the government, to the exclusion of parliament, was seen as a weak component of parliament's oversight role. There was a perception that more links should be developed between parliament, the government, and donors.

8.4 Overall evaluation

The interviews revealed discontent concerning the way that the Mozambican parliament performs. This finding was not unexpected. However, the findings do not end there. There are additional significant findings that should be carefully taken into account. For example, the findings indicate a belief and hope that the Assembly can and should do better. They also reveal a perception that the Assembly has improved gradually from term to term. Another finding is that, unlike many parliaments around the world, the stakeholders here show no apathy towards the workings of the Assembly. The Assembly's activity is followed by the stakeholders with interest and curiosity.

An important finding that should be heeded is the Assembly's poor communication with the public. Also of concern is the lack of engagement of the public in parliamentary activities. This applies to visitors of political and technical activities such as public hearings, and public-excursion visitors to parliament.

An important finding is the notion existing among the parliamentary staff that the image of the Assembly is negative, not just regarding its oversight function, but in general terms. This can result in frustration and a lack of motivation, limiting the organisation in carrying out the activities aimed at improving its relationship with the public, since the staff feel this is a lost cause.

It was pointed out in the previous section that the main difficulty regarding the oversight function by parliament is excessive party-centricity, which limits parliament. This party-centricity was seen as making parliament a hostage of party interests, instead of allowing it to pursue an independent agenda as an institution. The reactive position of parliament vis-à-vis its relationship with government was seen as impeding its performance, especially in matters of oversight. The absence from the Assembly of the president of the republic and the leader of the opposition, in this case the leaders of both parties, is seen as an impediment to eliminating the tensions between FRELIMO and RENAMO.

The structures for public collaboration with the Assembly regarding the oversight function are almost non-existent. Dissatisfaction was also expressed regarding how the visits to the provinces materialise. Even though the visits were appreciated, the lack of advance notification of the public was criticised, and there was suspicion that these visits were ceremonial and inefficient with regard to oversight of the activities of the government and in identifying the needs of the population outside of the capital.

The relationship between the donor community and the government (excluding the Assembly) was seen as enhancing parliament's difficulties regarding their oversight function. External aid is crucial for the country and is linked to stipulations with regard to government programmes and budgets. This makes the power that the Assembly holds of approval of the programme and the budget a mere formal procedure and not a real power. In addition, since the aid is conditional on the terms negotiated between the donors and the government being executed without the Assembly's involvement, the Assembly is reduced to being an external witness to these agreements, with no power and often with insufficient information.

8.5 Conclusion

The perception of the Mozambican parliament among the interviewed leaders of civil society was not positive. However, their evaluation conceded that there had been a slight improvement during the three multiparty mandates, and it revealed a desire for parliament to do better in future. This aspiration was based on the belief that parliament plays a crucial role in the sustainability of the political system, especially being the sole political institution that holds the power to oversee the executive. This was coupled with a willingness by the respondents to cooperate with parliament in its striving to improve its performance. Feedback from the interviews conveyed a belief that changes to the parliamentary activity, style, and procedures would have an impact on how the public views parliament. It is important to stress that, despite its low evaluation, parliament was seen as a vital institution. It appeared that parliament was not a 'lost cause' in civic stakeholders' minds. Although the interviews revealed that there was no direct communication between parliament and the public, information on parliament was disseminated by the media, one of the parties, or through personal contact with individual deputies.

The public opinion leaders interviewed were engaged with the daily activities of parliament, and the plenary sessions were consistently followed with interest.

CHAPTER 9

Insight into Mozambican MPs' perceptions

This chapter originated from interviews with 50 Mozambican MPs conducted in Maputo between February and May of 2008. Never before has such a study been conducted on the Mozambican Assembly. Hence, while previous chapters considered respondents' perceptions of their parliaments, this chapter investigates how Mozambican MPs view their relationships with the electorate and their roles as MPs. It also explores who the 'Mozambican MP' is.

As was shown in chapter two, elected parliaments in Africa have received little attention in the literature on democratisation. Even less attention has been dedicated to parliamentarians. This is in spite of the common understanding that studies on parliamentarians are central to political science (Alcántara Sáez, 2008; Putnam, 1976; Cohen, 1989). According to Díez & Díaz (2008), for historical and academic reasons, studies on Latin American parliamentary elites have also been neglected in the literature. From an historical perspective, this was because of the fragility of the development of democracy in the region, which made parliaments vulnerable and resulted in them possessing only relative autonomy; from an academic perspective, this was due to the difficulty of accessing materials and human resources, and in addition, scholarly attention was focused on the political transitions themselves (Díez & Díaz, 2008, p. 9).

Identical reasons can be extended to the scarcity of studies on African parliamentarians. In addition to the aforesaid reasons that also apply to Africa, there are few secondary sources available, such as political biographies or political publications written by politicians. With the exception of South Africa, political biographies are rare in African countries, especially biographies of second-tier politicians. In Mozambique, for example, there are few biographies and publications expressing the political ideas of political figures, although there are a few publications about the first president of the country, Samora Machel (Christie, 1989; Machel, 1976; Machel, 1975). Of the current politicians in parliament, there is not one political biography or one political publication written by or on one of the MPs, although there is a biography and a photobiography on the current president of the Republic, Armando Guebuza.

However, for the sake of being politically correct, both were published as authorised biographies in 2004 before the election (Cezerilo & Sopa, 2004; Matusse, 2004).

There are some Mozambican MPs who from time to time do write in local newspapers, and among the younger generation, one MP has a blog (Araujo, 2009).

Deputies are among the political elites of the country, and although they may be disempowered as a result either of the political parties' culture and rules or as result of the political system, their ideas and beliefs are crucial to entrenching the progress and consolidation of democracy (Diamond, Linz, & Lipset, 1988; Diamond, Linz & Lipset, 1999; Linz & Stepan, 1996; Dahl, 1971; Díez & Díaz, 2008). In short, politicians matter, as Alcántara Sáez puts it:

> Politicians matter. Political actions are influenced by institutional frameworks, but there is no political process without political players. Politicians have families, social and cultural origins, and they are marked by socialisation processes that influence their ideas. In turn, the ideas of politicians are important to understanding their strategic behaviour and, in the end, the outcomes of the political game. Their belonging to political parties and moving in a specific institutional framework can affect them, but politicians also affect the characteristics of their parties and the institutional environments they move in (2008, p. 2).

This chapter looks at MPs' perceptions in eight areas; additionally, the chapter includes a section describing the socioeconomic and religious backgrounds of MPs. As a result, this chapter is divided into the following sections:

- Relationship with the electorate
- Party discipline
- How do MPs become MPs
- Who is the Mozambican MP
- MPs' assessments of the Assembly's powers and performance
- Budget oversight

- MPs' views on the public disclosure of assets
- The Assembly of the Republic's own budget

9.1 Relationship with the electorate

9.1.1 Contact

As shown in Chapter 4, there appears to be little contact between citizens and parliamentarians in Africa. Only one in ten Africans said that they had some form of contact with parliamentarians.

MPs, however, painted a very different picture when the equivalent question was put to them. They were asked how many people contacted them while they were in session in Maputo. All replied that there was not a single week during which the electorate did not contact them. This contact took place mainly via mobile phone, but occasionally, members of the public also made personal contact with MPs inside the Assembly or in their party offices. When asked how citizens obtained their cell phone numbers, as there is no information made available by the Assembly or the political parties on how to contact MPs, the MPs answered categorically that those who did not have their number would be able to find it. Further, all the MPs who indicated that primary contact takes place via a cell phone also said that citizens tended to give them a 'missed call', expecting the MP to return the call and enquire after them, in this way passing on the expense of the phone call to the MP.

To better understand these contacts that MPs reported, it would be useful to have a follow-up question about who the citizens concerned were: Were these contacts initiated mainly by citizens who were close to the party of the MP and who, for this reason, felt comfortable contacting them, or were they are ordinary citizens who were strangers to the MPs? Unfortunately, this follow-up question was not included in the questionnaire, but some of the MPs mentioned that the contacts were normally made by people that were close to the party or who knew someone close to the MP.

Table 9.1: Frequency of contact and contact method used by the constituents, according to MPs

In an average week, how many of your constituents contact you in Maputo		**In general, how do your constituents contact you when you are in Maputo**	
One or two per day	16.0	Via cell phone	96.0
Many people every day	20.0	In person	4.0
One or two per week	64.0		

9.1.2 Presence of MPs in their provinces

The 250 Mozambican MPs represent 11 electoral constituencies – *circulo eleitoral*. Each *circulo eleitoral* corresponds to one of the 10 provinces (Cabo Delgado, Gaza, Inhambane, Manica, Maputo, Nampula, Niassa, Sofala, Tete, Zambézia) of the country, plus there is one for Maputo city.

Figure 9.1: Mozambican Provinces



Source: Le Mozambique, 2009

The table below shows the distribution of seats by party and region. In addition, the number of voters for each region is shown. It is evident that the number of MPs representing a province is in proportion to its population, with an average of one MP per 36.804 voters.

This section seeks to understand how MPs visit and interact with their provinces, although it is important to clarify that the Mozambican constitution establishes, in Article 168, No. 2, that MPs represent the entire country and not only their electoral constituencies[45].

FRELIMO holds the majority in eight of the 11 provinces; RENAMO-UE gained the majority of seats in Sofala province and Zambezia. These two parties share seats equally in Manica, while in the northern province of Nampula, RENAMO-UE holds 23 seats to FRELIMO's 27. The distribution of seats by province shows that the national split – 160 seats for FRELIMO and 90 for RENAMO – hides the geographical distribution of power.

[45] "2.O deputado representa todo o país e não apenas o círculo pelo qual é eleito."

Despite the weaker national power of RENAMO, the party has significant support in some provinces, but these are distant from the capital. The geopolitical differences are noticeable even during the political campaigning: Most small parties campaign in just a few provinces (EU Election Observation Mission, 2004), while RENAMO struggles to gain support in the provinces in the south of the country.

Table 9.2: Distribution of seats by party and region after the 2004 election

Province	Seats	FRELIMO	RENAMO-UE	Voters
Niassa	12	9	3	453 461
Cabo Delgado	22	18	4	794 270
Nampula	50	27	23	1 831 897
Zambézia	48	19	29	1 749 121
Tete	18	14	4	660 741
Manica	14	7	7	531 264
Sofala	22	6	16	802 149
Inhambane	16	15	1	579 356
Gaza	17	17	0	609 214
Maputo -province	13	12	1	483 493
Maputo city	16	14	2	600 249
Africa	1	1	0	
Europe	1	1	0	
Total	250	160	90	

Source: Mazula, 2006

Mozambique's territory measures 799 380 km^2 (INE, 2008). It is therefore no surprise that Mozambican MPs need to travel far to visit the constituencies. On average, MPs need to travel more than 1 500 kilometres just to arrive at the capital of a province. While visiting the province, additional travelling expenses will be incurred. Road access within the provinces is not always easy, and this often results in MPs needing to stay overnight in the areas that they are visiting. It is interesting to note that 50 percent of RENAMO MPs need to travel more than 1 930 kilometres, while the respective FRELIMO MPs at the median of the distribution need to travel 1 600 kilometres, the difference resulting from the geographic distribution of seats. This is a result of RENAMO having more seats in the north of the country.

Table 9.3: Kilometres that MPs need to travel from the capital city to get to the constituencies

		FRELIMO	RENAMO-UE
Mean		1328.8	1988.4
Median		1600.0	1930.0
Mode		1600[a]	1800.0
Minimum		.0	120.0
Maximum		2800.0	3540.0
Percentiles	25	287.5	1679.5
	50	1600.0	1930.0
	75	2000.0	2273.8

a. Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown.

Most of the MPs do not travel to the provinces during the sitting periods. The sitting period in Mozambique is divided into two very busy three-month periods. During the sittings, which are usually from the end of September to December and from May to July, MPs are in Maputo.

Again, this influences accessibility, as the presence of FRELIMO in the south allows FRELIMO MPs to visit the provinces during the parliamentary sessions.

Table 9.4: Visits to the provinces

	FRELIMO	RENAMO-UE
How many trips did you make to your constituency during a typical month when the National Assembly was in session?	2.9	0.8
On average, how long did you stay?	4.4	2.1
How many trips did you make to your constituency during a typical month when the National Assembly was not in session?	3.9	1.0
On average, how long did you stay (no. days)?	26.6	27.9

The working conditions of the MPs in the provinces were also investigated in the study. The Mozambican MPs do not have offices in the provinces. Officially, they are allowed to use the resources of the provincial governments, but in general, the MPs use the resources of their parties, or their own resources.

MPs from FRELIMO tend to collaborate more closely with the local authorities, since they are usually members of the same party. RENAMO MPs, on the other hand, complain that some governors or mayors refuse even to meet with them if they request a meeting where only RENAMO parliamentarians will be present. Under these circumstances, they do not even dare to ask for any assistance in overseeing any governmental projects in the provinces.

According to MPs, constituency work is done mainly under the instructions of, and coordinated by, their parties. Visits to, and work with, the electorate are normally done by teams of two or three MPs allocated by the parties' provincial leadership. This has the advantage of reducing transport costs, and since the roads are not in a state of good repair, it is more convenient to travel in a team.

Both parties' parliamentary leaders control the performance of their MPs in the provinces, including requiring reports of visits to the parties' parliamentary groups. In this regard, FRELIMO MPs have less freedom than RENAMO MPs.

9.1.3 MP expenses for constituency work

Regarding the costs that the MPs incur when visiting the electoral constituencies, it is important to differentiate between incidental travel and accommodation costs, and the expenses that MPs incur in assisting the constituencies. The National Assembly covers travelling expenses from the National Assembly to the MPs' electoral provinces – Mozambican MPs have four trips paid for between Maputo and their residences each year. However, if MPs reside in Nampula or Beira, which have a highly dispersed population (see map below), a visit to their outlying constituencies requires significant travel and, due to the dangers of driving in the evenings, a possible overnight stay in the region. These expenses are not covered by the Assembly, although MPs receive a travel allowance.

The typical reaction from MPs when asked how much they spent on assisting voters was a relieved laughter at someone having asked them this question. Others were surprised at the question and fumbled for an answer, with a non-committal exclamation such as "oh

yes, we have spent". From bicycles for traditional chiefs, and school fees, to funeral expenses, the population expects MPs to contribute generously. The main expenses for MPs are to satisfy the expectations of local citizens. One of the MPs exclaimed that this takes up to half of her salary every month. On average, a FRELIMO MP spends 7390 meticais, and a RENAMO-UE MP spends 8472 meticais on assisting constituents during one field visit to the province.

When in the provinces, the difference between the organisational structures of FRELIMO and RENAMO is evident, with FRELIMO MPs meeting the party's provincial structure most of the time, while RENAMO MPs seem to prefer meeting in informal groups.

Figure 9.2: Mozambique's population density



Source: Instituto Nacional de Estatistica, Mapa de Distribuicao da Populacao, 1997

Table 9.5: How MPs spend most of their time when in their constituencies

	FRELIMO	RENAMO-UE
Talking to groups and holding meetings	21.9	50.0
Listening to constituents	28.1	16.7
Attending local political party meetings	50.0	27.8
Inspecting development projects		5.6

FRELIMO MPs consistently prefer to meet with their party structures as the primary method of getting to know what is happening in a region. An important distinguishing element is that RENAMO MPs attribute more importance to listening to the traditional leaders and religious leaders as a primary method of information gathering than MPs from FRELIMO.

Table 9.6: Primary methods used when consulting with constituents

	FRELIMO	RENAMO-UE
Attend general public meetings (open to all)	18.8	11.1
Attend meetings with religious leaders		16.7
Hold meetings with traditional authorities	6.3	16.7
Hold meetings with party officials (local and regional level)	53.1	33.3
Live in the constituency		5.6
Hold meetings with community/civic leaders	21.9	16.7

9.1.4 MPs' frustration with the public and the public's frustration with MPs

MPs explained that they are the scapegoats for the public's frustration with politics and their rulers. The leader of the FRELIMO parliamentary group gave the example of a recent story involving a FRELIMO MP. On a visit by President Guebuza to one of the provinces, one of the MPs of that region served as an interpreter from a local language to Portuguese. The MP explained to his colleague that on this trip he experienced one of the most embarrassing moments of his life. He was required to translate to the president that

the MPs did not work, that constituents did not even know who they were, yet they still saw them in their fancy cars.

Another MP from RENAMO that gave an interview in a well-frequented hotel lobby explained that no one knew him or her. Being an MP in Mozambique is being at the lower end of the scale of political and social figures. There is no deference to them because of an awareness that they are MPs.

The riots of February 5 in Mozambique started with an anonymous SMS stating:

> The people are suffering; the children of ministers, parliamentarians and other dignitaries do not take public transport, which is so expensive. On 5 February, nobody should take public transport (chapas); no one should work. We will strike and demand justice, comrades. Send to others, united in the fight against poverty[46] (Serra, 2008).

The MPs were in the first line facing the popular angry, because of the popular perception that life was not easy for most Mozambicans, yet the MPs had a comfortable life.

9.1.5 Ranking of MPs' functions

Representing the people is seen as one of the main functions of Mozambican parliamentarians from both parties. There is a division between MPs who see themselves as representatives of the entire nation and those who see themselves as representatives only of their constituencies. Among the answers that were unusual in ranking parliamentarians were 'strengthen democracy' and 'To guarantee that Frelimo will be always in power'.

[46] «O povo está a sofrer, os filhos de ministros, deputados e outros dignitários não andam de chapa e os chapas estão caros. No dia 5 ninguém deve apanhar chapa, ninguém deve trabalhar. Vamos fazer greve e exigir justiça camaradas, envie para outros, seja unido na luta contra a pobreza»

Table 9.7: MPs' opinions about their functions

	FRELIMO			RENAMO-UE		
	1st	2nd	3rd	1st	2nd	3rd
Be the link between people's problems and the government	3.1		9.4	33.3	27.8	5.6
Represent women	3.1	3.1	3.1	33.3	16.7	5.6
Represent the party	6.3	12.5	15.6			22.2
Perform party leadership duties	6.3	3.1	3.1	11.1		5.6
Perform parliamentary duties	9.4	12.5	3.1			11.1
Make laws	12.5	9.4	15.6	11.1	16.7	
Represent my constituency	25.0	18.8	15.6	5.6		
Represent all the people/the entire country	34.4	6.3	6.3		5.6	
Fight AIDS		3.1		5.6		5.6
Oversight		21.9	18.8		11.1	5.6
Strengthen democracy		6.3	3.1		22.2	27.6
Contribute toward development		3.1	3.1			5.6
Facilitate self-development						5.6
Guarantee that Frelimo will always be in power			3.1			

9.2 Party discipline

Parliaments in the majority of countries are composed predominantly of political parties. Parliaments in which MPs are elected through proportional electoral systems result in severe party discipline. This is because the re-election of MPs generally follows from the party's will to include them on the list, rather than because of their acceptance or approval by the electorate.

Carey (2003), in his research on the new Latin American democratic parliaments, concluded that party parliamentary groups were subordinate to the parties' national structures, and that they therefore took their instructions on how to vote on specific issues from the national leadership. Party discipline is a well-known characteristic of the British parliament, and it shows no evidence of decline (Wright, 2000). Alberto Martins, leader

of the ruling party in Portugal, said in an interview with a newspaper, "Party discipline is to be assumed [47]"(Mota, 2008).

Taking into account the existence of party discipline in parliaments worldwide, it is no surprise that party discipline is even more severe in the Mozambican context, because this parliament is composed of only two political parties, and the electoral rivalry has been encouraged by mutual accusations of misbehaviour.

MPs were asked to describe whether, when taking up a position in parliament, they followed the party, the party leader, the national interest, the electorate, or their convictions. Most MPs unequivocally replied that they followed the views of the party, although the majority of FRELIMO MPs did not agree with the differentiation between the views of the party and the national interest.

Few FRELIMO MPs attributed the party's views to the party leader – they asserted that the party leader was the one who needed to follow the party's views, and not the other way around. As a result, FRELIMO tends to operate as a collective.

On the other hand, RENAMO MPs consider the views of the party leader to be those of the party. For them, authority is vested with the individual.

Table 9.8: Rankings of importance of factors when parliamentarians take up positions on issues in parliament

	FRELIMO	RENAMO-UE
The views of your party leader	3.1	5.6
The views of your party	59.4	66.7
The views of your constituents	6.3	
The national interest	28.1	22.2
Your personal convictions	3.1	5.6

To the question of how often their vote differed from that of the party, 9.4 percent of FRELIMO MPs replied that it had, at least once, but explained that rather than voting in agreement with RENAMO, they had instead abstained. RENAMO MPs voted more in

[47] A disciplina de voto e auto-assumida.

line with the party's parliamentary leadership. It was insightful to note that when asked if there were times when they would have liked to have voted differently to the party's orientation on an issue, the percentage increased significantly. Of the RENAMO MPs, 22 percent said that there were times when their vote would have differed from the party's, whereas 25 percent of FRELIMO MPs stated that there were a few times when they voted against their wills, with a further 6.3 percent stating that this had happened often.

Table 9.9: Party discipline

		FRELIMO	RENAMO-UE
How often (if ever) has your vote actually differed from the wishes of your political party?	Never	90.6	94.4
	Once or twice	9.4	5.6
How often (if ever) have you wished you could have voted differently from the wishes of your political party?	Never	68.8	77.8
	Once or twice	12.5	11.1
	Occasionally	12.5	11.1
	Often	6.3	--

9.3 How do MPs become MPs

9.3.1 The process of appearing in the electoral ballot

This section shows that there are different routes to becoming an MP in both parties. FRELIMO MPs will, generally, have had experience of some kind of state functions, either at a provincial or local level. Mainly, they will have been party chiefs, in the provincial structures or at a local level. RENAMO MPs generally follow one of two main routes: Either they are linked to the traditional leaders through their historical opposition of FRELIMO, or they are part of a second-tier of younger, educated urban professionals who were integrated onto the RENAMO lists during the last election, after several former MPs were expelled from the party.

The process through which the names of MPs came to be incorporated on party lists is not clear in both parties, but it is significantly less transparent in the case of RENAMO.

FRELIMO holds party quotas for women, the youth, former freedom fighters, turnover and continuity, and 10 percent of the list can be determined at a national level by the Political Commission, as established in the party rules (FRELIMO: 9 congresso, 2006, Article 78).

Even though FRELIMO MPs were more explicit about how party lists were determined and how their names came to be on the list, there was still some incongruence – some said that their name was proposed by the party cell (the smallest unit of the party structure), and then it was voted onto the list at provincial level. It is at this point that there are discrepancies on how the process is conducted. Some said that voting by delegates at a provincial conference was secret, while others said that party secretariats decided at a provincial level who would be incorporated onto the list. Still, all FRELIMO MPs could explain which quota they represented and how their selection process was conducted.

When it comes to RENAMO MPs, it is unclear whether there actually is an electoral process for selecting names for the party list. Among RENAMO parliamentarians, answers vary widely, from MPs who said that they were surprised when someone called to tell them that they would be included on the list, to others who explained that the invitation come directly from the president of the party. There are also those MPs who represent parties that are in coalition with RENAMO, in most cases being the leaders of their respective parties.

The table below records the responses of MPs. The numbers need to be interpreted bearing in mind that the answers do not give a complete description of the voting methods. This was due to a lack of consistency or formalisation of the process, especially where during the competitive primary election candidates were elected name-by-name vs whether voting was done in respect of the list.

Table 9.10: How MPs names appear on the party's electoral list

	FRELIMO	RENAMO-UE
Competitive primary election (where there were at least two candidates from the same party)	40.6	22.2
Nomination by local branch	3.1	__
Nomination by regional branch	12.5	16.7
Nomination by national party	12.5	50.0
Internal party quota (women, youth, former combatant[48])	31.3	5.6

9.3.2 Financial contributions of MPs for their electoral campaigns

Electoral campaigns in Mozambique are funded by the political parties, who receive funds from the state. International funds are prohibited. The MPs surveyed stated that most of the time they relied on the party machinery and its funds. The Electoral Law (2004) entitles political parties to financial support from the state for their political campaigns. For the elections of 2004, the government distributed 45 billion meticais (approximately 2 million USD): 550 000 USD to FRELIMO, 500 000 USD to RENAMO-UE, and 175 000 USD to two small parties[49] – PPD and PIMO. The remaining small parties that participated in the legislative elections each received 33 000 USD (Mazula, 2006, p. 136).

FRELIMO MPs use far less personal funds than RENAMO MPs. Only 34% of FRELIMO MPs said they contributed personal funds, compared to 61% of RENAMO MPs who said that they used their own funds besides party funds. On average, FRELIMO MPs spent 12 249.9 meticais, while RENAMO MPs spent more than double that amount, at an average of 26 027.8 meticais. As is evident from the table below, there are other important differences in the patterns of behaviour between the MPs from both parties. FRELIMO MPs that did spend personal funds are concentrated in a very small range (25 percent), with the maximum individual contribution being 150 000 meticais per annum.

[48] This concept includes ex-fighters from both Mozambique's colonial war and its civil war.

[49] These were the only two small parties that had candidates in all provinces as well as presidential candidates.

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On the other hand, most RENAMO MPs contributed from their personal funds, the maximum being 100 000 meticais per annum.

Table 9.11: How much MPs spent on the last legislative electoral campaign (currency in meticais)

		FRELIMO	RENAMO-UE
Mean		12 249.90	26 027.80
Median			22 500.00
Minimum		0	0
Maximum		150 000	100 000
Percentiles	25	0	0
	50	0	225 00.00
	75	4 749.75	50 000.00

9.3.3 Career management of MPs

It seems that the political tenure of MPs is an uncertainty for the majority of them. Of the FRELIMO MPs, 75 percent were not sure whether they would keep their positions as MPs in the next mandate. RENAMO MPs were more certain of their tenures, with 39 percent feeling assured that they would continue as MPs. However, RENAMO MPs were more hesitant concerning the possibility that the party would gain seats in the next election, many explaining that the elections in Mozambique were not free and fair and that, as a result, RENAMO seats were always under-allocated relative to the actual number of votes.

Table 9.12: Rankings of political parties and own electoral prospects in the 2009 election

		FRELIMO	RENAMO-UE
Confidence in how the party will do in the next election	We should gain many more seats	59.4	61.1
	We should gain a few more seats	37.5	22.2
	We will come out of it with about the same number of seats	3.1	--
	It is too uncertain to tell	--	16.7
Confidence in own election	I should retain my seat by a comfortable margin	15.6	38.9
	Things are too uncertain to tell	75.0	61.1
	I am concerned that I might lose by a close margin	3.1	—
	Do not know	6.3	--

9.4 Who is the Mozambican MP

In a study on the personal roots of American congress members, Burden (2007, p. 14) stated, "Researchers tend to assume that legislators either work only on behalf of their constituents or as foot soldiers for their political parties". In the case where there is strict party discipline and where the electoral system attributes to political parties the monopoly in deciding who can become MPs, as is the case in Mozambique, the tendency that Burden mentioned can be even more valid. However, parties are constituted of members, and MPs are unquestionably the elite within the political party. Who they are and where they come from can enhance an understanding of the functioning of the Mozambican parliament.

Table 9.13: Sociodemographic and sociopolitical characteristics of Mozambican MPs

	Overall	FRELIMO	RENAMO-UE
Gender (%)			
• Men	60	53.1	72.2
• Women	40	46.9	27.8
Average age	47.8	47.1	48.9
Education (%)			
• Primary school	4.0	3.1	5.6
	18.0	18.8	16.7
• Incomplete secondary school	14.0	15.6	11.1
	30.0	28.1	33.4
• Secondary school	18.0	15.6	22.2
	16.0	18.8	11.2
• 2-3 years of university			
• Degree			
• Graduate studies			
MPs' primary residences			
• Maputo	36.0	34.4	38.9
• Other city	64.0	63.6	61.1
Religious believer (%)	92.0	87.5	100
Is a full time parliamentarian (%)	50.0	43.8	61.1
Number of legislatures (%)			
• One	52.0	50.0	55.6
	18.0	18.7	16.7
• Two	28.0	28.1	27.8
	2.0	3.1	0.0
• Three			
• Monoparty legislature (pre-94)			
Average number of legislatures	1.80	1.84	1.72

9.4.1 Presence of women

The table above summarises the sociodemographic and sociopolitical characteristics of Mozambican MPs. It is evident that, overall, women hold 40 percent of the seats. The

FRELIMO[50] parliamentary group significantly contributes to this number, with nearly double the number of women that RENAMO contributes. Women also hold important positions of power, starting with the Vice-President of the Assembly of the Republic[51], Veronica Macamo (FRELIMO). Macamo is influential within FRELIMO and is seen as a strong candidate to become the speaker during the next term. Among the leadership of the parliamentary group, Margarida Talapa is the vice-president and Maria Ângela Manjate is the third-highest ranking. The parliamentary leadership of FRELIMO consists of two organs: the *Chefia da Bancada* – this forms the top leadership of the group and is made up of four people, of whom two are women – and the *Conselho de Chefia*, which is a larger organ including the four members of the *Chefia* plus all the party leaders of the provinces, the presidents and vice-presidents of the working committees, and all members of FRELIMO who are part of the Permanent Committee. The latter organ has 19 members, of which eight are women. FRELIMO's quotas put the minimum percentage of women members on the party's electoral lists in parliament at 33%. RENAMO, on the other hand, does not have any policy regarding women's representation. In spite of this, the 2004 legislature saw the parliamentary leadership group electing a woman to lead RENAMO-UE's parliamentary group.

9.4.2 Education of MPs

The average age of MPs determines that the majority of MPs were born prior to independence (25 June 1975). As is also shown in the table above, the average age of Mozambican MPs is 47.8. For this reason, almost all were educated under the one-party state and during the civil war, both of which constrained the day-to-day functioning of educational institutions.

In this regard, there are no significant differences between both parties.

After independence, the state and FRELIMO were almost one entity. The new state and the ruling party inherited a territory that had fought a colonial war for its liberation,

[50] FRELIMO has historically been concerned with the emancipation of women; see, for example, the section devoted to the necessity of the emancipation of Mozambican women in one of the first speeches of Samora Machel (Machel, 1975).

[51] The Assembly has two vice-presidents, one from each party.

inherited a deficient number of qualified civil servants, due to the exit of many of the former Portuguese civil servants, and the low level of education of Mozambicans[52]. One of the ways in which allies of the new Marxist party contributed to the fledgling state was through scholarships. As a result, university education was mostly carried out in the former Soviet Union, China, Cuba, or Germany, as was evident in the replies of FRELIMO MPs in response to be being asked which university they had attended. Being selected for higher education was a matter of academic performance at school but also of party performance. It is therefore unclear which organisation – FRELIMO or the Mozambican State – enabled and approved a given individual's further education, since the distinction between the two did not exist at that time.

It is not surprising that FRELIMO MPs with a high level of education had attended universities such as Karl Marx University in Germany; the Military Academy of the former Soviet Union; the University Pedagogic Cuba; the Weimar Public Institute in Germany; and some universities in Portugal, such as the Open University of Portugal and the Law Faculty Porto of Portugal.

On the other hand, the RENAMO MPs with a high level of education mainly studied in Portugal, at the following institutions: the Pharmacy Faculty in Lisbon, the Catholic University, and the Industrial Technical Institute. Of three RENAMO MPs surveyed, one studied at Clara Setkin, one at the University Rostock in Germany, and one at the University Polytechnic in Kenya.

Of Mozambique's universities, FRELIMO MPs studied at the University Eduardo Mondlane; the ISLE, Maputo; the University Pedagogic; the University Catholic, Mozambique; and the Institute Technical Industrial, Quelimane. Mozambican-educated RENAMO MPs graduated from the University Eduardo Mondlane, the Institute Public de Public Administration (Maputo) and the University Pedagogic.

It is interesting to note that even though Maputo city and Maputo province represent only 29 seats in total (see Table 9.2), which account for 19 percent of the total number of MPs,

[52] In the 1970 census, the last one before independence in 1975, just 14 percent of the population was literate. Only 6 percent of women and 12 percent of men had completed a primary education (Sheldon,1998).

36 percent of the surveyed MPs listed Maputo as their primary residence. This was a result of the country's services and education still being highly centralised in Maputo, and therefore, it was more convenient to be based in the capital. Some MPs explained that they kept two houses, one in Maputo and another in their province, since they spent half of the year in each of the two locations. The MPs from outside Maputo berated how difficult it was to manage two homes, even when one was just temporary. A female MP expressed her frustration with the conditions while in Maputo, suggesting that the president of the Assembly would do well to consider where and how MPs lived while in the capital. The MPs also explained that it was common for those MPs from outside Maputo to use their time in Maputo to study at the institutions of higher education.

9.4.3 Religions of MPs

Most of the Mozambican MPs are religious. It is a fact that RENAMO MPs show more devotion to religion than FRELIMO MPs. This is because FRELIMO, in the period following independence, had had an unsympathetic, if not hostile, relationship with the churches. However, with the opening of the multiparty regime, the religions and churches recovered their rapport with the state and subsequently with FRELIMO.

One of the FRELIMO MPs, who identified herself as a religious person, explained that during the monoparty era it was not acceptable to be religious. Religious practices were seen as a threat to the party's beliefs, and so this MP did not attend ceremonies such as baptisms or weddings for a number of years. The church therefore did not play an active part in the life of this MP for decades, until the political climate changed sufficiently to permit this MP to return to her religious practices and attend religious services. It is against this background that 87.5 percent of FRELIMO MPs identified themselves as religious.

The only notable episode in the history of the Mozambican parliament relating to religion was the attempt in 1995 to create two Islamic public holidays. The proposal was drafted

by Muslim MPs from both parties and consisted of the creation of public holidays for *Eid al-Adha (sacrifice)* and *Eid al-Fitr (fasting)*.[53]

The debates became very heated, with parliament briefly dividing for the first time along religious lines and not along party lines. After a series of problematic sessions, parliament approved the law in 1996, but the Constitutional Court later considered the matter to be unconstitutional. Parliament subsequently decided to postpone *sine die* a new discussion of this law (Morier-Genoud, 2000). It is interesting to note that Mozambican MPs are distributed across several religions. The majority are Roman Catholic, FRELIMO with 56.3% and RENAMO-UE with 44.4%. The second largest group in both parties is the Muslim group, accounting for 21.9% of FRELIMO MPs, and 5.6% of RENAMO MPs.

9.4.4 Exclusiveness of MPs

Table 9.13 shows the proportion of MPs who are exclusively dedicated to their position/profession. Of RENAMO MPs, 61 percent are full-time parliamentarians, compared with just 43.8 percent of full-time FRELIMO parliamentarians. Although MPs were not asked about the nature of their second occupation, some FRELIMO MPs voluntarily added that they held part-time positions in parastatal companies, or in private businesses.

Regarding their legislative experience, also shown in Table 9.13, more than half of the MPs in the current legislature are first-time members of parliament. One might have expected a significant difference in this statistic between the two parties, since FRELIMO has been ruling the country since 1975, and in the one-party state period at that time, the Assembly existed as the *Assembleia Popular*; however, it is evident that most of the parliamentarians from both political parties are inexperienced.

[53] Muslims have two celebrations (Eid), namely, Eid of Sacrifice and Eid of Fast-Breaking. The Eid of Sacrifice is in remembrance of the would-be sacrifice by Prophet Abraham of his son. The Eid of Fast-Breaking comes at the end of the month of fasting, Ramadan. The close of the Hajj is marked by a festival, the Eid al-Adha, which is celebrated with prayers and the exchange of gifts in Muslim communities everywhere. This, and the Eid al-Fitr, a feast-day commemorating the end of Ramadan, are the main festivals of the Muslim calendar (Jafri & Shah, 1999).

Regarding the previous occupations of MPs, the main occupations common to both parties was that of teacher. A close second for FRELIMO was that of party worker, while for RENAMO, business was the second most common previous occupation, and that of party worker was at third place.

Table 9.14: Main occupations prior to entering parliament

	FRELIMO	RENAMO-UE
Businessperson (owner of a business)	3.1	16.7
Teacher or headmaster/headmistress	25.0	22.2
Government worker/civil servant	3.1	11.1
University lecturer or professor	9.4	
Guerrilla/liberation fighter	6.3	11.1
Journalist	6.3	
Provincial governor	9.4	
Government minister	9.4	5.6
Leader of association of former freedom fighters	3.1	
Worker of the party	21.9	11.1
Army	3.1	
Traditional chief/headman		5.6
Student		5.6
Musician		5.6

9.5 MPs' assessments of the Assembly's powers and performance

9.5.1 The Assembly in comparison with the executive

The Mozambican Constitution (2004a) makes the political system highly presidentialised. As described in Chapter 7, the Mozambican parliament holds little power in comparison with the executive. When it comes to the formation of the cabinet, the president holds unrestricted powers to appoint the premier and individual ministers. The Mozambican president does not even require a proposal[54] from the premier to appoint individual ministers, which effectively means that the composition of the cabinet is at the president's sole discretion. The only restraint placed on the president's powers is that the president can be forced to dismiss a newly appointed premier and cabinet in the event that the government programme is rejected for a second time (Mozambique, 2007, Article 108).

[54] As happens in other Portuguese-speaking African countries (Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe, Angola and Guinea Bissau).

The Mozambican president, furthermore, has unrestricted powers to dismiss both the premier and individual ministers.

The National Assembly does not have the constitutional power to censure cabinet and cannot dismiss the government (as a whole or a single minister). It does not have any formal involvement in the process of forming the cabinet. The heads of the government and state combine in the president of the republic, but the one who is accountable to the National Assembly is the prime minister, to whom questions are submitted in the plenary.

The president addresses the Assembly once a year, with no room for debate, and this normally takes the form of a ceremonial session where the president reports on the state of the nation[55]. In his address on the state of the nation in 2008, President Guebuza's speech, spanning 39 pages and distributed to/by the media, surmised that the state of the nation was good, and this generated tension in the Assembly (Machava & Sidumo, 2009). The RENAMO-UE deputies refused to stand when the president entered the room and abandoned the plenary room, as a show of defiance, when the president began to talk about the fight against poverty (Serra, 2008, 24 December).

Taking into account the limited constitutional powers of the Mozambican Assembly, it is perplexing how the Mozambican MPs can perceive that the Assembly has sufficient constitutional powers. Overall, 64 percent of Mozambican MPs considered the Mozambican parliament to hold the right amount of power. Even the RENAMO opposition MPs considered the constitution to be generous toward parliament, with 55.6 percent of the opposition MPs indicating satisfaction with one of the most restrictive constitutions in Africa, regarding parliamentary powers[56] (see table below).

[55] In 2004, parliament approved a revision to the constitution that reversed the criminal immunity of the president. For crimes committed not relating to the exercise of his functions, the president will answer to the normal courts once his term in office expires. For crimes committed as president of the Republic, the Attorney General together with the Assembly (voted by two thirds) can impeach the president (Mozambican, 2004a, Art. 153).

[56] See, for example, the comparison of constitutional powers of African countries in Nijzink, Mozaffar & Azevedo, 2006.

One of the few MPs who were conscious of the limited powers of the Assembly commented on the recent case involving a change of ministers by President Guebuza, as an example of the resultant public embarrassment: "Following the last government alteration, two of the ministers were present in the Assembly when they were dismissed and no one knew about it. Not them, not us. The media informed us on our way out!"

RENAMO MPs who said that the balance of powers were 'about right' justified this by adding that the problem was not the constitution but the lack of respect that FRELIMO had towards the constitution and the opposition.

Table 9.15: MP's perceptions of the constitutional powers of the National Assembly

"Do you think parliament has too much, too little, or about the right amount of constitutional power? (Response in %)			
	Overall	**FRELIMO**	**RENAMO-UE**
• Much too little/too little	32.0	28.1	38.9
• About right	64.0	68.8	55.5
• Too much/far too much	4.0	3.1	5.6

When MPs were asked who, in practice, had the most power to determine what the government did, the answers from the two main parties were distinctly different. Of RENAMO MPs, 94.4 percent perceived the president to be the one who had full control of government activity, compared to just 40.6 percent of FRELIMO MPs who considered this to be the case.

FRELIMO MPs were equally split over whether the president or the Assembly had more control over the government. The perceptions of FRELIMO MPs, however, were contextualised by their stating that FRELIMO held the president accountable, and consequently, it was FRELIMO MPs who made sure that the government was accountable. This question was interpreted sensitively by FRELIMO MPs, especially by the more experienced ones, as FRELIMO is not a party of one person; one MP clearly stated this to be the case "because we argue about everything in the central committee". This statement is indicative of the FRELIMO argument that the party itself keeps the

executive accountable. However, as was further revealed by their statements, this takes place behind closed doors, between the members of the political party.

Table 9.16: MP's perceptions about who holds more power – the Assembly or the president of the Republic

"In practice, who has the most power to determine what government does, parliament or the presidency, or do they have the same amount of power?" (Responses in %)			
	Overall	**FRELIMO**	**RENAMO-UE**
Presidency, much more	60.0	40.7	94.4
Presidency	2.0	3.1	--
About the same	28.0	40.6	5.6
National Assembly	10.0	15.6	--

9.5.2 Assessment of the Assembly by MPs

Following the comparison of the powers of the Assembly and the executive, MPs were also asked to assess the Assembly's powers related to controlling its own proceedings, the Assembly's qualified staff, and the Assembly's budget. The findings give cause for concern, with a clear majority of MPs on both sides stating that the Assembly holds very little power.

Table 9.17: MPs' assessment of the Assembly's powers

Power to control own proceedings	**Qualified staff**
• Overall, 48% said "about right" and 48% said "much too little/too little" • 68.8% of FRELIMO MPs answered "about right" • 83.3% of RENAMO answered "much too little/too little"	• Overall, 60% said "much too little/too little", and 38% said "about right" • 46.9% of FRELIMO MPs answered "much too little/too little" • 83.3 % of RENAMO MPs answered "much too little/too little"

Subsequent to expressing their belief that the powers of the Assembly were insufficient, MPs were asked whether the situation that they described had got worse or improved

during the last five years. Overall, 60 percent of MPs said that it had got worse, and 10 percent said there had been no improvement in the status.

Table 9.18: MPs' perceptions of the extent of the Assembly's power

Over the past five years, has parliament's influence in governing the country increased, decreased, or remained the same?			
	Overall	**FRELIMO**	**RENAMO-UE**
Decreased somewhat	60.0	59.4	61.1
Stayed about the same	10.0	__	27.8
Increased a great deal	30.0	49.6	11.1

9.6 Budget oversight

One of the crucial moments annually, if not the most crucial, of any parliament is the approval of the national budget and later the approval of the report of how the budget was approved. Regardless of the strength of parliaments, this is an unalterable instance of parliament's power over the executive. Constitutions all over the world define the obligation of the executive at this time as being to submit their activities to the will and scrutiny of members of parliament. The Mozambican constitution has at least five articles (Articles 128, 130, 131, 179 and 206) that specify that the Assembly of the Republic is the institution that will deliberate and approve the national budget. Article 130 of the constitution is dedicated to the national budget, stating, "The proposal of the legal budget is elaborated on by the government and **submitted** to the Assembly of the Republic[57]". Article 131 states that the *Tribunal de Contas*[58] and the Assembly of the Republic will exercise oversight in respect of the execution of the national budget. Article 179(m) states that it is the **exclusive**[59] responsibility of the Assembly of the Republic to approve the national budget.

[57] Translation by the author : "3. A proposta de Lei do Orçamento do Estado é elaborada pelo Governo e submetida à Assembleia da República". Author's bold font.

[58] Accounts Court.

[59] Author's italics

For this reason, the survey included questions to measure how Mozambican MPs perceived their roles as main actors in the approval of the national budget, and in their appreciation and deliberation of the report of the *Tribunal de Contas*.

The results presented in the table below are, therefore, a cause for concern. FRELIMO MPs and RENAMO MPs believe that eight in ten MPs have a poor or very poor understanding of the national budget, and seven in ten have a poor or very poor understanding of the report of the *Tribunal de Contas*.

Table 9.19: MPs' perceptions of the ability of MPs to understand the national budget and the report of the *Tribunal de Contas*[60]

		FRELIMO	RENAMO-UE
National Budget	Very poor	15.6	27.8
	Poor	59.4	50.0
	Good	25.0	22.2
Report *Tribunal de Contas*	Very poor	12.5	22.2
	Poor	59.4	44.4
	Good	28.1	33.3

The results shown above raise doubts about how the process of the approval of the national budget is acknowledge and shared by the majority of MPs. However, with regard to the national budget, there are considerations that should be taken into account in order to form a better judgment of MPs: first, the country is a direct donor-aid recipient, and second, there is a culture among MPs that the *doctors* [61] would take care of the budget.

9.6.1 Disempowered MPs

Starting with the last point, the Mozambican Assembly has a single committee that deals with the budget and with the *Tribunal de Contas* (Report on the Budget). As a result, this committee invests considerable energy in preparing for the deliberation on both documents that will dictate the verdict. Both are presented in the plenary.

[60] Accounts Court

[61] The term doctor is used for any person with a degree. In this case, the word is used in reference to the economists or accountants in parliament.

This committee is presided over by an MP Virgina Videira. Virginia is seen as one of the good old vanguard of FRELIMO party members from after independence, meaning that she is an honest, dedicated and a hard worker. She has been the president of the working committee since 1994.

The boundary between the party, the executive, and parliament was definitely questionable when the president of the parliamentary committee that oversaw the budget was also part of the cabinet as advisor to the minister of finance. In institutions that function normally, this would be impossible, with some parliaments even stipulating in their standing orders that the president of the parliamentary committee needs to be from the opposition, as happens in the Cape Verdean Assembly.

Therefore, what the Mozambican committee does at this stage does not constitute political oversight of the budget, but rather a form of technical oversight of the budget. There is constructive dialogue between the committee and the minister regarding technical gaps, necessary clarifications, etc. These limitations are acknowledged by MPs themselves. When MPs were asked to indicate the extent of their influence over the budget, 60% said that they felt that they had 'too little/much too little' influence. They felt even more disempowered concerning the international loans signed by the executive; 80% said that they had 'too little/much too little' influence in this matter.

The working committee received a genuine expression of appreciation from MPs, with 80% of them stating that the working committee did a 'good' job in its analysis of the budget and the *Tribunal de Contas*. It is even more representative of the lack of political awareness in this matter when the positive evaluation is made across both political parties. What contributes to this is the friendly relationship that the president of the committee (FRELIMO) has with the vice-president of the committee (RENAMO), which in the context of the Mozambican Assembly is seen as remarkable.

9.6.2 The hijacking of parliament's role in the national budget

The political problem derives from the involvement of parliament at a late stage in the elaboration on the budget. As result of the country's budgetary dependence on

international donors, when the budget arrives at the Assembly, it has already been negotiated politically and technically with the international agencies and, in the case of Mozambique, with the consortium that groups the 19 aid donors.

During 2003, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed for programme aid (direct budgetary support) between the Mozambican government and the Programme Aid Partners (PAPs) (PAP Structure, 2009). This agreement established a form of consortium of 19[62] cooperation partners who provide direct support to the Mozambican state's national budget. In 2007, the budget support programme pledged 377 million USD. The Mozambican model of management of aid in the form of direct support of the budget is seen by the partners as a "…sophisticated and innovative process, which is already seen as an example to be replicated in other African countries and beyond"[63] **(**The Programme Aid Partnership in Mozambique, 2009, #7). According to PAP, the direct-aid support of the national budget of Mozambique is one of the largest joint programmes in Africa, both in terms of amounts and the number of partners involved **(**The Programme Aid Partnership in Mozambique, 2009). The hope of the donors is that this sophisticated model of aid will:

> Provide an important avenue for dialogue between government and donors on development policies and public spending choices. In other words, general budgetary support allows for a dialogue that is more focused on key policy priorities instead of highly repetitive and fragmented dialogue processes with individual donors. The transfer of financial resources alone does not automatically generate policy, institutional and governance improvements: appropriate technical assistance and policy dialogue are also needed. **(**The Programme aid Partnership in Mozambique, 2009).

Throughout the website developed by the PAPs and the Mozambique, government there is only one mention of the Assembly of the Republic's role in the national budget. The PAPs not only design the policies and priorities but also assume their monitoring and execution, ministry by ministry. Complex and technical indicators were designed by the

[62] The partners are the African Development Bank (ADB), Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the European Commission, Finland, France, Germany, Holland, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the World Bank.

[63] See also the World Bank statement about the success of this model of aid in Mozambique (Mozambique – Mozambique emerges as a success story on donor harmonization, 2009).

international organisations' workers that 'check' the Mozambican government's performance. This, again obviates any role that parliament could have in this matter. It is interesting to note that PAP does create working groups where civil society groups are invited to participate, but no MPs are part of the monitoring component of PAP[64], except that in a recent memorandum of understanding, there is mention that the Mozambican government is accountable to Mozambique citizens through the Assembly of the Republic. The European commission explains the section involved as follows:

> The G19 works at three levels: (1) Ambassadors engage in political dialogue with the government on sensitive issues (e.g. corruption); (2) heads of cooperation steer the work – from the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), donors choose their priorities; (3) economists and sector specialists work in 24 working groups, along with the government, donor representatives and civil society.[65] The budget support group focuses on financial management, with five working groups: tax, budgetary analysis, procurement, auditing, and systems of financial administration (German Foundation for World Population, 2009, p. 2)

9.7 MP's views on the public disclosure of assets

Mozambican MPs were asked if they would support the implementation in Mozambique of a public disclosure of assets of the president of the republic, members of the government, MPs and judges. The table below shows interesting variations on which disclosures the MPs would support and which they would not support. Regarding the president of the republic, only 40.6 percent of FRELIMO MPs would support disclosure, compared with 88.9 percent for RENAMO. Regarding members of the government, 53.1 percent of FRELIMO MPs supported the public disclosure of the assets of the government, with 94.4 percent of MPs from RENAMO-UE supporting this.

[64] For information on how PAPs work, see the webpage of the programme, http://www.pap.org.mz/history.htm, online 5 January 2009.

[65] Civil society is represented through a group called the G20, which includes churches, labour unions, networks of NGOs, the private sector, and academics.

It is important to note that the reactions of MPs to this question included apprehension, laughter, asking whether the questionnaire was really anonymous, and a very few being upset with the inclusion of this question.

Regarding the question about public disclosure for the president of the republic, one of the MPs who did not agree, justified this, saying, "No, because he has a lot, and people will not understand". Another FRELIMO MP who did not support public disclosure for the president and members of government but who did support public disclosure for MPs and judges said, "I will definitely support this in the near future, but at the moment we are not prepared".

Regarding the disclosure of assets by themselves, some of the MPs chose no disclosure, justifying this by saying, "How can I be corrupt? We don't manage any money", but others who also insisted that they could not be corrupt because they did not manage money, still preferred disclosure, for the sake of example and transparency, in the words of one MP, "Everyone should do it, even those who just have a cow or a goat!"

One MP who emphatically did not agree with such measures gave the example of the Minister of Finances, Manuel Chang, who had made the mistake of declaring his assets publicly, and the result, according to this MP, was petty and malicious 'talking' in the newspapers based on malevolent speculations. According to the weekly newspaper Savana, the Minister had made public his assets in 2005 when joining the government. In the words of the newspaper, the minister had "… at the commencement of his functions in 2005, believed, maybe naïvely, that transparency and integrity were the most important characteristics of a public servant; he was the only high-powered public servant who had publicly declared his assets"[66] (2008, p. 2)

The salaries of the members of government and of MPs are a secret in Mozambique. In 2006, when the author tried to obtain information from the Assembly of the Republic about MP's salaries, it was explained that this was confidential information. In 2008, in confidence, the author got access from MPs to the Assembly's resolution detailing

[66] Author's translation: " No inicio das suas funcoes em 2005, acreditou, talvez ingenuamente que a transparencia e integridade eram a cracteristica principal de um servidor publico; foi ate aqui o unico funcionario superior do governo a declarar publicamente os seus bens".

salaries. From the staff this would definitely have been impossible, still based on the premise that MPs would not like it (which in general is the truth). The deputies' salaries are not determined by a particular law. Rather, these are established in *Norma de execuçao orçamental interna*[67], which is updated annually in line with national salary increases. The monthly salary for the deputies for 2007 was 46 000.00 MTN (1 750 USD). The national minimum salary was 1 443.17 MTN (55 USD) (*Portal do Governo de Moçambique,* 2009).

This culture of secrecy is justified by the view that 'they', the people, would not understand, since the average of salaries is very low in the country. The culture of secrecy goes as far as the MPs themselves, who do not know how much the salary of the president of the Assembly is. The resolution regarding the assembly salaries approved by MPs includes information on all MPs, with the exception of the president of the Assembly.

Table 9.20: Support vs opposition to legally requiring selected groups to publicly disclosure their assets, with strong sanctions for non-disclosure

	FRELIMO			RENAMO-UE		
	Support	**Oppose**	**DN**	**Support**	**Oppose**	**DN**
President of the republic	40.6	50	9.4	88.9	5.6	5.6
Members of government	53.1	43.75	3.1	94.4		5.6
Judges	56.3	37.5	3.1	83.3	5.6	6.3
MPs	43.7	53.1	6.3	88.9	5.6	5.6

The economic growth of Mozambique since the peace agreement in 1992 and the establishment of a multiparty regime pleased international donors, who considered Mozambique a success story. However, the assassinations of the journalist Carlos Cardoso in 2000 and the bank manager Siba Siba Macuacua in 2001 tainted this image of success. Cardoso and Macuacua were investigating and denouncing a case of fraud relating to the privatisation of the two major Mozambican Banks – 400 million USD went missing from the Mozambique banking system in the 1990s (Hanlon, 2004, p. 747).

[67] Internal norms for budgetary execution.

[68] Rules for budgetary execution.

These public scandals took on an international dimension that in 2000 caused international donors to suspend the transfer of aid funds until the government committed to taking measures against corruption (Mosse, 2008, p. 67). However, this suspension was very short-lived, when two months after the death of Siba Siba Macuacua at the donor consultative group meeting in October 2001 it was decided to give 722 million USD dollars to the Mozambican government. The government had only requested 600 million USD; this increase by the donors was, according to the minister of security at the time, Sergio Vieira, in recognition of good governance that "overrides the bank scandal and the assassinations of Siba-Siba Macuacua and Carlos Cardoso" (Vieira, 2001, quoted by Hanlon, 2004, p. 748). The Mozambican government report containing the policy on anti-corruption stated the following:

> The low wages in the public sector and poverty that affect most Mozambicans, while creating a favourable environment for so-called petty corruption (bribery, extortion and illegal charges), is not the direct cause of the proliferation of acts and practices of corruption. Rather, the promoters of the acts of corruption are some public officials, well paid and knowledgeable of the rules and laws, that moved by the spirit of living ostentatiously use their power and knowledge to extort money from the public and erode the coffers of the state[69]. (Mozambique: Comissão Interministerial Da Reforma Do Sector Público, 2006, p. 3)

Corruption is a recurring debate in the Assembly's plenary, with RENAMO-UE deputies often bringing the topic to the plenary, accusing FRELIMO of covering and blocking the debate. However, one the most striking statements in the plenary about the death of Carlos Cardoso was made by the FRELIMO deputy Teodato Hunguana in 2002 before the order of the day, and then published in a local newspaper:

> The only way to prevent the State from becoming riddled with crime is to trigger an all-out war against crime and its promoters, and also against its performers or instruments. A fight against the latter, leaving the promoters unscathed and untouchable, means keeping intact the sources of their

[69] "Os baixos salários auferidos no sector público e a pobreza que afecta a maioria dos moçambicanos , embora criem um ambiente favorável a chamada pequena corrupção (suborno, extorsão e cobranças il ícitas), não são a causa directa da proliferação de actos e práticas de corrupção. Pelo contrário, os promotores dos actos de corrupção são alguns funcionários e agentes públicos bem pagos e conhecedores das normas, leis e informação mas que movidos do espírito de viver faustosamente usam o seu poder e conhecimentos para extorquir o cidadão e delapidar os cofres do Estado." Translation by the author.

> proliferation, sources that are becoming more dangerous and capable of taking ownership of the state itself (Hunguana, 2002).

Hunguana's speech was a clear statement that corruption existed in the highest spheres of the state, and that this required incisive action from his own party.

One of the measures known as important in promoting transparency and, consequently, fighting corruption is the enforcement of public disclosures of the assets of public officials or politicians. The public disclosure of assets by politicians is especially important in new democracies, as a tool for increasing the confidence of the electorate (Carlson & Walecki, 2006; Goredema & Montsi, 2002).

9.8 Assembly of the Republic's own budget

As has already been stated in Chapter 2, the approval of the Assembly's budget by the Assembly, and not by the government, is seen to be an indication of the strength of a parliament (Barkan, 2005). This is the case in Mozambique, where the parliamentary budget is approved by the Assembly and not by the government. However, this approval is unofficially negotiated beforehand between parliament and the minister of finance. In theory, parliament decides its own budget; in practice, the negotiation process is more of a consultation process, where the government asks about the expectations of the Assembly, but the final decision is really the governments. In spite of the reduced budget, there is no history of the Assembly condemning the amount allocated. Furthermore, the modernisation of the public administration in Mozambique represents a setback, with all payments (except salaries) being made through the central government. Suppliers receive payments from the ministry of finance, and not from the accounting department of parliament.

The only financial transactions that the Assembly has to manage are salaries and donors' money that is allocated directly to the Assembly.

Since 1994, according to the parliamentary staff and deputies, there has been no evidence of discontent by the political leadership of the Assembly with regard to the behaviour of the executive in this matter. The Assembly's budget is presented further on in this chapter.

As is shown in Chapter 7, the Assembly of the republic receives a paltry budget compared with other state institutions. As is also observed in its analysis of the budget for 2009, the Mozambican civic organisation *Centro de Integridade Publica*, in its report, stated, "The budget is once again concentrated on the executive (98%). The Assembly of the Republic has the same budget for current expenses as the cabinet of the Presidency of the Republic and the Services of Information and State Security have" (CIP, 2009).

Mozambican MPs also seem to be frustrated with their own power regarding the Assembly's budget: 89 percent of RENAMO MPs say that MPs have too little influence over parliament's budget; 68.8 percent of FRELIMO MPs share this sentiment. Still, 18.8 percent of FRELIMO MPs are relatively happy with the Assembly's budget.

Table 9.21: MPs' perceptions of their own influence over parliament's budget

With regard to parliament's own budget, does parliament have too much influence, about the right amount of influence, or too little influence over each of the following?		
	FRELIMO	**RENAMO-UE**
Too little/much too little	68.8	88.9
About right	18.8	--
Too much	12.5	11.1

9.9 Conclusion

Mozambican MPs are the contented foot soldiers of their political parties. What in the previous chapter was seen as a critique of parliament is shown here to be the only option MPs consider as being available to them. Also, the mistrust between the parties reinforces the sentiment that the party needs to be strong collectively**.** In a democracy, MPs from different parties are political adversaries and not enemies; in Mozambique, the transition from enemies to political adversaries is not yet complete.

Two truths exist about contact between citizens and MPs – citizens indicated that they did not have contact, while MPs indicated that they did. As is shown in Table 3.10, the ratio is 1 member of parliament per 100 000 of the populace, as it is in most of the countries

covered in the study. This ratio, along with the fact that Mozambican MPs always work as the representatives of their parties, weakens the association between citizens and MPs.
With regard to interpreting relations with the executive, there are significant distinctions between FRELIMO and RENAMO MPs; however, in terms of socioeconomic background, there are no significant differences between both parties. There is a perception that RENAMO has fewer educated members, and while this may be the truth outside of parliament, inside parliament there are no noteworthy educational differences.

A recurring pattern among RENAMO MPs' responses is a fear for the democratisation process and a disbelief in the fairness of elections**.**

Regarding the development of the Assembly, MPs stated categorically that the Assembly had worsened in recent years. This was related to mainly working conditions and the power of the Assembly over its own budget.

A surprise finding is MPs' beliefs that the Assembly holds sufficient constitutional powers, when actually the powers of the Assembly are nearly limited to the approval of the government program and the national budget.

The donors' intervention of direct aid to the budget, although made with goodwill, has, has added force to the notion of parliament being merely a rubber stamp, with the resultant weakening of parliament.

Accountability and corruption are crucial issues in the process of consolidating democracy in Mozambique. These challenges seem more difficult with the role of the Assembly being limited to the formality of budget approval. The fight against corruption has been posited as a government priority; however, the culture of lack of transparency is a severe threat to the success of this offensive. There is even more reason for concern when, within the house that should be the guardian of the interests of the citizens in relation to the rulers, the practice is one of protecting the rulers from the citizens, as is the case with the opposition among MPs to the prospect of an enforced disclosure of assets.

CHAPTER 10
Conclusion

10.1 Parliament as seen by the public and parliament's negative self-image

In March of 2007, the late general secretary of the Mozambican Assembly, Carlos Manuel, tried to persuade me to choose a topic other than my study of the public's perceptions of parliament, saying, "Why do you want to know what the public says about us. I can tell you in just three words what their image of parliament is – a) useless; b) unperturbed, and c) too expensive" (Interview with the author, March 17, 2007). This statement reveals the widespread perception among staff and parliamentarians that the public perceives the Assembly negatively. However, this negative image is, as it turns out, not completely shared by the public.

In the majority of countries surveyed, citizens, on average, gave a positive evaluation of their parliaments, especially on the measure of 'trust'. In particular, regarding the Mozambican parliament, the Mozambican stakeholders stressed that, despite the fact that they attributed a low evaluation of their parliament's performance, they saw the Mozambican parliament as a vital institution. Certainly, the Mozambican parliament is not a 'lost cause' in civic stakeholders' minds.

The Mozambican stakeholders were aware of the problems that the Assembly had faced since its inception, but conceded that there had been improvements during the three multiparty mandates. In particular, they expressed the desire for parliament to do better in future, since they saw parliament's role as being crucial for the sustainability of the Mozambican political system. It is also interesting to note that the Mozambican public opinion leaders interviewed were engaged with the daily activities of parliament, and the plenary sessions were followed with interest.

African multiparty parliaments are still in their infancy. As shown in the study, the average age of the multiparty parliaments in the 18 countries is 16.2 years, and on average, they have experienced four mandates.

The parliaments of six countries – Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa and Tanzania – have been given just three mandates. It is known that the roles of legislatures can be influenced by the circumstances of their origin and their age (Muslof & Smith, 1979).

This period in their evolution presented problems of internal institutionalisation for legislatures in maturing their staff, procedures, rules, and the experience of politicians. It also presented the challenge to these parliaments of consolidating their space and role among others political institutions and, equally important, of fostering a relationship with the public.

The main problem is that the challenges need to be embraced simultaneously. To some extent, these parliaments have been doing this, but it is a complex process. Aside from elections, parliaments are the main arena of political competition, made up of the cream of the country's politicians. Consequently, *parliaments are the alma maters of politics*. This could sound infelicitous, but it is not, considering the persistent negativism that parliaments in Africa have been receiving in the literature (Nijzink, Mozaffar, Azevedo, 2006).

There is also the naive idea that there is too much politics in Assembly. The truth is that politics is the nature of parliaments. This question takes us back to the meaning of politics. As Sartori (1973) postulates, politics is different from morality, religion, ethics and economics. The problem is the stereotypical perception that politicians are morally worse than the rest of us (Walzer & Action, 1973). In emerging democracies, these stereotypical perceptions seem to be worse, due to the severe poverty and inequality that exists in these countries, and due to the narrow frontier between politics, private business and control of the state.

By comparison, African citizens show higher levels of trust and job approval for both institutions than citizens in the Western world do. The literature on African

democratisation is often tainted by negativism and scepticism. By contrast, for now, African citizens' evaluations look like a vote of confidence in their political institutions.

Democratically elected African parliaments need to make an effort to be accessible to their communities. However, as previous analyses in other parts of the world have shown, this will most probably result in more critical attitudes and greater demands from citizens towards parliamentarians. Democracy is not supposed to be a quiet game between citizens and their elected representatives. Gaining citizens' support is not just crucial for parliaments in these countries to function, it can also be crucial for their very survival. As Doorenspleet (2005, p. 84) put it, "These democratic institutions can also become a democratic façade without the support of citizens."

10.2. Public's perception of the fairness of elections, and the effect of party allegiance on perception of parliament

The public's support for the majority of the legislatures in this study is widespread, but the findings also revealed that the level of support varies as a result of individual characteristics. Unlike previous studies by Doorenspleet (2005) on the Malians' support for legislatures, this larger analysis of 18 countries indicates that political characteristics are more important concerning how citizens evaluate their parliaments than socioeconomic characteristics, such as poverty.

Measuring the impact of different individual characteristics on the composite index 'LegislativeScore' shows that the characteristics that have an effect on the score are not those that are inherent to socioeconomic status, such as habitat, gender or poverty, but rather those relating to the political profile of the individual: party allegiance and perception of the fairness of elections. These last two variables show a pattern of influence in the majority of countries surveyed.

In democratic regimes, the formation of parliaments results from elections. By their cast vote, citizens choose the composition of their parliaments. Therefore, the way in which citizens perceive their parliaments will be a product of how free and fair they believe the elections that composed the houses were. The findings of this thesis reveal that this was

not just a likely hypothesis, but indeed, a fact. African citizens are still sceptical about the fairness of their elections, and this affects the way that they perceive their parliaments.

Perceptions of the fairness of elections influenced the LegislativeScore in 15 of the 18 countries; the only three where this variable did not have an effect were Benin, South Africa, and Namibia. In the remaining 15 countries, those who perceived elections to have been 'completely free and fair' consistently increased the score significantly.

Individuals aligned with opposition parties attributed a higher LegislativeScore to their parliaments. On the other hand, when this phenomenon was investigated among the ruling parties' supporters, party allegiance had an impact on the LegislativeScore in 15 of the 18 countries (the three countries where the variable was not significant were Botswana, Ghana and Mali). Among the other 14 countries, participants aligned with the ruling party further contributed to the score in just seven countries: Uganda, South Africa, Zambia, Malawi, Madagascar and Kenya. In these seven, the contribution to the score from participants aligned with the ruling party was consistently lower than from those aligned with the opposition. The other seven countries where only opposition-party affiliation is a factor are Mozambique, Cape Verde, Nigeria, Namibia, Senegal, Zimbabwe, and Tanzania.

Parliaments are particular institutions composed, not of a united group, but of political rivals. Accurately described as representative institutions, parliaments clearly cannot please all citizens in equal measure if they are to perform this role. Which political parties citizens support is a factor that contributes to their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with their parliaments.

These findings represent both positive and not such positive news. The positive aspect is that poverty is not a veil of ignorance that conceals politics from citizens' consciousnesses, as is often portrayed. Being poor does not mean that the citizen will be less politicised. The less positive aspect is that in Africans' minds the fairness of elections is still a problem. The mistrust of the election process poses a serious problem for the legitimisation of the elected legislatures.

A more 'neutral' finding is that party allegiance does affect citizens' appreciation of their parliaments. Again, this reinforces the independence of the citizen's habitat as a determinant of politicisation: Whether rural or urban, educated or not educated, wealthy or poor, party allegiance plays a role.

10.3 Electoral systems and party dominance do not affect the public's perception of parliaments

The closed-party-list proportional electoral system, which exists in South Africa, has been blamed for the alleged weakening of the South African parliament. The new political party in South African politics, formed by ANC dissidents, has been the most vocal supporter of the need to change the current electoral system (Southall, 2008). The former leader of the South African opposition party Tony Leon dedicated a full chapter of his biography to the decline of the South African democratic parliament from 1994 to the present. In his words, the decline of parliament has resulted in its becoming an 'ethics free zone' (Leon, 2008, p. 390). Patricia de Lille, another opposition party leader and an MP known for her inquiries in parliament into political scandals such as the arms deal, seems to share this view, as one of her main slogans for the elections in 2009 has been "We want to put criminals in jail and not in Parliament" ("ID will reintroduce Scorpions: De Lille", 2009).

In the academic literature, the debate regarding choice of electoral system has been an ongoing and classic one. Some scholars argue that proportional systems facilitate a better representation of societal and minority groups and, therefore, which will result in citizens being supportive of their institutions (Lijphart, 1999; Anderson, 1998). Other scholars, by contrast, argue that constituency systems show higher levels of satisfaction with the state and the regime, since under such systems voters have greater choice through their vote, which serves to strengthen the link between voters and the elected (Farrel and McAllister, 2006; Norris, 1999).

This thesis examines the impact of the electoral systems of the 18 countries studied against the way in which citizens perceive their parliaments. The cross-country analysis

does not reveal a relationship between a particular electoral system and a parliament's pattern of support by its citizens.

The dominance of ruling parties represents an area of interest that was also tested to examine whether party dominance was an influential variable indicating the way that citizens perceived their parliaments. As happened with the variable electoral system, this hypothesis was refuted. The parliament of Tanzania, where 87 percent of the seats were occupied by the ruling party, exhibited consistently higher appreciation from its electorate; on the other hand, the parliaments of Nigeria, Zimbabwe and Kenya exhibited the lowest average scores for citizens' appreciation.

10.4 Citizens' distinction between parliaments and presidents

A legitimate concern regarding the elected legislatures in Africa is how they are handling the legacy of strong executives. The lessons from Latin America show that in new democracies strong executives dominate politics, placing parliaments on a lower level of the political hierarchy. It is also known that the majority of the African constitutions gave generous powers to executives, to the detriment of parliaments. This study, however, suggests that African citizens do make a distinction between presidents and parliaments.

Citizens show an aptitude for having opinions about both institutions, which is particularly important as a pre-requisite for accountability. The positive evaluation of presidents does not imply unconditional support. The findings reveal that citizens do not want to lose gains made in the multiparty regime; parliaments are preferred to presidents as lawmakers. The findings also reveal that despite appreciation of the current presidents, citizens prefer to place limits on their functions and powers.

The preceding findings on citizens' attitudes towards parliaments are an important barometer of how these institutions are seen by external actors. Of equal importance is how the parliamentarians themselves perceive their role.

10.5 Members of parliament

Parliamentarians are the main feature of a parliament. Parties, staff, rules and resources are fundamental to the functioning of a parliament, but the main actors in the plenary sittings, in the committees, in the corridors of parliaments are the MPs. They are the features of a parliament. As shown in Table 3.7, the parliaments in this study had, on average, four electoral cycles. The parliamentarians in these parliaments are pioneers. They lead their daily parliamentary lives based not on the precedent of a remote past but by relying on their own good sense and expertise. The parliaments in this study are grouped according to size; for example, the South African parliament has 399 MPs, while the Botswanan parliament has 62 MPs. Fifty Mozambican MPs were interviewed for this study.

Mozambique's Assembly consists of 250 deputies elected using a closed-party-list system, and 11 multi-member constituencies made up of the provinces (12 to 50 representatives for each, based on population). Each deputy is entrusted to represent the entire country, and not only the district where he or she was elected (Mozambique Constitution, 2004, Article 168).

The Mozambican civic leaders interviewed denounced as a weakness of the Mozambican parliament the extreme party-centricity its members exhibited. The study on the Mozambican MPs revealed that they were the contented foot soldiers of their political parties. In observing the Mozambican political context, it became clear that the parliamentarians were an accurate reflection of the broad Mozambican political society.

The manoeuvres of the political parties in their interactions exhibit the complexity of Mozambican politics. Its two main political parties were belligerent opponents until the 1990s. This legacy is evident in the relationship between the two parties, but also in the way it manifests between the different generations within each party. There is distrust between the parties, which reinforces the sentiment that the party needs to be strong collectively**.** In a democracy, MPs from different parties are political adversaries and not enemies; in Mozambique, the transition from enemies to political adversaries is not yet complete.

Moreover, the Mozambican democratisation process has been showing signs of a setback, as is evident, for instance, in the RENAMO MPs' claims of their fear for the democratisation process and their disbelief in the fairness of the elections.

The next issue examined was how democratic the parliamentarians are and how democratic the political parties themselves are. MPs were asked to describe whether, when taking a stand in parliament, they followed the party, the party leader, the national interest, the electorate, or their own convictions. Most MPs unequivocally replied that they followed the views of the party. A few FRELIMO MPs attributed the party leader's views to the party as a collective – they asserted that the party leader was the one who needed to follow the party's views, and not the other way around. On the other hand, RENAMO MPs considered the views of the party to be those of the party leader. Nevertheless, towing of the party line is practiced not only by the MPs of both parties, but it is also seen by them to be the only way of operating

Since the combating of corruption is a priority of the government, the MPs were asked if they would support the implementation in Mozambique of the public disclosure of the assets of the president of the republic, members of the government, MPs, and judges. Regarding the president of the republic, only 40.6 percent of FRELIMO MPs said they would support disclosure. Regarding members of the government, 53.1 percent of FRELIMO MPs supported the public disclosure of the assets of the government. The reactions of MPs to this question included apprehension, laughter, asking whether the questionnaire was anonymous, and, for a very few, being upset with its inclusion. One of the MPs who disagreed justified this by saying, "I would not support this (disclosure), because he has a lot, and people will not understand". This culture of secrecy is defended by the view that 'they', the people, would not understand, since the per capita income is very low in the country.

The culture of secrecy exists among the MPs themselves, who do not know how much the salary of the president of the Assembly is. They not only do not know, but they accept that this 'norm' is an unquestionable 'norm'. There is further reason for concern when, within the house that is meant to be the guardian of the interests of citizens in relation to their rulers, the practice is one of protecting the rulers from the citizens, as is evident with the MPs' opposition to the prospect of an enforced disclosure of assets.

In addition, the MPs were convinced that the Assembly had 'normal' constitutional powers, and therefore these were sufficient, when in fact, the powers of the Assembly were nearly limited to the approval of the government program and the national budget.

The Mozambican MPs contended that the Assembly's performance had worsened in recent years. This was mainly due to the deficient working conditions and the decrease in the power of the Assembly over its own budget. In addition, in the MPs' opinion, the financial aid intervention of international donors, with direct aid to the budget, albeit an expression of goodwill, had added weight to the notion that parliament merely acted as a rubber stamp, with the resultant weakening of the role of the MPs.

MPs were frustrated with the public, and explained that they were the scapegoats for the public's frustration with politics and their rulers. The leader of the FRELIMO parliamentary group gave the example of a recent story involving a FRELIMO MP. On a visit by President Guebuza to one of the provinces, one of the MPs of that region served as an interpreter from a local language to Portuguese. The MP explained to his colleague that on this trip he experienced one of the most embarrassing moments of his life. He was required to translate to the president that the MPs did not work, that constituents did not even know who they were, yet they still regularly saw them in their fancy cars.

Two truths existed about contact between citizens and MPs – citizens indicated that they did not have contact, while MPs indicated that they did. As shown in Table 3.10, the ratio is one member of parliament per 100 000 of the populace, as it is in most of the countries covered in the study. This ratio, along with the fact that Mozambican MPs always work as the representatives of their parties, weakens the association between citizens and MPs.

For Przeworski (1991), the consolidation of democracy requires that political actors come to view democratic procedures as serving their long-term self-interest. For Highley and Gunther (1992), consolidation occurs when there is consensus among the elite about the rules and codes of political conduct and when they agree on the worth of political institutions. For this to take place, the aforementioned consolidation requires convergence between the political actors and for the anti-system discourse to be dropped.

These conditions are far from the reality of Mozambican politics. However, the Mozambican parliament has an important role that is, enabling the process of learning to work together.

10.6 Parliaments matter for the consolidation of democracy

During the last days of January 2009, violence erupted in the streets of Antananarivo in Madagascar. In just a few hours, at least 43 people were killed in confrontations with the police (D'Ersu, 2009). The popular revolt was against what the press called the 'entrepreneurial president', President Marc Ravalomanana. Protesters set fire to the government television-broadcasting complex, an oil depot, a shopping mall, and a private TV station linked to the president. This followed the government's closure of an opposition radio station ("43 killed in Madagascar political violence", 2009). Madagascar's recent political history showed how the National Assembly was the only obstacle to the president's attempt to extend his constitutional power even further. In 2007, the president dissolved the National Assembly in response to its refusal to concede even more powers to the president (See Appendix 9).

The Madagascan example of the clash of powers between the Executive and the National Assembly points to the problems of assemblies in emerging democracies: the lack of capacity of national assemblies to stand up to executives; the imbalance in constitutional power between both institutions; the confusion between the dominance of politics vs the dominance of private business; the feeling of being excluded from the political game by opposition parties, and the exclusion of the emerging private business sector. The result is that national assemblies ultimately become the only institutional space allowed for opposition parties.

The missing element in the literature on democratisation is what is needed between the transition to democracy and the point when democracy is consolidated. The literature distinguishes between what constitutes a transition and the consolidation stage of a democracy (Linz, Stepan & Gunther, 1995), but it does not elaborate on what should happen in between. This is the case even though the literature on transitions is abundant from the perspectives of various approaches and theories (Lipset, 1959; Rustow, 1970;

Schmitter & Karl, 1991; Linz & Stepan, 1996), as are the discussions on how to measure the consolidation of democracy (Schedler, 2001).

As far as conditions desirable for democracy are concerned, the debate on political institutions has mainly been about the constitutional design and the electoral system that are advisable for democracy. The aforementioned authors defend one system or another, aiming for greater accountability and political balance. However, for these elements to occur independently of the electoral system or of the constitutional design, parliament is a key element.

There is no miraculous recipe that can guarantee that under a certain system parliament will be stronger than under another. Parliamentary systems can result in weak parliaments, and presidential systems can result in strong congresses, or the other way around. The choice of constitution and electoral system are important, but they are not the determinants of success.

The new multiparty regimes in Africa have faced a lack of political accountability and fragile governance. To address these issues, parliaments are essential. This approach also has the benefit of being practical and attainable in the present compared with via a hypothetical change of the constitution.

As the Mozambican case reveals, international aid donors, play a central role in the politics of many African countries. As was seen in the case of Mozambique, the form of aid supplied directly to the national budget is seen as innovative and efficient. However, parliament has been neglected in this process. The warranty of accountability by the executive is given directly to the donors themselves, and to civil society. This formula contains serious problems of sustainability in the long and medium term, and in the short term, it contains serious problems of legitimacy.

The problem with this formula is that the elected Mozambican government, which carries the power of having been elected by Mozambicans through popular suffrage, has become the servant of international organisations, and accountable to non-elected civil society organisations. The members of these organisations are sometimes elected politicians (elected in a foreign country, and therefore, accountable to their electorate) from the

countries donating aid. Civil society in Africa, as Gyimah-Boadi (1996) postulates, has the credit of having been at the forefront of democratisation on the continent in the 1990s; however, as he explains, expectations regarding civil society's contribution are too high. Unfortunately, civil society in Africa remains too weak to fulfil these expectations.

In the long term, this practice will crystallise into the executive not being accountable to parliament regarding the national budget, for control of the nation's finances will be assumed to be the domain of the international experts. The confusion originates with the national budget being not only a technical document but also a political document. Therefore, it needs to be scrutinised by the political institution that is competent to do this, elected by the people and mandated by the constitution to do so.

Despite all the problems that parliaments in Africa face, they are still the privileged forum of political debate. It is true that the ruling parties in the national assemblies tend to behave as a shield of the executive, but this is not peculiar to Africa. The former conservative Lord Chancellor Lord Hailsham described the Westminster system of parliamentary government as an 'elected dictatorship'; since once the government is elected, it does whatever it wants (Rogers& Walters, 200, p.94). Also, as in others parts of the world, opposition parties in parliaments work, as Mitchell (2000) describes them, as a 'fire alarm', monitoring government decisions and confronting members of government.

Moreover, in emerging democracies, parliaments are living political schools. As a former Mozambican MP from the opposition said about arriving at the first multiparty parliament, they were seen as 'bandits in town'. After three mandates, there is still discomfort between most of the MPs from the ruling party and the opposition; yet, it is much better than in the past. Mozambican parliamentarians have progressed slowly from being enemies to being political opponents.

For consolidation of democratisation to occur, parliaments need to be strengthened. For this, external support is important, as are international agencies' funds and expertise, but external assistance is not per se the solution to the weaknesses of Mozambican parliament. Political parties are key actors; they are definitely part of the problem, but without them, there would be no workable solution. It would be naive to advocate radical change to a system entailing the role of the parties not being central to parliament.

The quality of governance is seen as the main cause of the continual problems of the continent. The need for better governance, for the consolidation of democracy, and overall, to better the lives of ordinary citizens, demands guardian parliaments. However, politics does not operate in a *ceteris paribus* mode. As a result, parliaments cannot reschedule or suspend their development; it needs to happen this instant. As stated before, the development of parliaments needs to happen simultaneously on several fronts.

Most of the parliaments in the countries studied began with very rudimentary staff structures, or nearly none existed, since the sitting periods under a monoparty regime were relatively short. Many of these multiparty parliaments inherited staff that were politically closer to the former monoparty regime than to the opposition. Therefore, there existed a need for institutionalised and professionalized parliamentary staff; however, again, with African parliaments, this is not so simple. This needs to be done as part of an integrated larger program, which needs to involve and have the assent and support of politicians. No parliament-strengthening project will succeeded without the genuine involvement of politicians.

In cases of a reversal in democracy, parliaments are usually the first victims, and in the past, they have often been suspended or completely abolished. The parliaments examined here operate within countries still consolidating their democracy. In these cases, institutions are vulnerable to abuse by other political players. Public support can be crucial in the event of a political crisis. For now, in general, public support exists, and this is good news for parliaments. It can also be good news for democracy, if embraced by parliaments and citizens.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Afrobarometer Map



Source: Afrobarometer, 2009

Appendix 2: Countries and field work dates

Country	Date of fieldwork, Afrobarometer, Round 3
Benin	2005
Botswana	2005
Cape Verde	2005
Ghana	2005
Kenya	2005
Lesotho	2005
Madagascar	2005
Malawi	2005
Mali	2005
Mozambique	2005
Namibia	2005
Nigeria	2005
Senegal	2005
South Africa	2006
Tanzania	2005
Uganda	2005
Zambia	2005
Zimbabwe	2005

Source: Afrobarometer, 2009

Appendix 3: Distribution, party seats in the 18 lower houses

(Country, date of the last legislative election, and seats, by political party)

Benin 2007	
Cauri Forces for an Emerging Benin (FCBE)	35
Alliance for Democratic Momentum (ADD)	20
Democratic Renewal Party (PRD)	10
Key Force (FC)	4
Union for Renewal (UPR)	3
Coalition for an Emerging Benin (CBE)	2
Hope Force	2
National Union for Democracy and Progress (UNDP)	2
Alliance for Renewal (AR)	2
Restore Hope (RE)	1
Alliance of Progressive Forces (AFP)	1
Party for Democracy and Social Progress (PDPS)	1
Botswana 2004	
Botswana Democratic Party (BDP)	44
Botswana National Front (BNF)	12
Botswana Congress Party (BCP)	1
Cape Verde 2006	
African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde (PAICV)	41
Movement for Democracy (MPD)	29
Union for an Independent Democratic Cape Verde (UCID)	2
Ghana 2006	
New Patriotic Party (NPP)	128
National Democratic Congress (NDC)	94
People's National Convention (PNC)	4
Convention People's Party (CPP)	3
Independents	1
Kenya 2007	
Orange Democratic Movement Party of Kenya (ODM)	99
Party of National Unity (PNU)	43
Orange Democratic Movement-Kenya (ODM-K)	16
Kenyan African National Union (KANU)	14
SAFINA	5
National Rainbow Coalition-Kenya (NARC-K)	4
National Rainbow Coalition (NARC)	3
Forum for the Restoration of Democracy-People (FORD-P)	3
SISI KWA SISI Party of Kenya (SKSPK)	2
Democratic Party (DP)	2
Party of Independent Candidates of Kenya (PICK)	2

CHAMA CHA UMA (CCU)	2
New Forum for the Restoration of Democracy-Kenya (NFK)	2
Peoples Party of Kenya (PPK)	1
Kenya African Democratic Development Union (KADDU)	1
United Democratic Party of Kenya (UDM)	1
National Labour Party (NLP)	1
Kenya African Democratic Union ASILI (KADU-ASILI)	1
KENDA	1
Forum for the Restoration of Democracy-ASILI (FORD-A)	1
MAZINGIRA Greens Party of Kenya (MGPK)	1
Forum for the Restoration of Democracy-Kenya (FORD-K)	1
Peoples Democratic Party (PDP)	1
Lesotho 2007	
Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD)	62
National Independence Party (NIP)	21
All Basotho Convention (ABC)	17
Lesotho Workers Party (LWP)	10
Basotho National Party (BNP)	3
Alliance of Congress Parties (ACP)	2
Basotho Batho Democratic Party (BBDP)	1
Basotho Congress Party (BCP)	1
Basotho Democratic National Party (BDNP)	1
Marematlou Freedom Party (MFP)	1
Patriotic Front For Democracy (PFD)	1
Madagascar 2007	
Tiako I Madagasikara (TIM)	106
Independents	11
Fanjava Velogno	2
Vohibato Tapa-Kevitsa	1
Isandra Mivoatra	1
Brunly	1
Liaraike	1
Fampandrosoana Mirindra	1
Leader Fanilo	1
Mayors' Association	1
ANAWI	1
Malawi 2004	
Malawi Congress Party (MCP)	174
United Democratic Front (UDF)	164
Independents	372
Mgwirizano Coalition	295
Mali 2007	
Alliance for Democracy and Progress (ADP)	114
Democracy and Republic Front (FDR)	15
Independents	14

African Solidarity for Democracy and Independence (SADI)	4
Mozambique 2004	
Mozambican Liberation Front (FRELIMO)	160
Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO)	90
Other parties	0
Namibia 2004	
South -West African People's Organization (SWAPO)	55
Congress of Democrats (COD)	5
Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA)	4
United Democratic Front of Namibia (UDF)	3
National Unity Democratic Organisation (Nudo)	3
Monitor Action Group (MAG)	1
Republican Party	1
Nigeria 2007	
Peoples Democratic Party (PDP)	262
All Nigeria People's Party (ANPP)	62
Action Congress (AC)	32
Progressive People's Alliance (PPA)	3
Labour Party (LP)	1
Senegal 2007	
Sopi 2007 coalition	131
And Defar Senegal coalition	3
Takku Defarat Senegal	3
Waar Wi coalition	3
People's Rally (RP)	2
Convergence for Renewal and Citizenship (CRC)	1
National Patriotic Union (UNP)	1
Jef Jel Alliance	1
Rally of Senegalese Ecologists - Greens (RES)	1
Social Development Reform Movement (MRDS)	1
Front for Socialism and Democracy- Benno Jubel (FSD-BJ)	1
Social Democrat Party - Jant bi (PSD - Jant bi)	1
Authentic Socialist Party	1
South Africa 2004	
African National Congress (ANC)	279
Democratic Alliance (DA)	50
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)	28
United Democratic Movement (UDM)	9
New National Party (NNP)	7
Independent Democrats (ID)	7
African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)	6
Freedom Front Plus (FF+)	4
United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP)	3
Pan Africanist Congress (PAC)	3
Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO)	2

Minority Front (MF)	2
Tanzania 2005	
Revolutionary Party of Tanzania (CCM)	206
Civic United Front (CUF)	19
Chadema (Party for Democracy and Development)	5
Tanzania Labour Party (TLP)	1
United Democratic Party	1
Uganda 2005	
National Resistance Movement (NRM)	206
Forum for Democratic Change (FDC)	37
Independents	37
Uganda People's Congress (UPC)	9
Democratic Party (DP)	8
Conservative Party (CP)	1
Justice Forum of Uganda (JEEMA)	1
Zambia 2006	
Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD)	74
Patriotic Front	43
United Democratic Alliance (UDA)	26
United Liberal Party (ULP)	3
Independents	3
National Democratic Focus (NDF)	1
Zimbabwe 2008	
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC)	100
ZANU-PF	99
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC-AM)	10
Independents	1

Source: IPU Parliaments Online database (Parline), 2008

Appendix 4: Code variables, Chapter 4

Corruption

"How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Members of parliament?"

Response categories recoded: Don't Know = 0; None=1, Some of them= 2; Most of them=3; All of them=4.

Performance

"Do you approve or disapprove of the way the following people have performed their jobs over the past twelve months, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Your member of parliament?"

Response categories recoded: Don't Know = 0; Strongly disapprove = 1; Disapprove = 2; Approve=3; Strongly approve = 4.

MP's will to listen

"How much of the time do think the following try their best to listen to what people like you have to say: Member of parliament?"

Response categories recoded: Don't know = 0; Never = 1, Only sometimes = 2, Often = 3, Always = 4.

Trust

"How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Parliament?"

Response categories recoded: Don't know = 0; Not at all = 1; Just a little = 2; Somewhat = 3; A lot = 4

Contact

"During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons about some important problem or to give them your views: An MP?"

Response categories recoded: Don't nnow = 0; Never = 1; Only once = 2; A few times = 3; Often = 4

Time MP should spend in the constituency

"How much time should your member of parliament spend in this constituency to visit the community and its citizens?"

Response categories recoded: Never/Not necessary =0; At least once a year=1; At least once a month=2; At least weekly=3; All of the time=4; Don't know =9

Time MP does spend in the constituency

"How much time does your member of parliament spend in this constituency?"

Response categories recoded: Never/Not necessary = 0; At least once a year = 1; At least once a month = 2; At least weekly = 3; All of the time = 4; Don't know = 9

LegislativeScore

Is the computation of following four variables:

$$LegislativeScore = Corruption + Perfomance + Trust + MPs' {}^{*} will\ to\ listen$$

For this question, corruption codes were inverted to graduate the scale from negative to positive accordance with the others.

A factor analysis was perfomed on with the four variables. The analysis shows that it is possible to extract one factor with reliability (Cronbach's Alpha 0.598). The principal component analysis extracted one component showing a Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of sampling adequacy of 0.673.

Appendix 5: Descriptive statistics, Chapter 4

Descriptive Statistics					
	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Performance	25389	0	4	2.3	1.19
Corruption	25395	0	4	2.2	1.37
LegislativeScore	25381	0	16	8.7	3.31
MP's will to listen	25391	0	4	1.7	1.09
Trust	25395	0	4	2.5	1.27
Time MP should spend	25397	0	9	2.8	2.09
Time MP does spend	25397	0	9	2.5	3.24
Contact MP	24349	0	9	0.2	0.88

Appendix 6: Coding and recodingof variables, Chapter 6

The data was cleaned and recoded using SPSS 16.

Independent variables

Education

"What is the highest level of education you have completed?"

Response categories recoded: No formal schooling=0; Primary schooling= 1; Secondary school=2; Higher education=3.

Poverty

"Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family gone without – Enough food to eat? And a cash income?"

Response categories recoded as: Never=4; Just once or twice=3; Several times=2; Many times= 1; Always=0.

Satisfaction with the economy

"In general, how would you describe: The present economic condition of this country?"

Responses recoded as: Very good=4; Fairly good=3; Neither good nor bad=2; Fairly bad=1; Very bad=0.

Satisfaction with personal living conditions

"In general, how would you describe your own present living conditions?"

Responses recoded as: Very good=4; Fairly good=3; Neither good nor bad=2; Fairly bad=1 ; Very bad=0.

Trust in others

"Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you must be very careful in dealing with people?"

Responses recoded as: Most people can be trusted=2; You must be very careful=1; Don't know=0 (this question was not included in the Zimbabwe questionnaire).

Party allegiance

"Do you feel close to any particular political party? Which party is that?"

Responses recoded as: Opposition party=2; Ruling party 280,360,300,201,440,340,166,240,182,512,126,422,222,380,102,142,320,263=1; No affiliation=0.

Radio use

"How often do you get news from the following sources?

Responses recoded as: Every day=4; A few times a week=3; A few times a month=2; Less than once a month=1; Never=0.

TV use

"How often do you get news from the following sources?"

Responses recoded as Every day=4; A few times a week=3; A few times a month=2; Less than once a month=1; Never=0.

Newspapers use

"How often do you get news from the following sources?"

Responses recoded as: Every day=4 A few times a week=3 A few times a month=2 Less than once a month=1 Never=0.

Generation

"How old are you?"

Responses were recoded as: Individuals who were considered part of the 'multiparty generation' – they were 18 or less at the time of the first (of the continuous three) election – received the code 2; individuals classified as being part of th post-independence generation – they were 18 or less when independence was achieved – received the code 1; those who were considered part of the pre-independence generation received the code 0. The table below shows the proportions for the age groups for each country, listed under the respective codes.

Country	Code 2: 'multiparty generation'	Code 1: 'post-independence generation'	Code 0: 'pre-independence generation'
Benin	18 - 35	36 - 65	66 - 99
Botswana (has two age groups multiparty and independence)	18 - 59	N/A	60 - 99
Cape Verde	18 - 35	36 -50	50 - 99
Ghana	18 - 35	36 - 68	69 - 99
Kenya	18 - 35	36 - 63	64 - 99
Lesotho	18 - 34	35 - 59	60 -99
Madagascar	18 - 34	35 - 63	64 - 99
Malawi	18 - 31	32 - 61	62 - 99
Mali	18 - 33	34 - 66	67 - 99
Namibia (*multiparty* was not included, since it is equal to *post-independence*)	18 - 35		36 - 99
Nigeria	18 - 25	26 - 65	66 - 99
Senegal	18 - 48	49 - 58	59 - 99
South Africa (has two age groups – before and after multiparty)	18 - 33	34 - 99	
Tanzania	18 - 30	31 - 61	62 - 99
Uganda (no existence of a category *multiparty generation* since the multiparty election in 2006 was not contested more than those preceding it)		18 - 63	64 - 99
Zambia	18 - 35	36 - 61	62 - 99
Zimbabwe (only two age groups are pertinent)	18 - 45		46 - 99

Gender
"Responses were recoded as: Male=1; Female=2

Habitat
Responses were recoded as: Urban=1; Rural=2

Satisfaction with democracy
"Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Mozambique? **Responses were recoded as**: Don't know=0; Not at all satisfied=1; Not very satisfied= 2; Fairly satisfied=3; Very satisfied=4.

Perception of the fairness of elections
"On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national election?"
Responses were recoded as: Don't know and Don't understand the question=0; Not free and fair=1; Free and fair, but with major problems=2; Free and fair, with minor problems=3; Completely free and fair=4.

Perception of the embeddedness of democracy
"In your opinion, how much of a democracy is the country today?"
Responses were recoded as: Do not understand the question/Do not understand what 'democracy' is/Don't know=0; Not a democracy=1; A democracy, but with major problems=2; A democracy, but with minor problems=3; A full democracy=4.

Frequency of political discussion
Responses were recoded as: Never=0; Occasionally=1; Frequently=2.

Defining the dependent variable:

Z_1*="How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?"* Responses were coded as: Don't know=0**;** Not at all=1; Just a little=2; Somewhat=3; A lot=4.

Z_2*=How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?* Responses were coded as: Don't know=0, All of them=1; Most of them=2; Some of them =3; None=4. Note: In the recoding of this question, not just the 'Don't know' responses were considered but also the codes were inverted to progress the scale from negative to positive as for the other three questions in the questionnaire.

Z_3*=How much of the time do you think the following try their best to listen to what people like you have to say?,* Responses were coded as: Don't know=0; Never=1; Only sometimes=2; Often=3; Always=4.

Z_4=Do you approve or disapprove of the way that the following people have performed their jobs over the past twelve months, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?
Responses were coded as:
Don't know=0; Strongly disapprove=1; Disapprove=2; Approve=3; Strongly approve=4

Subsequently:
LegislativeScore=Z_1+Z_2+Z_3+Z_4
Minimum score=0; Maximum score=16

Appendix 7: Descriptive statistics, Chapter 6

	Obs.	Mean	Std. dev	Min	Max
Education	25305	1.35	0.909	0	3
Cash income deprivation	25262	2.00	1.370	0	4
Food deprivation	25342	2.89	1.255	0	4
Satisfaction with economy	25308	1.61	1.190	0	4
Satisfaction with personal living conditions	24831	1.57	1.255	0	4
Trust in others	24313	1.14	0.405	0	2
Party allegiance	25397	0.84	0.770	0	2
Radio use	25361	3.12	1.303	0	4
TV use	25234	1.75	1.746	0	4
Newspapers use	25077	1.18	1.478	0	4
Generation	25103	1.37	0.818	0	2
Gender	25397	0.50	0.500	0	
Habitat	25397	0.62	0.486	0	1
Satisfaction with democracy	25389	2.97	1.628	0	5
Perception of fairness of elections	25384	2.73	1.348	0	4
Perception of embeddedness of democracy	25393	2.26	1.352	0	4
Frequency of political discussion	25085	0.93	0.727	0	2
LegislativeScore	25381	8.69	3.31	0	16

Appendix 8: Regression model, by country, for the dependent variable *LegislativeScore*

Benin						
Estimates of parameters						
	[Parameter]		estimate	s.e.	t(1134)	t pr.
	Constant	Constant	4.625	0.801		5.77
Factor	Parametization					
Education ((Factor reference level 'no formal schooling)	**Primary schooling**	**-0.809**	**0.239**	**-3.38**	**<.001**	
	Secondary school	-0.489	0.28	-1.75	0.081	
	High education	-0.139	0.525	-0.26	0.791	
Cash Income Deprivation (Factor reference level 'always')	Many times	0.868	0.446	1.95	0.052	
	Several times	0.241	0.331	0.73	0.467	
	Just once or twice	-0.626	0.336	-1.86	0.063	
	Never	**-1.448**	**0.36**	**-4.02**	**<.001**	
Food Deprivation(Factor reference level 'always')	**Many times**	**1.666**	**0.662**	**2.52**	**0.012**	
	Several times	**1.448**	**0.657**	**2.2**	**0.028**	
	Just once or twice	0.9	0.675	1.33	0.183	
	Never	**1.762**	**0.639**	**2.76**	**0.006**	
Satisfaction with economy (Factor reference level 'very bad')	**Fairly bad**	**0.503**	**0.232**	**2.17**	**0.03**	
	Neither good or bad	0.328	0.321	1.02	0.306	
	Fairly good	0.634	0.385	1.65	0.1	
	Very good	**3.069**	**0.741**	**4.14**	**<.001**	
Party allegiance(Factor reference level 'no affiliation')	Opposition party	0.397	0.337	1.18	0.239	
	Ruling party	**0.5**	**0.235**	**2.12**	**0.034**	
Radio use(Factor reference level ' Never')	**Less than once a month**	**-1.225**	**0.54**	**-2.27**	**0.024**	
	A few times a month	0.173	0.483	0.36	0.719	
	A few times a week	-0.357	0.427	-0.84	0.403	
	Every day	0.188	0.395	0.48	0.634	
Satisfaction with democracy(Factor reference level 'don't know')	My country is not a democracy	2.19	1.64	1.33	0.182	
	Not all satisfied	0.385	0.409	0.94	0.346	
	Not very satisfied	**1.05**	**0.328**	**3.2**	**0.001**	
	Fairly satisfied	**2.043**	**0.317**	**6.44**	**<.001**	
	Very satisfied	**3.123**	**0.355**	**8.79**	**<.001**	
Response variate: LegislativeScore R^2=21.2						

Botswana					
	Estimates of parameters				
	Parameter	estimate	s.e.	t(1183)	t pr.
	Constant	8.319	0.328	25.35	<.001
Factor	Parametization				
Satisfaction with economy (Factor reference level 'very bad')	Fairly bad	0.02	0.201	0.1	0.919
	Neither good or bad	0.628	0.238	2.64	0.008
	Fairly good	0.241	0.24	1.01	0.314
	Very good	0.202	0.623	0.32	0.746
Satisfaction with Personal Living Conditions (Factor reference level 'always')	**Fairly bad**	**-0.481**	**0.279**	**-1.73**	**0.084**
	Neither good or bad	-0.284	0.299	-0.95	0.343
	Fairly good	0.053	0.291	0.18	0.855
	Very good	-0.284	0.411	-0.69	0.489
Radio use (Factor reference level ' Never')	**Less than once a month**	**1.058**	**0.493**	**2.15**	**0.032**
	A few times a month	**1.14**	**0.353**	**3.23**	**0.001**
	A few times a week	**0.762**	**0.246**	**3.1**	**0.002**
	Every day	**0.605**	**0.238**	**2.55**	**0.011**
Satisfaction with democracy(Factor reference level 'don't know')	My country is not a democracy	-1.34	1.02	-1.31	0.192
	Not all satisfied	-0.532	0.342	-1.56	0.12
	Not very satisfied	0.477	0.322	1.48	0.139
	Fairly satisfied	**0.996**	**0.301**	**3.31**	**<.001**
	Very satisfied	**1.631**	**0.313**	**5.21**	**<.001**
Response variable: Legislative Score; R^2=8.6					

Cape Verde

	Estimates of parameters				
	Parameter	estimate	s.e.	t(1128)	t pr.
	Constant	0.88	0.756	1.16	0.245
Factor	Parametization				
Education ((Factor reference level 'no formal schooling)	Primary schooling	0.873	0.247	3.54	<.001
	Secondary school	1.618	0.276	5.87	<.001
	High education	1.773	0.421	4.21	<.001
Cash Income Deprivation (Factor reference level 'always')	Many times	-0.22	0.27	-0.82	0.415
	Several times	-0.423	0.243	-1.74	0.082
	Just once or twice	-0.585	0.25	-2.34	0.019
	Never	-0.844	0.301	-2.81	0.005
Satisfaction with Personal Living Conditions (Factor reference level 'always')	Fairly bad	-0.057	0.299	-0.19	0.848
	Neither good or bad	-0.029	0.296	-0.1	0.923
	Fairly good	1.099	0.368	2.99	0.003
	Very good	1.415	0.864	1.64	0.102
Interpersonal Trust(Factorreference level 'don't know')	You must be very careful	1.575	0.641	2.46	0.014
	Most people can be trusted	2.011	0.794	2.53	0.011
Party allegiance(Factor reference level 'no affiliation')	Opposition party	1.622	0.224	7.24	<.001
	Ruling party	0.16	0.203	0.79	0.43
Radio use(Factor reference level ' Never')	Less than once amonth	-0.198	0.478	-0.41	0.678
	A few times a month	-0.184	0.362	-0.51	0.611
	A few times a week	0.353	0.294	1.2	0.23
	Every day	0.773	0.306	2.53	0.012
Gender(Factor reference level 'male')	Female	-0.508	0.174	-2.91	0.004
Satisfaction with democracy(Factor reference level 'don't know')	My countryis not a democracy	0.326	0.424	0.77	0.441
	Not all satisfied	0.495	0.374	1.32	0.187
	Not very satisfied	0.685	0.391	1.75	0.08
	Fairly satisfied	1.105	0.394	2.8	0.005
	Very satisfied	0.326	0.424	0.77	0.441
Perception ofFairness of elections(Factor reference level 'don't know')	Not free and fair	1.18	0.437	2.7	0.007
	Free and fair with major problems	1.133	0.304	3.73	<.001
	Free and fair with minorproblems	0.792	0.27	2.93	0.003
	Completely free and fair	1.244	0.267	4.66	<.001
Perception ofEmbeddedness of Democracy(Factor reference level 'don't know')	Not a democracy	1.987	0.595	3.34	<.001
	a democracy with major problems	1.046	0.351	2.98	0.003
	a democracy with minorproblems	1.326	0.341	3.89	<.001
	A full democracy	1.582	0.387	4.09	<.001
Politics discussion(Factor reference level 'never')	Occasionally	0.565	0.199	2.84	0.005
	Frequently	0.934	0.247	3.78	<.001
R^2=32.7					

Ghana					
	Estimates of parameters				
	Parameter	estimate	s.e.	t(1125)	t pr.
	Constant	6.036	0.447	13.5	<.001
Factor	Parametization				
Cash Income Deprivation (Factor reference level 'always')	Many times	0.073	0.271	0.27	0.788
	Several times	-0.167	0.256	-0.65	0.513
	Just once or twice	-0.556	0.263	-2.11	0.035
	Never	-0.706	0.333	-2.12	0.034
Satisfaction with Personal Living Conditions (Factor reference level 'always')	Fairly bad	0.806	0.217	3.71	<.001
	Neither good or bad	0.831	0.329	2.52	0.012
	Fairly good	1.231	0.243	5.06	<.001
	Very good	1.36	0.526	2.58	0.01
Newspapers use(Factor reference level 'never')	Less than once a month	-0.402	0.318	-1.26	0.207
	A few times a month	0.801	0.324	2.47	0.014
	A few times a week	0.375	0.294	1.28	0.202
	Every day	0.323	0.309	1.04	0.297
	My country is not a democracy	-1.36	1.22	-1.11	0.266
Satisfaction with democracy(Factor reference level 'don't know')	Not all satisfied	1.008	0.728	1.39	0.166
	Not very satisfied	0.685	0.656	1.04	0.297
	Fairly satisfied	1.002	0.618	1.62	0.105
	Very satisfied	1.741	0.633	2.75	0.006
Perception of Fairness of elections(Factor reference level 'don't know')	Not free and fair	2.353	0.473	4.98	<.001
	Free and fair with major problems	1.756	0.487	3.61	<.001
	Free and fair with minor problems	2.367	0.416	5.69	<.001
	Completely free and fair	2.071	0.404	5.13	<.001
Perception of Embeddedness of Democracy(Factor reference level 'don't know')	Not a democracy	-1.577	0.891	-1.77	0.077
	a democracy with major problems	-1.156	0.642	-1.8	0.072
	a democracy with minor problems	-0.118	0.6	-0.2	0.844
	A full democracy	-0.036	0.617	-0.06	0.953

Kenya					
	Estimates of parameters				
	Parameter	estimate	s.e.	t(1223)	t pr.
	Constant	5.389	0.331	16.28	<.001
Factor	Parameticization				
Satisfaction with economy (Factor reference level 'very bad')	Fairly bad	0.521	0.227	2.29	0.022
	Neither good or bad	0.295	0.256	1.15	0.248
	Fairly good	0.694	0.254	2.73	0.006
	Very good	0.863	0.481	1.79	0.073
Satisfaction with Personal Living Conditions (Factor reference level 'always')	Fairly bad	0.512	0.208	2.45	0.014
	Neither good or bad	0.523	0.254	2.06	0.04
	Fairly good	0.686	0.244	2.81	0.005
	Very good	0.669	0.481	1.39	0.165
Party allegiance(Factor reference level 'no affiliation')	Opposition party	0.751	0.168	4.47	<.001
	Ruling party	0.316	0.174	1.82	0.069
Habitat (Factor reference level 'urban')	Rural	0.629	0.149	4.21	<.001
Perception of Fairness of elections(Factor reference level 'don't know')	Not free and fair	-0.031	0.454	-0.07	0.946
	Free and fair with major problems	0.447	0.338	1.32	0.186
	Free and fair with minor problems	1.053	0.295	3.57	<.001
	Completely free and fair	1.395	0.297	4.7	<.001
Politics discussion(Factor reference level 'never')	Occasionally	0.406	0.168	2.42	0.016
	Frequently	0.678	0.199	3.4	<.001
Response variable: Legislative Score; R^2 =12.3					

Lesotho					
	Estimates of parameters				
	Parameter	estimate	s.e.	t(1116)	t pr.
	Constant	5.076	0.372	13.63	<.001
Factor	Parametization				
Satisfaction with Personal living conditions (Factor reference level 'always')	Fairly bad	0.871	0.217	4.02	<.001
	Neither good or bad	0.284	0.287	0.99	0.322
	Fairly good	0.679	0.262	2.59	0.01
	Very good	0.579	0.496	1.17	0.244
Trust in Others (Factor reference level 'you must be careful')	Most people can be trusted	1.078	0.235	4.59	<.001
Party allegiance (Factor reference level 'no affiliation')	Opposition party	1.871	0.225	8.31	<.001
	Ruling party	0.561	0.293	1.91	0.056
Satisfaction with democracy (Factor reference level 'don't know')	My country is not a democracy	0.504	0.01	0.992	0.005
	Not all satisfied	0.055	0.316	0.17	0.862
	Not very satisfied	0.789	0.299	2.64	0.008
	Fairly satisfied	1.001	0.300	3.33	<.001
	Very satisfied	1.756	0.335	5.24	<.001
Perception of Fairness of elections (Factor reference level 'don't know')	Not free and fair	0.156	0.598	0.26	0.795
	Free and fair with major problems	1.278	0.415	3.08	0.002
	Free and fair with minor problems	1.159	0.345	3.36	<.001
	Completely free and fair	1.218	0.3	4.06	<.001
Politics discussion (Factor reference level 'never')	Occasionally	0.525	0.209	2.51	0.012
	Frequently	0.779	0.266	2.93	0.003
Response Variable: Legislative Score; $R^2 = 20$					

Madagascar					
	Estimates of parameters				
	Parameter	estimate	s.e.	t(1328)	t pr.
	Constant	5.520	0.391	14.12	<.001
Factor	Parametization				
Satisfaction with economy (Factor reference level 'very bad')	Fairly bad	0.059	0.337	0.17	0.862
	Neither good or bad	**0.614**	**0.336**	**1.83**	**0.068**
	Fairly good	**0.882**	**0.351**	**2.51**	**0.012**
	Very good	**2.263**	**0.94**	**2.41**	**0.016**
Party allegiance (Factor reference level 'no affiliation')	**Opposition party**	**0.996**	**0.222**	**4.49**	**<.001**
	Ruling party	**0.909**	**0.238**	**3.82**	**<.001**
	My country is not a democracy	**0.847**	**0.493**	**1.72**	**0.086**
Satisfaction with democracy (Factor reference level 'don't know')	**Not all satisfied**	**0.699**	**0.298**	**2.35**	**0.019**
	Not very satisfied	**0.844**	**0.227**	**3.71**	**<.001**
	Fairly satisfied	**1.420**	**0.248**	**5.72**	**<.001**
	Very satisfied	**1.761**	**0.396**	**4.44**	**<.001**
Perception of Fairness of elections (Factor reference level 'don't know')	**Not free and fair**	**1.244**	**0.418**	**2.97**	**0.003**
	Free and fair with major problems	**1.643**	**0.444**	**3.70**	**<.001**
	Free and fair with minor problems	**1.200**	**0.334**	**3.59**	**<.001**
	Completely free and fair	**1.804**	**0.295**	**6.11**	**<.001**
Response variable: Legislative Score; R^2 = 12.6					

Malawi					
	Estimates of parameters				
	Parameter	estimate	s.e.	t(1171)	t pr.
	Constant	5.166	0.573	9.02	<.001
Factor	Parametization				
Party allegiance(Factor reference level 'no affiliation')	**Opposition party**	**1.068**	**0.316**	**3.38**	**<.001**
	Ruling party	**1.015**	**0.225**	**4.52**	**<.001**
Satisfaction with democracy(Factor reference level 'don't know')	My country is not a democracy	-0.28	0.895	-0.31	0.755
	Not all satisfied	**1.528**	**0.534**	**2.86**	**0.004**
	Not very satisfied	**1.269**	**0.542**	**2.34**	**0.019**
	Fairly satisfied	**1.853**	**0.586**	**3.16**	**0.002**
	Very satisfied	**2.071**	**0.568**	**3.64**	**<.001**
Fairness of elections(Factor reference level 'don't know')	Not free and fair	0.554	0.454	1.22	0.223
	Free and fair with major problems	**1.325**	**0.481**	**2.75**	**0.006**
	Free and fair with minor problems	0.646	0.498	1.3	0.195
	Completely free and fair	**1.053**	**0.458**	**2.3**	**0.022**
Politics discussion(Factor reference level 'never')	**Occasionally**	**0.436**	**0.237**	**1.84**	**0.066**
	Frequently	**0.596**	**0.259**	**2.3**	**0.022**
Response variable: Legislative Score; R^2 = 12.6					

Mali					
	Estimates of parameters				
	Parameter	estimate	s.e.	t(1217)	t pr.
	Constant	3.852	0.499	7.72	<.001
Factor	Parametization				
Education((Factor reference level 'no formal schooling)	Primary schooling	0.183	0.221	0.83	0.407
	Secondary school	1.172	0.369	3.18	0.002
	High education	-0.247	0.543	-0.45	0.649
Satisfaction with Personal living Conditions Factor reference level 'always')	Fairly bad	0.492	0.218	2.25	0.024
	Neither good or bad	0.56	0.305	1.83	0.067
	Fairly good	1.138	0.303	3.75	<.001
	Very good	2.518	0.629	4	<.001
Radio use(Factor reference level ' Never')	Less than once a month	1.158	0.565	2.05	0.041
	A few times a month	1.277	0.481	2.66	0.008
	A few times a week	1.323	0.363	3.65	<.001
	Every day	1.145	0.335	3.42	<.001
Fairness of elections(Factor reference level 'don't know')	Not free and fair	1.429	0.42	3.4	<.001
	Free and fair with major problems	1.715	0.403	4.25	<.001
	Free and fair with minor problems	1.982	0.395	5.02	<.001
	Completely free and fair	2.471	0.35	7.05	<.001
Perception of Embeddedness Democracy(Factor reference level 'don't know')	Not a democracy	1.493	0.522	2.86	0.004
	a democracy with major problems	1.649	0.44	3.74	<.001
	a democracy with minor problems	1.76	0.45	3.91	<.001
	A full democracy	2.357	0.438	5.38	<.001
Response variable: Legislative Score; R^2 = 15					

Mozambique					
	Estimates of parameters				
	Parameter	estimate	s.e.	t(1120)	t pr.
	Constant	3.983	0.541	7.36	<.001
Factor	Parametization				
Education((Factor reference level 'no formal schooling)	Primary schooling	0.187	0.239	0.78	0.436
	Secondary school	**0.774**	**0.304**	**2.55**	**0.011**
	High education	-0.077	0.64	-0.12	0.904
Satisfaction with economy (Factor reference level 'very bad')	**Fairly bad**	**0.884**	**0.385**	**2.3**	**0.022**
	Neither good or bad	**1.26**	**0.377**	**3.34**	**<.001**
	Fairly good	**1.13**	**0.382**	**2.96**	**0.003**
	Very good	-0.201	0.672	-0.3	0.765
Party allegiance(Factor reference level 'no affiliation')	**Opposition party**	**1.369**	**0.263**	**5.2**	**<.001**
	Ruling party	0.281	0.413	0.68	0.496
Radio use(Factor reference level ' Never')	Less than once a month	-0.891	0.589	-1.51	0.13
	A few times a month	0.452	0.404	1.12	0.263
	A few times a week	0.108	0.335	0.32	0.746
	Every day	**0.612**	**0.293**	**2.09**	**0.037**
Satisfaction with democracy(Factor reference level 'don't know')	**My country is not a democracy**	**-3.18**	**1.34**	**-2.37**	**0.018**
	Not all satisfied	-0.33	0.51	-0.65	0.518
	Not very satisfied	-0.547	0.437	-1.25	0.211
	Fairly satisfied	0.043	0.408	0.11	0.916
Perception of Fairness of elections(Factor reference level 'don't know')	**Very satisfied**	**0.869**	**0.421**	**2.06**	**0.039**
	Not free and fair	**1.039**	**0.609**	**1.7**	**0.089**
	Free and fair with major problems	**1.761**	**0.492**	**3.58**	**<.001**
	Free and fair with minor problems	**1.373**	**0.422**	**3.26**	**0.001**
	Completely free and fair	**1.475**	**0.38**	**3.89**	**<.001**
Perception of Embeddedness of Democracy(Factor reference level 'don't know')	**Not a democracy**	**2.612**	**0.719**	**3.63**	**<.001**
	a democracy with major problems	**1.876**	**0.439**	**4.28**	**<.001**
	a democracy with minor problems	**1.855**	**0.387**	**4.8**	**<.001**
	A full democracy	**2.542**	**0.391**	**6.5**	**<.001**
Response variable: Legislative Score; R^2 = 21.3					

Namibia					
	Estimates of parameters				
	Parameter	estimate	s.e.	t(1146)	t pr.
	Constant	8.734	0.485	18	<.001
Factor	Parametization				
Cash Income Deprivation (Factor reference level 'always')	Many times	-0.243	0.248	-0.98	0.329
	Several times	-0.605	0.222	-2.73	0.007
	Just once or twice	-1.109	0.255	-4.35	<.001
	Never	-1.286	0.38	-3.38	<.001
Satisfaction with personal living conditions (Factor reference level 'always')	Fairly bad	0.077	0.334	0.23	0.818
	Neither good or bad	0.549	0.326	1.68	0.093
	Fairly good	0.678	0.325	2.08	0.037
	Very good	1.264	0.371	3.41	<.001
Party allegiance(Factor reference level 'no affiliation')	Opposition party	0.635	0.217	2.93	0.003
	Ruling party	0.406	0.264	1.54	0.124
Newspapers use(Factor reference level 'never')	Less than once a month	-0.089	0.285	-0.31	0.754
	A few times a month	-0.601	0.259	-2.32	0.02
	A few times a week	-0.86	0.241	-3.57	<.001
	Every day	-1.733	0.239	-7.24	<.001
Perception of Fairness of elections(Factor reference level 'don't know')	Not free and fair	0.727	0.55	1.32	0.186
	Free and fair with major problems	1.17	0.406	2.88	0.004
	Free and fair with minor problems	1.122	0.385	2.91	0.004
	Completely free and fair	1.7	0.38	4.47	<.001
Perception of embeddedness of Democracy(Factor reference level 'don't know')	Not a democracy	-1.791	0.722	-2.48	0.013
	a democracy with major problems	-0.618	0.324	-1.91	0.057
	a democracy with minor problems	0.652	0.288	2.27	0.023
	A full democracy	0.972	0.289	3.36	<.001
Politics discussion(Factor reference level 'never')	Occasionally	0.545	0.192	2.84	0.005
	Frequently	0.441	0.24	1.84	0.067
Response Variable: Legislative Score; R^2 = 21.7					

Nigeria					
	Estimates of parameters				
	Parameter	estimate	s.e.	t(1134)	t pr.
	Constant	5.972	0.365	16.36	<.001
Factor	Parametization				
No Cash (Factor reference level 'always')	Many times	0.18	0.132	1.36	0.174
	Several times	-0.121	0.13	-0.94	0.349
	Just once or twice	-0.164	0.159	-1.04	0.3
	Never	-0.431	0.193	-2.23	0.026
No food (Factor reference level 'always')	Many times	-0.711	0.275	-2.58	0.01
	Several times	-0.419	0.249	-1.68	0.093
	Just once or twice	-0.318	0.249	-1.28	0.201
	Never	-0.305	0.246	-1.24	0.215
Satisfaction with economy (society)(Factor reference level 'very bad')	Fairly bad	0.491	0.113	4.33	<.001
	Neither good or bad	0.913	0.166	5.49	<.001
	Fairly good	1.222	0.125	9.76	<.001
	Very good	1.124	0.22	5.1	<.001
Party allegiance(Factor reference level 'no affiliation')	Opposition party	0.626	0.104	6.01	<.001
	Ruling party	0.148	0.118	1.25	0.21
Satisfaction with democracy(Factor reference level 'don't know')	My country is not a democracy	0.343	0.428	0.8	0.422
	Not all satisfied	0.309	0.265	1.17	0.244
	Not very satisfied	1.025	0.266	3.85	<.001
	Fairly satisfied	1.639	0.274	5.99	<.001
	Very satisfied	2.516	0.348	7.24	<.001
Response Variable: Legislative Score; R^2 = 18.6					

Senegal					
	Estimates of parameters				
	Parameter	estimate	s.e.	t(1134)	t pr.
	Constant	1.082	0.521	2.08	0.038
Factor	Parametization				
Satisfaction with economy (society)(Factor reference level 'very bad')	Fairly bad	0.986	0.378	2.61	0.009
	Neither good or bad	1.659	0.357	4.64	<.001
	Fairly good	1.921	0.375	5.12	<.001
	Very good	3.055	0.83	3.68	<.001
Party allegiance(Factor reference level 'no affiliation')	Opposition party	1.41	0.222	6.36	<.001
	Ruling party	0.216	0.286	0.75	0.452
Generation(Factor reference level 'pre-independence')	Post-independence	-1.038	0.398	-2.61	0.009
	Multiparty	0.227	0.301	0.75	0.451
Habitat (Factor reference level 'urban')	Rural	0.858	0.209	4.11	<.001
Satisfaction with democracy(Factor reference level 'don't know')	My country is not a democracy	1.687	0.995	1.7	0.09
	Not all satisfied	0.954	0.608	1.57	0.117
	Not very satisfied	0.76	0.595	1.28	0.202
	Fairly satisfied	1.1	0.576	1.91	0.057
	Very satisfied	2.109	0.593	3.55	<.001
Perception of Fairness of elections(Factor reference level 'don't know')	Not free and fair	2.408	0.587	4.1	<.001
	Free and fair with major problems	1.682	0.499	3.37	<.001
	Free and fair with minor problems	2.411	0.389	6.2	<.001
	Completely free and fair	1.92	0.327	5.87	<.001
Perception of embeddedness of Democracy(Factor reference level 'don't know')	Not a democracy	0.018	0.702	0.03	0.98
	a democracy with major problems	0.596	0.569	1.05	0.295
	a democracy with minor problems	1.304	0.563	2.32	0.021
	A full democracy	1.605	0.576	2.79	0.005
Response Variable: Legislative Score; R^2 = 28.5					

South Africa					
	Estimates of parameters				
	Parameter	estimate	s.e.	t(1134)	t pr.
	Constant	3.619	0.343	10.54	<.001
Factor	Parametization				
Satisfaction with economy (society)(Factor reference level 'very bad')	Fairly bad	0.058	0.233	0.25	0.803
	Neither good or bad	-0.026	0.225	-0.12	0.907
	Fairly good	0.691	0.204	3.38	<.001
	Very good	0.773	0.264	2.93	0.003
Party allegiance(Factor reference level 'no affiliation')	Opposition party	1.334	0.143	9.33	<.001
	Ruling party	0.741	0.203	3.66	<.001
TV use(Factor reference level 'never)	Less than once a month	0.115	0.428	0.27	0.788
	A few times a month	-0.595	0.396	-1.5	0.133
	A few times a week	-0.727	0.264	-2.75	0.006
	Every day	-0.146	0.208	-0.7	0.482
Newspapers use(Factor reference level 'never')	Less than once a month	0.474	0.245	1.94	0.053
	A few times a month	0.136	0.225	0.6	0.547
	A few times a week	0.385	0.206	1.87	0.061
	Every day	0.415	0.19	2.19	0.029
Satisfaction with democracy(Factor reference level 'don't know')	My country is not a democracy	1.226	0.844	1.45	0.147
	Not all satisfied	1.051	0.436	2.41	0.016
	Not very satisfied	1.818	0.426	4.27	<.001
	Fairly satisfied	2.573	0.423	6.08	<.001
	Very satisfied	3.305	0.443	7.46	<.001
Perception of embeddedness of Democracy(Factor reference level 'don't know')	Not a democracy	0.066	0.468	0.14	0.888
	a democracy with major problems	0.88	0.377	2.34	0.02
	a democracy with minor problems	1.58	0.378	4.18	<.001
	A full democracy	1.536	0.39	3.94	<.001
Politics discussion(Factor reference level 'never')	Occasionally	0.386	0.145	2.66	0.008
	Frequently	0.81	0.184	4.4	<.001
Response Variable: Legislative Score; R^2 = 27					

Tanzania					
	Estimates of parameters				
	Parameter	estimate	s.e.	t(1223)	t pr.
	Constant	8.106	0.471	17.2	<.001
Factor	Parametization				
Education((Factor reference level 'no formal schooling)	**Primary schooling**	**0.647**	**0.29**	**2.23**	**0.026**
	Secondary school	0.261	0.368	0.71	0.478
	High education	**1.331**	**0.736**	**1.81**	**0.071**
Satisfaction with Personal living Conditions (Factor reference level 'always')	Fairly bad	0.382	0.365	1.05	0.296
	Neither good or bad	0.638	0.37	1.72	0.085
	Fairly good	**1.211**	**0.369**	**3.28**	**0.001**
	Very good	**2.029**	**0.892**	**2.27**	**0.023**
Party allegiance(Factor reference level 'no affiliation')	**Opposition party**	**0.43**	**0.208**	**2.07**	**0.039**
	Ruling party	-0.452	0.381	-1.19	0.235
Perception of Fairness of elections(Factor reference level 'don't know')	Not free and fair	0.86	0.619	1.39	0.166
	Free and fair with major problems	-1.053	0.65	-1.62	0.105
	Free and fair with minor problems	**0.596**	**0.294**	**2.02**	**0.043**
	Completely free and fair	**1.102**	**0.254**	**4.34**	**<.001**
Perception of Embeddedness of Democracy(Factor reference level 'don't know')	Not a democracy	-1.099	0.818	-1.34	0.179
	a democracy with major problems	-0.25	0.624	-0.4	0.689
	a democracy with minor problems	**0.472**	**0.246**	**1.92**	**0.055**
	A full democracy	**0.414**	**0.228**	**1.82**	**0.07**
Response Variable: Legislative Score; R^2 = 6.5					

Uganda					
	Estimates of parameters				
	Parameter	estimate	s.e.	t(2322)	t pr.
	Constant	7.516	0.298	25.19	<.001
Factor	Parametization				
Education((Factor reference level 'no formal schooling)	Primary schooling	0.719	0.192	3.74	<.001
	Secondary school	0.875	0.203	4.3	<.001
	High education	0.625	0.248	2.52	0.012
Satisfaction with Personal living Conditions (Factor reference level 'always')	Fairly bad	0.323	0.171	1.89	0.059
	Neither good or bad	-0.127	0.2	-0.64	0.525
	Fairly good	0.336	0.157	2.14	0.032
	Very good	0.817	0.288	2.83	0.005
Party allegiance(Factor reference level 'no affiliation')	Opposition party	0.462	0.12	3.86	<.001
	Ruling party	0.278	0.16	1.73	0.083
Newspapers use(Factor reference level 'never')	Less than once a month	0.475	0.175	2.71	0.007
	A few times a month	0.326	0.17	1.92	0.055
	A few times a week	0.434	0.165	2.63	0.008
	Every day	0.132	0.214	0.62	0.538
Gender(Factor reference level 'male')	Female	-0.271	0.109	-2.48	0.013
Perception of Fairness of elections(Factor reference level 'don't know')	Not free and fair	0.595	0.265	2.25	0.025
	Free and fair with major problems	0.513	0.243	2.11	0.035
	Free and fair with minor problems	0.779	0.229	3.4	<.001
	Completely free and fair	0.789	0.229	3.44	<.001
Politics discussion(Factor reference level 'never')	Occasionally	0.221	0.147	1.5	0.135
	Frequently	0.337	0.168	2	0.046
Response Variable: Legislative Score; R^2 = 5.1					

Zambia					
	Estimates of parameters				
	Parameter	estimate	s.e.	t(1151)	t pr.
	Constant	6.525	0.217	30	<.001
Factor	Parametization				
Satisfaction with Personal Living Conditions (Factor reference level 'always')	Fairly bad	0.312	0.16	1.95	0.051
	Neither good or bad	0.379	0.216	1.75	0.08
	Fairly good	0.469	0.193	2.43	0.015
	Very good	1.058	0.481	2.2	0.028
Party allegiance (Factor reference level 'no affiliation')	Opposition party	1.186	0.188	6.32	<.001
	Ruling party	0.482	0.156	3.09	0.002
Satisfaction with democracy (Factor reference level 'don't know')	My country is not a democracy	0.749	0.701	1.07	0.286
	Not all satisfied	0.468	0.426	1.1	0.273
	Not very satisfied	0.712	0.405	1.76	0.079
	Fairly satisfied	1.296	0.425	3.05	0.002
	Very satisfied	1.416	0.511	2.77	0.006
Perception of Fairness of elections (Factor reference level 'don't know')	Not free and fair	0.04	0.224	0.18	0.857
	Free and fair with major problems	0.374	0.242	1.54	0.123
	Free and fair with minor problems	0.728	0.244	2.99	0.003
	Completely free and fair	0.97	0.305	3.18	0.002
Perception of Embeddedness of Democracy (Factor reference level 'don't know')	Not a democracy	-1.258	0.516	-2.44	0.015
	a democracy with major problems	-0.305	0.405	-0.75	0.452
	a democracy with minor problems	-0.266	0.418	-0.64	0.525
	A full democracy	-0.307	0.454	-0.68	0.498
Politics discussion (Factor reference level 'never')	Occasionally	0.413	0.159	2.59	0.01
	Frequently	0.607	0.222	2.73	0.006
Response Variable: Legislative Score; R^2 = 16.2					

Zimbabwe					
	Estimates of parameters				
	Parameter	estimate	s.e.	t(1022)	t pr.
	Constant	7.028	0.446	15.76	<.001
Factor	Parametization				
Cash Income Deprivation (Factor reference level 'always')	Many times	0.459	0.362	1.27	0.205
	Several times	0.478	0.359	1.33	0.183
	Just once or twice	**0.826**	**0.342**	**2.41**	**0.016**
	Never	-0.535	0.345	-1.55	0.121
Satisfaction with economy(Factor reference level 'very bad')	**Fairly bad**	**0.654**	**0.191**	**3.43**	**<.001**
	Neither good or bad	0.403	0.347	1.16	0.245
	Fairly good	0.249	0.344	0.72	0.469
	Very good	-0.315	0.674	-0.47	0.641
Party allegiance(Factor reference level 'no affiliation')	**Opposition party**	**1.592**	**0.225**	**7.07**	**<.001**
	Ruling party	0.217	0.175	1.24	0.215
Satisfaction with democracy(Factor reference level 'don't know')	My country is not a democracy	0.355	0.486	0.73	0.466
	Not all satisfied	0.172	0.429	0.4	0.688
	Not very satisfied	0.443	0.429	1.03	0.303
	Fairly satisfied	**0.989**	**0.468**	**2.12**	**0.035**
	Very satisfied	0.921	0.824	1.12	0.264
Perception of Fairness of elections(Factor reference level 'don't know')	Not free and fair	0.406	0.333	1.22	0.223
	Free and fair with major problems	**0.698**	**0.347**	**2.01**	**0.045**
	Free and fair with minor problems	**1.054**	**0.353**	**2.99**	**0.003**
	Completely free and fair	**1.909**	**0.349**	**5.47**	**<.001**
	Not a democracy	**-1.001**	**0.423**	**-2.37**	**0.018**
Perception of Embeddedness of Democracy(Factor reference level 'don't know')	a democracy with major problems	-0.534	0.425	-1.26	0.209
	a democracy with minor problems	**-0.817**	**0.46**	**-1.78**	**0.076**
	A full democracy	**-1.429**	**0.738**	**-1.94**	**0.053**
Response Variable: Legislative Score; R^2 = 23.5					

Appendix 9: Highlights on the 18 parliaments

Benin

The National Assembly originated with the national conference that took place on February 19, 1990. It included representatives of the ruling People's Revolutionary Party, trade unionists, civil servants, students, religious leaders, and representatives of the military. This first national conference overthrew the authoritarian regime, hence being named the first civil *coup d'état* in Africa.

As result of it allowing the registration of opposition parties, the legislative general elections took place in 1991. The elections of 2005 were contested by 5580 candidates from 31 parties. The Assembly was enlarged to 83 seats (19 more than the previous Assembly had. The opposition won with an absolute majority of 51 seats. The third multiparty legislative election took place in 1999; the composition of the Assembly resulted in a majority of seats being distributed to parties opposed to President Mathieu Kérékou. In the elections of 2003, the parties in favour of the president recovered the majority of the parliamentary seats, with 52 of the 83.

Sources: Robinson, 1994; IPU PARLINE database: Benin, General information, 2009; Englebert & Murison, 2007.

Botswana

1965-2008 – The National Assembly has numberous continuous multiparty elections. The National Assembly has been always dominated by the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP). However, the main opposition party, Botswana People's Party, has been consistently present in parliament.

2002 – The National Assembly changes the number of seats from 40 to 57, to be in place in 2004.

2006 – Civic organisations publicly express the concern that parliament will not oversee the execution by the government of the Security Bill, which has been discussed in parliament. The Botswana Council of Nongovernmental Organisations is opposed to the legislation.

Sources: Saunders & Brown, 2007a; Botswana Democratic Party, 2008.

Cape Verde

1991, 1995, 2001, and 2006 – Multiparty legislative elections occur four times. In 1991, the new opposition party MpD beats the ruling party PAICV. In 2001 the National Assembly is again taken over by a PAICV majority.

Sources: Grepne & George, 2007; Assembleia Nacional de Cabo Verde, 2008.

Ghana

1991, May – A 260-member consultative assembly is constituted to draft a multiparty constitution. The constitution is passed by referendum.

1992 – Dissatisfied with the process of the presidential elections, the opposition boycotts

parliamentary elections. Because of this, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) wins most of the seats (189 of 200). This NDC majority iss retained in the election of 1996, even though all parties participate in the election. In the elections of 2000 there iss a turnover in the Assembly, with the New Patriotic Party (NPP) becoming the majority party, which iss repeated in the election of 2004.

1997 – The NPP boycotts sessions of parliament, demanding that parliament invests the authority to undertake procedures, which previously have been the exclusive function of the president, with the ministers. The Supreme Court rules that all presidential nominees for ministerial positions have to be approved by parliament. This measure is applied retroactively to the ministers already in place. This rule is to become one of the strongest powers of the Ghanaian parliament.

Sources: Synge & McCaskie; 2007a; *History of the Parliament of Ghana*, 2008.

Kenya

1995 – 11 opposition MPs cross the floor to the ruling party, KANU

1999 – The constitution iss revised by an independent commission, but President MOI decides that this should be done by the National Assembly. In 1999 the National Assembly creates a committee to revise the constitution. The MP Odinga is chosen to head the parliamentary committee charged with constitutional reform. The opposition boycotts the first meeting of this commission.

2000 – The parliamentary commission headed by Odinga presents its proposal to the Assembly.

2001 – The National Assembly refuses to create an anti-corruption authority; as a result, the IMF confirms its suspension of aid to Kenya due to the epidemic corruption. The next day President Moi establishes a special police force to conclude the 132 cases of corruption that a previous anti-corruption commission has initiated.

2002, Dec – Legislative elections. The opposition party, National Rainbow Coalition, lead by Kibaki, ends four decades of KANU (Kenya African National Union) rule. The opposition secures a victory of 125 seats out of the 210 seats.

2003, Apr – Constitutional review conference starts. The government proposes that the executive power should remain with the president, but the 629 delegates to the conference, including 3 ministers, vote to reduce presidential powers. Also, the conference defends assigning additional powers to the National Assembly. The government withdraws from the conference. No constitution is approved.

2003, May – The National Assembly passes legislation obliging all civil servants to declare and account for their income and assets.

2005, Apr – The National Assembly reacts to the abuse of land ownership in the country and votes for a limit on land ownership by citizens.

2005, Aug – The new constitution is approved by the Assembly, with the acceptance of the executive. However, The new constitution is rejected in a referendum.

2007 – Legislative elections end in violence.

Source: Chronology – Kenya in crisis after disputed elections, 2008; Rake & Jennings, 2007a.

Lesotho

1993, Mar 27 – First multiparty election after a military regime. Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) wins all seats. Basutoland National Party (BNP) denounces irregularities and rejects its two seats in the Senate. The king dissolves the Assembly and dismisses the government.
1998 – Legislative election. Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) secures 78 of the 80 seats. BNP secures one seat. Several petitions denouncing irregularities are presented in the High Court. Continual popular unrest; prime minister asks for support from South African government, which sends a military contingent. The SA army faces a discontented population and loses 68 soldiers.
1999, October – An appointed tribunal resolves the conflict, proposing a combination of constituency and proportional systems.
2000, Feb – The National Assembly rejects the electoral system proposal by the tribunal. Opposition parties demand the dissolution of the National Assembly.
2002, May – Legislative elections take place under a mixed electoral system. BNP leader claimes that the results were manipulated.
2005, Apr – Legislative elections. LCD wins again, securing three quarters of the seats. Voter participation is less than 30%.
2007, Feb – Legislative elections. LCD secures 61 seats of a total of 80 seats. The elections are surrounded by controversy.
Source: Saunders & Brown, 2007b; Silva, 2001.

Madagascar

1989 – The monoparty National Assembly changes the constitution to allow multiparty participation.
1991, May – Members of the FV forcibly enter the chamber of the National People's Assembly to submit their proposals for constitutional amendments (including a limit on presidential terms).
1992, Feb – The interim government suspends the National People's assembly.
1993 – Legislative elections. The party winning the most seats is Cartel HVR, with 45 of the 138 seats. The National Assembly comprises 25 political parties.
August 1993 – The National Assembly endorses the new ministers with 72% of the votes.
1994, Jul – 31 deputies propose a motion of censure, which does not succeed.
1995, Jun – some MPs cross the floor to support the new party, led by the prime minister, Ravony. President Zafy announces that he cannot collaborate with Prime Minister Ravony and calls a referendum to amend the constitution to allow the president, instead of the National Assembly, to appoint the prime minister. The president wins the referendum; the National Assembly looses its power to appoint the prime minister.
1996, Jul 26 – The National Assembly votes, by 99 votes to 34, to impeach President Zafy, forcing him to resign.
1998, Mar 15 – New referendum for constitutional amendments is held. The changes give even more powers to the president, to the detriment of the judiciary and the Assembly.

1998, May – Legislative elections.
2007, Mar 4 – A referendum approves constitutional changes granting more powers to the president, including full powers of emergency and the power to terminate Senate mandates.
2007, May-July – Several incidents of popular unrest; as result, the president dissolves the National Assembly.
2007, Nov – Legislative elections. The party of President Ravalomanana 'I Love Madagascar' secures a large majority, with 105 of the 127 elected seats.
Source: Brown, 2008; EISA, 2008a; Political and social unrest hits Madagascar, 2008.

Malawi

1993, Jun 14 – Referendum supports the reintroduction of multiparty politics.
17 May 1994 – Legislative Elections. UDF wins 84 of the 177 seats, MCP 55 seats, AFORD 36 seats.
1996, May – Opposition parties boycott parliament and appealed to the high court to declare previous session illegal and unconstitutional.
1997 – Opposition ends the boycott, based on the promise by president Muluzi to change the constitution in order to prevent MPs from crossing the floor from one party to another.
1999 – Legislative elections.
2004, May – Legislative elections.
2005, Oct – The National Assembly votes in favor of beginning proceedings to impeach President Mutharika. High Court expresses concerns with the legitimacy of the process. Impeachment process withdrawn.
2006 – President Mutharika opponents requested a court ruling on whether the speaker of parliament should declare a seat vacant when an MP crosses the floor.
2008, Feb – President Mutharika stops parliamentarians from meeting until they agree not to expel 70 members of his Democratic Progressive Party, which is largely made up of defectors from the opposition. The United Democratic Front and another opposition party want to expel most of the government's MPs based on an interpretation of a constitutional provision which prevents deputies leaving one party to join another. Had the opposition succeeded, they would have had enough support to pass a vote of no-confidence in wa Mutharika's government, and an impeachment motion against the president, who quit the United Democratic Front to form his own party after the 2004 election.
Sources: EISA, 2008b; Saunders & Brown;2007c; Malawi runs without parliament, 2008.

Mali

1991 – National conference for a new constitution with 1800 delegates. Constitution approved by referendum in 1992.
1992, Feb and March – Legislative elections. 21 parties contest the elections. Alliance pour la démocratie au MALI (ADEMA**),**) secures 76 seats of the 129 seats.
1997, Jan – the National Assembly approves a new electoral law and increases the number of seats from 129 to 147
1997, Apr – ADEMA wins the majority of parliamentary seats. There were 1500

candidates. ADEMA will have internal divisions. Political tension, with five opposition leaders arrested until the week before the legislative elections.
1997, July – ADEMA secures 130 seats.
2000 – The national assembly approves state funding for political parties. New electoral system will incorporate a proportional system: Of the 150 seats, 40 will be by proportional system.
2001, Feb – Twenty-one ADEMA MPs form a new political party.
2002 – 37 ADEMA MPs break away from the party in 2001 to form Rassemblement pour le Mali (RPM).
2003, Jun – Seventeen MPs leave ADEMA to form the Union pour la Republique et la democratie (URD).
Sources: ADEMA-PASJ, 2008; Englebert & Murison, 2007; Gouahinga, 2007.

Mozambique

1990, Nov and Dec – New constitution approved by the monoparty assembly – Assembleia Popular. Also approves the constitutions of political parties.
1994 – Legislative elections. 3 parties secure seats in the assembly. FRELIMO rules.
1999 – Legislative elections. Only FRELIMO and RENAMO secure parliamentary seats.
2004 – Legislative elections. Observers unanimous in the existence of electoral irregularities in favour of FRELIMO, but all the observers stress that the irregularities were not sufficient to change the FRELIMO victory, but all noted that they were sufficient to take parliamentary seats away from RENAMO. However, observers also note irregularities and fraud perpetrated by RENAMO.
2005 – The Assembly establishes an ad hoc commission to revise the four electoral laws (CNE, registration, national elections, and local elections) and draft a new law for provincial elections. But the commission gets paralysed due to the structure of the membership of the CNE (electoral commission). RENAMO refuses to allow it to do anything until this question is resolved. In May, the FRELIMO majority in parliament decides to abolish the ad hoc commission and remit the issues to the AR Commission on Agriculture, Regional Development, Public Administration and Local Power, chaired by Alfredo Gamito. FRELIMO in this way avoids the need for RENAMO votes, since the standing committees do not require unanimity.
2006 – New electoral law approved by the Assembleia Nacional, ending the 5% threshold necessary for parties to be elected to parliament.
Source: Vitória retumbante manchada por má conduta,2005; Interview by the author with Gamito, A., 21 March 2008, Maputo.

Namibia

1990, Feb – A constituent assembly designs a draft constitution and the independence of the country. Independence is granted on 21 March.
1994, Dec 7-8 – First multiparty legislative elections. SWAPO secures 53 seats, the opposition only 15 seats.
2003, Nov – The parliamentary opposition becomes even more fragmented due to the

Herero-based National Unity Democratic organisation (NUDO) withdrawing from the DTA and registering as an independent party.
2004, Nov – Legislative elections. SWAPO has a large a majority once more. The High Court rules the results of the November 2004 National Assembly elections invalid and orderes a recount of the ballots.
Source: Saunders, 2007; IFES Election Guide - Country Profile: Namibia – Elections, 2008.

Nigeria

1999 – The speaker of Nigeria's House of Representatives resigns after pleading guilty to lying about his age in election papers.
2003 – Legislative elections are the first run by civilians since the transition from military rule four years earlier.
2006 – The house of representatives and the Senate refuse to approve constitutional amendments to allow a third term for President Obasanjo.
2007, Sep-Oct – Popular protests demand the resignation of the speaker of the National Assembly. In one of the protests, the police prevent several hundred protesters from marching beyond the gates of the National Assembly complex.
2007, Oct – The Speaker of the Nigerian House of Representatives, Patricia Etteh, and her deputy resign over a corruption scandal. Their resignation comes before the house can vote on a motion to impeach the two.
Sources: Lewis, 2003; Synge & McCaskie, 2007b; "Nigeria humanitarian country: Profile", 2007; "Nigeria's disgraced speaker fined $20", 2008; "Nigerian speaker quit over corruption row", 2008.

Senegal

1978, 1983, 1988, and 1998 – Elections. Socialist Party dominates the National Assembly until April 2001, when President Wade's coalition (Senegalese Democratic Party - PDS) wins a majority (89 of 120 seats).
1991, Mar – The National Assembly makes constitutional changes, especially restoring the post of prime minister.
1993, May – PS wins 84 of 100 seats.
1996, Jan – President Diouf declares that a Sénat needs to be constituted.
1998, Mar – The National Assembly increases the number of MPs from 120 to 140
1998, Aug – The National Assembly removes the constitutional clause that limits the number of presidential terms to two; also eliminates the requirement that a president needs to be elected with at least 25% of the votes of all registered voters. The opposition parties claim that the changes are a 'constitutional coup d'état'
1999 – The party PS "lends" MPs to URF to allow this party to continue to have a parliamentary group.
2001, Jan – Referendum abolishes the Sénat.
2004, Dec – National Assembly abolishes the death penalty.
2005, Jan – The National Assembly votes for an amnesty for politically motivated crimes committed from 1984 to 2004.

2007, Jan – The National Assembly approves the restoration of a Sénat.
2007, Jun 3 – Legislative elections. Most of the major opposition parties boycott the elections, allowing the ruling Senegalese Democratic party (PDS) and its allies to capture 131 of the 150 seats.
Source: Englebert & Murison, 2007; "Senegal: Wade's historic turnaround", 2008.

South Africa

1990, Feb 2 – Addressing the three Houses of parliament, President de Klerk announces the release of Nelson Mandela and lifts the ban on the ANC, PAC and 33 other political organisations.
1994, May 9 – The first multiparty nonracial National Assembly elects Nelson Mandela president of the country. ANC secures majority in all legislative elections from 1994 to 2004.
Source: Saunders & Omer-Cooper, 2007; Parliament of South Africa, 2008.

Tanzania

1992, May – The monoparty Assembly approves a new constitution for a multiparty democracy.
1995, Oct – Multiparty legislative elections held for the National Assembly and for the Zanzibari House of Representatives. CCM wins 186 of the 232 elected seats.
2000, Oct 29 – Legislative elections for National Assembly. Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) secures 244 seats; the opposition only 21 seats.
2000 – While elections in mainland Tanzania are peaceful, voting in Zanzibar is, according Commonwealth observers, problematic. Fighting between members of the Civic United Front (CUF) opposition party and police. Media reports at least 37 people killed.
2005, Oct 30 – The election of the Zanzibari House of Representatives. Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) wins the majority of the seats, 30 of the elected seats.
2005, Dec – Legislative elections for National Assembly. Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) guaranteed 266 seats.
Source: (EISA, 2008d); ("Concern at Zanzibar elections mounts", 2008); (Zanzibar Election Pictures,2000); (Msekwa, 2008)

Uganda

1995, Jun – Constituent assembly rejectes the immediate restoration of multiparty democracy. Candidates are required to seek election without official reference to political affiliation.
2004, Feb – Seven main opposition parties form a coalition to negotiate a transition to multiparty democracy with the government.
2005, Jun – Parliament passes legislation restoring multiparty democracy. This is ratified in a national referendum.
2006, Feb – multiparty legislative elections, the president's party National Resistence Movement (NRMO) secures 202 seats. The opposition contests the results, accusing the

ruling party of fraud.

Source: (Rake & Jennings, 2007b); (About NRMO, 2008); (Parliament of Uganda, 2008)

Zambia

1990, Dec – Monoparty National Assembly approves constitutional amendments to allow a multiparty system.

1991, Aug – Monoparty National assembly approves a new constitution.

1991, Oct 31 – Legislative elections. Six parties and 330 candidates contest the elections. Ruling party of the monoparty Assembly defeated. Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD) wins 125 of the 250 seats.

1993, Mar – National Assembly approves a state of emergency due to violence and political conspiracies.

1996 – Legislative elections are boycotted by the main opposition party and five other allied parties due to the new constitution adopted prior to the election that bars the president and vice-president of the opposition United National Independence Party (UNIP) from standing for the presidency. MMD secures 131 of the 150 seats.

2001 – Fifty MMD deputies (from the president's party) sign a petition against a third presidential term.

2001, May 3 – Sixty-five deputies sign a motion to impeach president Chiluba for alleged violations of the constitution. The Speaker of the National Assembly, Amusaa Mwamawabwa, does not allow the motion to be debated.

2001, Dec 27 – Legislative elections. MMD secures only 69 of the 150 seats.

2003, Aug – National Assembly vote to impeach President Mwanawasa, but the impeachment is defeated even after several MPs from the president's party vote in favour of the impeachment.

2005 – Opposition parties and civic organisations creat a forum, Oasis Forum, demanding a new constitution to be enacted by a constituent assembly and not by the National Assembly, since it does not have the forum's trust.

2006, Oct 28 – Legislative elections. MMD secures 75 seats.

Sources: Mthembu-Salter, 2007; EISA, 2008c.

Zimbabwe

1985 – First general election since independence, with '20 white seats guaranteed' and '80 common roll seats'.

1987, Sep – The seats reserved for whites are abolished.

1987, Oct – The National Assembly approves constitutional amendments to replace the ceremonial executive with an executive presidency, including a prime minister.

1989, Nov – National Assembly abolishes the Senate. The Assembly subsequently extended from 100 to 150 seats (120 elected, 8 provincial leaders, 10 chiefs, 12 appointed by the president) to be effective with the next election.

1998, Oct – Government discusses a new constitution with the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA).

1998, Nov – NCA suspended, the result of 50 protesters urging democratisation being prevented by the police from marching.
1999, Mar – President Mugabe appoints a commission of inquiry, dominated by ZANU-PF, to propose a new constitution; the NCA refuses to participate.
2000 – New constitution defeated in a referendum, followed by legislative elections (from the elected seats, Zanu obtains 62 seats and the MDC, 57 seats).
2005 – Legislative elections. (MDC loses 16 seats).
2005 – John Nkomo elected speaker (elected as independent, he is seen as a conciliatory figure).
2008 – National Assembly votes for an increase in the number of deputies, from 150 to 210 (more rural constituency seats, and all seats are elected).
2008, Mar 29 – Legislative Elections. For the first time, opposition has the majority of seats – MDC 99 seats, ZANU-PF 97 seats
2008, Aug – Member of the opposition, Lovemore Moyo, elected as Speaker.

Sources: EISA, 2008e; "Zimbabwe opposition wins speaker vote,"2008; Brown, 2008.